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ABSTRACT 
Company law in Pakistan does not recognise shareholders’ right of derivative action. 
This situation raises the question as to what extent derivative action, if recognised 
under the company law in Pakistan, can promote good corporate governance and 
contribute to reinforce enforcement powers of shareholders as to safeguarding their 
rights? The purpose of this thesis is twofold. First, this thesis argues that an effective 
derivative action system could act as a means of disciplining corporate management in 
Pakistan. Second, it presents it argumentations that other legal and extra-legal 
managerial disciplinary mechanisms have limitations of their own that support the 
introduction of a statutory derivative action system in Pakistan. 
The methodologies used in this thesis are doctrinal, historical, case study, comparative 
and semi-structured interviews. Doctrinal analysis has been employed when analysing 
statutes and case law. Case study methodology has been used to exemplify problems of 
directorial misconduct and providing empirical evidence for carrying out further 
analysis. A comparative approach has been utilized for which the UK has been chosen 
for comparative purposes to identify lessons that Pakistan can learn from the UK 
derivative action system while finding ways for effective use of derivative action 
system in Pakistan. Semi-structured interviews are aimed at providing an evaluation of 
the reform proposals. 
This study contributes to the subject of derivative action in three key ways. First, it 
provides an in-depth examination of the regulatory framework pertaining to shareholder 
protection in Pakistan in order to highlight the inherent challenges presented by un-
updated legal framework. Second, based on the findings from this thesis, reform 
proposals are made as to codifying derivative actions, clarifying the procedural route 
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for derivative proceedings and providing a funding mechanism to attract shareholders 
to bring derivative actions to enforce corporate rights. Third, suggestions proposed in 
this thesis are supported by both the opinions of the interviewees and original research 
on judicial experience of other jurisdictions, particularly the UK. The findings made in 
this study and proposals have implications for law reforms and are expected to inform 
practitioners, academics, legislators and policy makers on the way forward in reforming 
shareholder protection in Pakistan. Thus, this thesis would inform reforms in the 
company law in order to strengthen the enforcement power of shareholders and ensure 
corporate accountability in Pakistan. 
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KEY TERMS  
The Ordinance:  the Companies Ordinance 1984  
The Code:  the Code of Corporate Governance of Pakistan. 
The SECP Act:  the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan Act 1997. 
Pyramiding: In pyramid ownership arrangements, a family based company may 
control a publicly traded company A, and then the company A controls another publicly 
traded company B and then the company B controls yet another company C and in 
doing so, the company at the top of the pyramid controls the company that is at the 
lowest tier of the pyramid often with very low shareholding. 
Cross share-holding: Cross share-holding structures help shareholders maintain 
control over different firms by occupying shares therein. For example, if majority 
shareholders, due to their majority shareholdings, have the control of a company A and 
if  company A occupies majority shares of company B, this phenomenon helps the 
majority shareholders of company A to control company B alongside though they are 
not occupying majority shares in the company B.  
Derivative action: a legal action initiated by a shareholder in the name of a company 
defrauded by its directors or managers, is called a ‘Derivative Action’.  
Direct action: a legal action initiated by a shareholder in his own name for the 
enforcement of the violation of his personal right is called, a ‘Direct Action’.  
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The following table explains the difference between direct actions and derivative 
actions.  
Shareholder Litigation Direct  Action  Derivative Action  
Who brings action?   The individual shareholder 
whose private rights are 
infringed by the 
management can take a 
direct action against the 
management. 
Any shareholder of the 
company can take a 
derivative action against 
management alleged to have 
violated the rights of the 
company. 
Who pays the legal costs 
?  
The individual aggrieved 
shareholder himself pays the 
legal costs.  
The company pays the costs.  
Who is entitled to 
compensation?  
The aggrieved shareholder 
receives the compensation 
as a result of the successful 
direct action. 
The concerned company 
receives the compensation 
as a result of the successful 
derivative action and it is to 
be shared by all shareholders 
in proportion to their shares 
in the company. 
 
Difference between Public Enforcement and Private sector Enforcement:  
The public enforcement is related to government initiated proceeding while private 
sector enforcement is related to shareholders’ actions for the enforcement of their 
rights. 
Difference between Common Law and codified law:  
Common law is judge-made law (judicial precedents) while a law passed by the 
legislature of a country is called, a statutory law. 
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RESEARCH BACKGROUND  
An effective corporate governance framework ensures smooth functioning of a 
company, promises shareholder protection and guarantees that the directors perform 
their duties in accordance with the companies’ interests.1The framework ensures that 
financial reports and information are consistent, and that all shareholders are treated 
impartially and equitably. Attempts have been made to improve corporate governance 
within companies in different countries by promulgating corporate governance codes of 
best practices and improving their legal framework to ensure shareholder protection. 
Reliable remedial measures have been devised, such as derivative actions, which the 
shareholders can resort to when things happen to go wrong and thus, to have the 
wrongdoers held accountable.
2
 
A central feature of derivative litigation is to provide shareholders, particularly 
minority shareholders with an armoury to safeguard their interests.
3
 Minority protection 
is an important corporate governance objective. It wields greater significance especially 
in the context of Pakistan where equities are held in blocks of shares enabling the 
                                                 
1
 Stijn Claessensa and Joseph P.H. Fanb, ‘Corporate Governance in Asia: A Survey’ (2002)3(2) 
International Review of finance 71-103,72  
2
 Harald Baum and Dan W. Puchniak, ‘The Derivative action: an economic, historical and practice-
oriented approach in Dan W. Puchniak, Herald Baum and Michael Ewing-Chow (eds), The Derivative 
action in Asia :a comparative and Functional Approach ( Cambridge University Press 2012) 1;  Coffee 
and Schwartz, ‘The Survival of the Derivative Suit : An Evaluation and a Proposal for Legislative 
Reform’ (1981) 81 Columbia Law Review 261, 302–309; William Kaplan and Bruce Elwood, ‘The 
Derivative Action: A Shareholder’s “Bleak House?”’(2003) University of British Columbia Law Review 
443, 451, 455  
3
  James D. Cox, Randall S. Thomas, ‘ Common Challenges facing shareholder suits in Europe and the 
United States’ (2009) 6(2)European Company and Financial Law Review 348-57; Robert Clark, 
Corporate Law (Little, Brown US (01 July 1986) 622 
  xx 
 
block-holders to control and manage not only family firms but also other related 
companies through the use of stock pyramids and cross-ownership structures.
4
 
Based on the recommendations of agency, legal and communitarian theories, law is 
needed to protect minority interests against majority abuses in block-holding ownership 
structures and to avoid conflict of interest problem between the owners and the 
managers in instances where the ownership structures are diffused.
5
 In Pakistan, the 
primary agency problem does not lie between owners and the managers as viewed in 
different studies; rather conflict of interests between major and minor shareholders is of 
a prime concern.
6
 This form of conflict of interest is further deepened by inadequate 
minority protection and weak corporate governance mechanisms
7
. 
The majority shareholders, by virtue of their dominant role and voting power, may 
misuse their authority by taking major corporate decisions such as investments the 
companies make, appointments and removal of directors, directors’ excessive pay and 
perks, related party transactions and exploitation of business prospects for their private 
benefits.
8
These controlling shareholders treat the companies as a mere projection of 
                                                 
4
 Farooq Sobhan and Wendy Werner (eds), A Comparative Analysis of Corporate Governance in South 
Asia: Charting a Roadmap for Bangladesh 2003’ p 117 < bei-bd.org/wp 
content/uploads/2015/03/whc4f4bb192762221.pdf> accessed 02 January 2016 ; Atif Ikram, Syed Ali 
Asjad Naqvi, Family Business Groups and Tunneling Framework: Application and Evidence from 
Pakistan’ Centre for Management and Economic Research Working Paper No.5-41, 2005 p 1 
<saber.eaber.org/sites/default/files/documents/LUMS_Ikram_2005.pdf> accessed 12 January 2016. 
5
 Michael C. Jensen and William H. Meckling,"Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behaviour: Agency 
Costs and Ownership Structure" (1976) 3 (4)Journal of Financial Economics 305,308; Million David, 
New Direction in Corporate Law; Communitarians, Contractarians and the Crisis in Corporate 
law’(1993) 50(4) Washington and Lee Law Review 1373-1393; Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-
Silanes and Andrei Shleifer, ‘Legal Determinants of External Finance’ (1997)52(3) The Journal of 
Finance 1131-1150,1149 
6
 Fahad Abdullah, Attaullah Shah, Safi Ullah Khan, ‘Firm Performance and the Nature of Agency 
Problems in Insiders-Controlled Firms: Evidence from Pakistan’(2012) 51(4)The Pakistan Development 
Review 161-183, 167  
7
  Ibid (n4), 178   
8
  Ibid (n4), 176-180   
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their interests and may influence the internal management and exploit the financial 
resources of the company to suit their individual advantages.
9
  
For instance, they can dictate the policies of the company and the way it is managed 
and controlled, decline to pay dividends, approve abusive-related party transactions and 
pressurise minority shareholders to sell their shares below the market value. Since 
minority shareholders lack sufficient resources to counterbalance the manoeuvres of 
majority shareholders; they are incapable of countering these unscrupulous practices.
10
 
An effective legal framework ensures that all shareholders are treated fairly and 
equitably, irrespective of their shareholding. Shareholders must be assured that in case 
of a grievance, they are entitled to resort to court and seek an appropriate remedy, or 
that they may have the choice to sell their shares at fair market value if they wish to 
leave the company. Thus, systems must be in place for shareholders to enforce their 
legal rights and prevent expropriation of corporate assets by the majorities; failing 
which, minority shareholders will continue to be helpless victims of managerial or 
directorial wrongdoings.
11
 
Derivative litigation provides minority shareholders with a safety valve that protects 
them against managerial/directorial wrongdoings.
12
 Abuse of minority interests by 
majority shareholders is a common phenomenon in Pakistan and unfortunately the 
protection that exists is too weak to afford adequate redressal to minority 
                                                 
9
 Khurram Raja, ‘Corporate governance and minority shareholders' rights and interests in Pakistan: a case 
for reform’ (2012) 23(10)International Company and Commercial Law Review 347-362, 347  
10
 Ibid 347. 
11
 Anthony Boyle and John Birds, Boyle & Birds Company Law (6th edn, Jordans 2007) 381  
12
 Chrispas Nyombi, Alexender Kibandama, Principles of Company Law in Uganda (Law Africa 
Publishing (k) Ltd,2014)117 
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shareholders.
13
 Derivative actions are inaccessible to shareholders in Pakistan. This is 
because the company law of Pakistan does not provide for derivative action system. 
Pakistan is a unique jurisdiction amongst the common law countries that does not have 
a statutory derivative action system. 
On the other hand, the subject of derivative proceedings received world-wide 
acceptance being an effective enforcement mechanism as to safeguarding corporate 
rights. For example, the United Kingdom,
14
 the US,
15
 New Zealand
16
 and Australia
17
 
have codified derivative action systems. Many developing countries like Hong Kong
18
, 
Japan
19
, Taiwan
20
, South Korea
21
, Singapore
22
 and China
23
 have also introduced 
derivative actions system in their company laws which provides for robust weaponry 
for minority shareholders to safeguard their interests. The recognition of statutory 
framework for derivative actions in both developed and developing countries vividly 
highlights the important role that derivative litigation has to play in preserving 
corporate assets and fostering corporate accountability in Pakistan. 
                                                 
13
 Ali Cheema,’Corporate governance in Pakistan: issues and concerns’(2003)8(2)The Journal7-19; 
Lubna Hasan, ‘Rule of Law, Legal Development and Economic Growth: Perspectives for Pakistan; 
Pakistan Institute of Development Economics September 2010 < https://mpra.ub.uni-
muenchen.de/25565/> accessed on 05 April 2016 ; Haroon H Hamid and Valeria Kozhich, ‘Corporate 
Governance in an Emerging Market; A perspective on Pakistan (2007) 1 (1)Journal of Legal Technology 
Risk Management 22-33, 26. 
14
 Corporate Law Review Commission Report 2005 <www.secp.gov.pk/pdf/Concept.pdf> accessed 14 
February 2016 p 17, S. 260-264 UK Companies Act 2006.   
15
 See section .327 Delaware General Corporation Law  
16
 See Sections 165-168, New Zealand Companies Act, 1993  
17
 See section . 237-242 Australian Corporations Act 2001  
18
 Part IVAA of the Companies Law (Amended by the Companies Amendment Bill 2003) 
19
 Article 847 , Company Act  
20
 Article 214 Company Act  
21
 OECD Report , Corporate Governance in Asia, 2011 <www.oecd.org/daf/ca/48806174.pdf > accessed 
15.02.2016 p 18 ; Article 403-406 Korean Commercial Code  
22
 See 216 A, 216 B , Singapore Companies Act 1994  
23
 See Article 152 of Company Act   
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Table 1 Availability of derivative suits (minimum 0; Maximum 1) They are available in all jurisdictions 
surveyed with the Exception of Pakistan, Netherland, Slovenia and Mexico. 
 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 
Canada  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
France  1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Malaysia 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
S. Africa 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Switzerlan
d  
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
Japan  0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 
US 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.75 0.75 0.75 
Argentina  0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 
Brazil 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 
India  0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 
Spain 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 
U.K 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 
Germany  0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.75 
China  0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 
Czech 
Rep. 
0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 
Sweden  0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 
Turkey  0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 0.25 
Russia  0 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.75 
Italy  0 0 0 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 
Chile  0 0 0 0 0 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 
Latvia  0 0 0 0 0 0 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.5 
Mexico  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Netherlan
d  
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Pakistan  0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Slovenia  0           
Source: CBR Shareholder Protection Index-25 countries.
24
 
The table shows the absence of derivative claims in Pakistan that are available in other 
jurisdictions. The absence of derivative claims continued following the year of 2005 
and to date, shareholders’ right to derivative litigation is not recognised in Pakistan.25 
The introduction of statutory framework for derivative action is expected to play a 
crucial role in improving corporate governance and protecting the interests of minority 
shareholders in Pakistan. In fact, shareholders stand deprived of important measure of 
                                                 
24
 Mathias Siems, Priya Lele, Pablo Iglesias-Rodriguez, Viviana Mollica, Theis Klauberg, Stephan 
Heidenhain, Nina Cankar, John Hamilton, Gerhard Schnyder, and Pinar Akman, ‘ CBR Shareholder 
Protection Index-25 countries’ (2009) <www.cbr.cam.ac.uk/research/programme2/project2-
20output.htm.> accessed 03 October.2016.  
25
  This is based on searching from Pakistan law site and Pakistan law journal =, leading databases of 
reported judgments in Pakistan by using the expression, derivative suit’ and derivative claims’. However 
it does not count unreported judgments in Pakistan. Till date means date 10 January 2017.  
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evoking managerial accountability as the right to engage in derivative actions is not 
available to shareholders in Pakistan. This makes the prospective role of derivative 
litigation to discipline errant managers and directors in Pakistan worth exploring. The 
essence of this thesis is to address issues; (1) should derivative litigation play its role in 
protecting shareholders’ interests in Pakistan?(2) If the answer is in affirmative, how 
such a system can effectively be implemented in order to discipline corporate 
management in Pakistan. 
Second, this thesis presents its argument by demonstrating the shortcomings of internal 
and external managerial disciplinary mechanisms. As a consequence, the codified 
derivative action system ought to be introduced and should play a pivotal role in 
regulating the misbehavioral hierarchy of controlling shareholders, corporate officers 
and directors. After demonstrating the need to introduce and effectively implement 
derivative action system in Pakistan, this thesis takes to explore the scope of derivative 
litigation in Pakistan. 
It examines the prevalent minority protection mechanism under the company law in 
Pakistan. Despite the presence of some provisions regarding minority protection, 
judicial treatment of managerial oppressions has been very discouraging and 
circumstances in which relief may be obtained have not been given. Absence of 
statutory derivative actions in the company law constitutes a barrier for shareholders 
intending to exercise this right of action against directorial misconducts. 
After discussing why derivative action system should play a significant role in 
monitoring management, this thesis aims at articulating the structure of derivative 
action system and how it can be implemented so that it could address issues of 
widespread managerial opportunism and minority protection in Pakistan. 
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This thesis argues that shareholders are willing to go for the derivative actions to 
protect their interests because of the establishment of commercial and by virtue of 
litigious society, if strategies are developed and embraced to provide incentives to 
them. The courts are also capable of dealing with derivative action cases because of the 
increasing recruitment of more qualified people to the judiciary
26
 and establishment of 
special commercial courts in Pakistan.
27
 It is expected that setting flexible, modern and 
accessible criteria for derivative actions can contribute to foster good corporate 
governance and can ensure protection of corporate as well as small investors’ assets in 
Pakistan. 
This study is particularly important at the time when the government of Pakistan plans 
to introduce new company law that would replace the Companies Ordinance,
28
 
currently the main company law that sets out the structure of corporate entities, powers 
and responsibilities of directors and shareholders’ rights.  The corporate law review 
commission has recommended for codification of derivative action system in Pakistan 
so as to strengthen shareholders’ enforcement power.29 
This thesis promises to make a significant contribution to the understanding on the 
subject of role of derivative litigation in reducing agency costs and preventing 
                                                 
26
 National Judicial Policy, Supreme Court of Pakistan 
<www.supremecourt.gov.pk/web/user_files/File/NJP2009.pd>  accessed 10 February2016; the same was 
revised in 2012 to achieve its objectives such as, increasing number of judges through recruitment 
process, their capacity building, establishing training centres and ensuring a corruption free judiciary in 
Pakistan.  
27
 Pakistan Vision 2015 One Nation, One Vision’ <fics.seecs.edu.pk/Vision/Vision-2025/Pakistan-
Vision-2025.pd> accessed 12 February. 2016  
28
 Country Review: Islamic Republic of Pakistan IOSCO Objectives and Principles of Securities 
Regulation Detailed Assessment of Implementation July 2015, p 25. 
29
 The corporate law review commission, Concept Paper , SECP,< www.secp.gov.pk/wp-
content/.../May_25_CLRCPresentsConceptPaperToSECP.pdf > accessed 27 January 2016; This is body 
which was established by the Security and Exchange Commission of Pakistan to review the companies 
ordinance and make suggestion for improving the ordinance.; Common law is judge made law and based 
on legal precedents, and general principles. 
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managerial/directorial frauds against companies as well as against minority 
shareholders. This thesis will provide significant understanding of legal scholarship on 
derivative actions and guiding principles to legislators, practitioners and policy makers 
in Pakistan on how to make better use of derivative action system. 
To that end, this thesis seeks to address three main issues that might affect the efficacy 
of the derivative litigation in Pakistan. First, it addresses shareholders incentive barriers 
and funding issues that operate as disincentives to shareholders in bringing derivative 
proceedings for enforcing corporate rights. Second, it addresses the problems affecting 
derivative actions’ usefulness due to strike suits, dishonest and unfounded actions. 
Third, this thesis addresses issues surrounding standing requirements of derivative 
claimants in derivative proceedings (locus standi rules
30
). 
Thesis layout  
This thesis intends to explore the role and significance of derivative proceedings in the 
protection of minority shareholders by making a comparative reflection on the 
derivative action system in the UK. In order to achieve the aims of this study, it is 
broken down into six chapters.  Chapter 1 explains the minority protection problem and 
helps us to understand why minority shareholders’ interests deserve protection. It 
explains and provides for a general theoretical framework of derivative actions and the 
rationale for studying minority protection through derivative actions.  This chapter also 
explains the flaws and limitations of market forces to prevent minorities’ interests from 
being infringed. 
Special emphasis is placed on derivative action system so as to see whether derivative 
proceedings could help to prevent self-serving decisions of controlling shareholders 
                                                 
30
 The right to bring action  
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which operate to the detriments of the interests of minority shareholders in Pakistan.  It 
also explains the methodologies employed in this research and reasons for using those. 
This chapter is important in a sense that it explains why it was important to study the 
use of litigation for the protection of minority shareholders and preservation of 
corporate assets what this research aims to achieve. 
Chapter 2 presents a critical review of literature regarding minority rights which helps 
to understand the unique context of managerial opportunism and minority protection, to 
develop research questions and to address the research gap.  This chapter reviews 
literature on the necessity of statutory provisions which could serve as an indispensable 
deterrent against wrongdoers in corporate entities. It identifies what previous scholars 
have contributed and summarises the key concerns and gaps in the existing literature.  
This chapter is important in a sense that it provides for the basis for the introduction of 
a meaningful derivative action system which could be used in complement with other 
managerial disciplinary mechanisms in Pakistan. 
Chapter 3 is broken down into two parts. The discussion in the first part focuses on 
examining minority rights and remedies under the company law in Pakistan.  The first 
part of chapter 3 highlights infirmities and shortcomings in the law not only as regards 
provision of evidence to an inadequate minority protection in Pakistan, but also to 
demonstrate why statutory derivative action system is indispensable in Pakistan. In 
particular, it focuses on examining financial, voting and enforcement rights of minority 
shareholders. This chapter recapitulates that the company law of Pakistan does not 
provide for an adequate protection to minorities therein. 
There are a few of instances of provisions here and there in the Ordinance regarding 
minority protection. The current enforcement mechanism employed in the Ordinance in 
the form of voting rights and remedy against unfair prejudice is defective and does not 
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ensure protection to minority shareholders. Moreover, the Ordinance does not provide a 
key enforcement mechanism in the form of derivative proceedings. Statutory 
framework for derivative actions is vital in terms of complementing other managerial 
disciplinary frameworks in order to provide an effective managerial accountability 
mechanism in Pakistan. 
The second part of chapter 3 takes care of the application of Sharia law in commercial 
matters and discovers the possibility of Sharia considerations in circumventing of 
minority sufferings in Pakistan. It is mainly intended to examine how Sharia business 
principles may complement laws regarding minority protection in Pakistan and how it 
may serve as a remedy to the noticeable statutory gaps. It is expected that this principle 
will function just as the concept of equity in the UK.  
Chapter 4 presents a kind of case study examples in which controlling shareholders 
misused their authority in disregard of the interests of the companies as well as 
minority shareholders therein. The investigations of these specific examples of 
corporate abuses were selected in order to develop the basis for having in place 
statutory framework for derivative action in order to provide a greater enforcement 
power in the hands of small shareholders. The chapter is important in a sense it 
exemplifies misconduct on the part of corporate management which is ill-reputed for its 
self-serving behaviour in Pakistan. Further, it accentuates how controlling shareholders 
behave opportunistically in disregard of minority shareholders and sometimes even 
against the companies which provides theoretical underpinnings of statutory framework 
for derivative actions in Pakistan. 
Chapter 5 is broken down into two parts. In its first part, this chapter considers reform 
proposals made in this thesis relating to the statutory framework for derivative actions. 
The proposals are aimed at codification of derivative action system in Pakistan. This 
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chapter addresses problems with the derivative proceedings in Pakistan and it proposes 
what may work effectively in the particular context of Pakistan underscoring the 
striking issues of common law rules on derivative actions, procedural complexities and 
the issues of disincentives to shareholders in derivative proceedings. Towards that end, 
this explains different approaches to deal with issues surrounding legal costs and 
procedural complexities. It provides for reform proposals regarding funding issues that 
can best address the problems concerning economic disincentives to derivative 
claimants. 
The chapter also analyses the functioning of common law derivative action system and 
reviews how it has been reformed in the UK. It presents the problems which used to 
exist under common law derivative action system which would more or less be similar 
to those shareholders might face in bringing derivative claims in Pakistan. It examines 
the recommendations of the Law Commission and the Company Law Review Group 
regarding the introduction of statutory derivative action system in the UK. 
This chapter also provides an understanding of statutory derivative action system in the 
UK which was developed in response to difficulties minority shareholders faced under 
old common law derivative action system. Finally, this chapter evaluates common law 
rules on derivative actions and the statutory framework for derivative actions in 
comparison. The analysis in this chapter has been carried out bearing in mind that to 
what extent, Pakistan can draw lesson in order to find ways for a functional derivative 
action framework which could better address the issue of corporate accountability in 
Pakistan. It demonstrates, in this regard, that although legal transplant can be a useful 
strategy to facilitate a meaningful statutory framework for derivative actions in 
Pakistan, yet, it never mean to adopt each and every single rule on derivative actions in 
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force in the UK which may not be suitable to the local conditions and a particular 
business environment in Pakistan. 
The second part of chapter 5 offers an analysis of empirical study which involves semi-
structured interviews with domestic corporate lawyers, academics and senior officials 
from Security and Exchange Commission of Pakistan in order to look into how 
statutory derivative action system works effectively in the marketplace. It provides 
evaluation and reflection of this empirical study undertaken to evaluate reforms 
proposals as to the statutory framework for derivative actions in Pakistan. This part is 
important as it helps to assess reform proposals made in this thesis by giving a sense of 
multiple interpretations and, by reflecting the reactions of the participants which helped 
in finding a more workable and functional derivative action framework in Pakistan. 
Finally, chapter 6 draws conclusions that the company law of Pakistan does not 
guarantee minority protection that provides theoretical underpinnings for the 
introduction of statutory framework for derivative actions in Pakistan. It provides 
summary of the thesis and makes comments to any future study. This chapter bring 
together arguments made throughout in this thesis. It examines research questions in the 
light of reform proposals. The examination of research question is carried out in order 
to see whether the research aim has been achieved? Finally this chapter concludes by 
elucidating that statutory derivative action system can substantially improve corporate 
accountability in Pakistan and explains the final contribution of this research.
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Chapter 1. Theoretical Framework of Derivative Action  
1.1 Minority Shareholders in Family-Owned and State-Owned 
Enterprises in Pakistan 
There is concentration of shareholder ownership in Pakistan with families, business 
groups and the State as the dominant stakeholders in both private and the public 
companies.
1
These dominant stakeholders maintain control over companies either by 
holding majority equities or through indirect and complex ownership structures such as 
interlocking, cross-shareholding or pyramid ownership structures.
2
 The complex 
ownership structures are not normally understood by the outside investors. The 
majority shareholders may appoint trusted persons and friends as board members and 
other non-executive directors. They normally do not consider factors such as corporate 
sector knowledge, relevant qualifications and professional expertise while filling in 
directorial positions. 
Important decisions are made by the controlling managers without considering the 
rights of other stakeholders such as small investors.
3
Most of the public companies in 
Pakistan are governed by majority shareholders and they thereby exercise a 
                                                 
1
 Attiya Y. Javid, Robina Iqbal, ‘Corporate Governance in Pakistan: Corporate Valuation, Ownership and 
Financing’ (2010 ) PIDE Working paper < pide.org.pk/pdf/Working%20Paper/WorkingPaper-57.pdf> 
accessed 13 May 2016 ; Faisal Javaid, Abdul Saboor, ‘Impact of Corporate Governance index on Firm 
Performance: evidence from Pakistani manufacturing sector (2015)5 (2) Journal of Public 
Administration and Governance1-21,19; Ali Cheema, ‘Corporate governance in Pakistan: issues and 
concerns’ (2003) 8(2)The NIPA Journal 7-19. 
2
 Abid A. Burki Shabbir Ahmad, ‘Corporate Governance Changes in Pakistan’s Banking Sector: Is There 
a Performance Effect? CMER WORKING PAPER No. 07-59 < 
https://core.ac.uk/download/pdf/6256587.pdf> accessed 04 April 2016.  
3
 Arshad Hassan and Safdar Ali Butt , Impact of Ownership Structure and Corporate Governance on 
Capital Structure of Pakistani Listed Companies (2009) 4 (2) International Journal of Business and 
Management 50-57,55 
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disproportionate amount of control over the companies
4
. The majority shareholdings, 
complex corporate ownership structures such as interlocking directorship, cross-
shareholdings and pyramid structures are often used by controlling shareholders with a 
view to subverting minority interests. Common allegations include complaints on 
mismanagement of business
5
, the expulsion of a petitioner from management
6
, 
misappropriation of corporate assets
7
, share dilution
8, tunnelling of companies’ assets9, 
public interest
10, directors’ self-interest11, inter-corporate financing12  and non-payment 
of dividends,
13
  in Pakistan. 
The State is the second largest business entity in the corporate sector of Pakistan after 
corporate groups controlled by business families. The State Owned Enterprises (SOEs) 
                                                 
4
 Faiza A. Chaudary, Marc Goergen and Shoeb I. Syed, ‘Corporate Governance in the Financial Sector of 
Pakistan’ <www.eaber.org/sites/default/files/.../LUMS_Chaudary_2006.pdf> accessed 06 
December.2015. 
5
 Muhammad Fikree v Fikree Developmentg Corp Ltd [1992] M.L.D. 668; Associated Biscuits 
International Ltd v English Biscuits Manufacturers (Pvt) Ltd (EBM) [2003] C.L.D. 815 (Karachi).  
6
 Ch. Muhammad Hussain v Khiali Paper and Board Mills (Pvt) Ltd [2005] C.L.D. 636   
7
 Brothers Steel Ltd. And Others vs. Mian Miraj Din [1995] PLD SC 320; Attock Refinery Ltd.Vs. 
Executive Director Enforcement and Monitoring Division, SECP [2010] PLD SC 946. 
8
 Razzak Usman v Golden Plastics [1998] C.L.C. 1109 (Karachi); Associated Biscuits v EBM [2003] 
C.L.D. 815 (Karachi)  
9
 Shahmatullah Qureshi v Hi-Tech Construction Pvt Ltd [2004] C.L.D. 640; Daily Dawn  newspapers 23 
December, 2012, Murky Corporate Segment available <www.dawn.com/news/773559/murky-corporate-
segment> accessed 21 February 2016. 
10
 Shahbazud Din Chaudhry v Messrs Services Industries Textiles Ltd [1988] PLD 1 (Lahore)  
11
 Muhammad Anwar Manoo v Muhammad Waqar Monnoo [1987] C.L.C. 1943; Israrul Haq v Al-Tahir 
Industries (Pvt) Ltd [2002] C.L.D. 325 (Lahore)  
12
 Shahid Anwar, Tariq Aleem, Dr. Wasim Azhar , Mazurul haq, Shaid Latif Dar, Ifran Qamar& others, 
Mehmood Ahmed Shezi Nackvi v Chairman Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan [2015] 
Appellate Bench Security and Exchange Commission of Pakistan; See Daily Dawn Newspaper, 04 
December 2011, ‘Making inter-corporate financing transparent’<www.dawn.com › Newspaper › 
Business & Finance> accessed 05 November 2016. 
13
 Aliya Bushra and Nawazish Mirza, ‘The Determinants of Corporate Dividend Policy in Pakistan’ 
(2015)20(2) The Lahore Journal of Economics, 77-98, 80 ;Qureshi v Hi-Tech Construction [2004] 
C.L.D. 640; Talat Afza, Hammad Hassan Mirza, ‘Ownership Structure and Cash Flows As Determinants 
of Corporate Dividend Policy in Pakistan’(2010)3(3)International Business Research 211-221, 217 ; 
Ahmed, Hafeez and Javid, Attiya Yasmin, ‘Dynamics and determinants of dividend policy in Pakistan 
(evidence from Karachi stock exchange non-financial listed firms)’(2008)25 International Research 
Journal of Finance and Economics 148-171,149 
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are listed as well as private companies. The government has corporatized a number of 
SOEs during the last two decades under the pressure of international financial 
institutions
14
. The government owns 14 out of top 40 companies listed on Karachi 
Stock Exchange (KSE)
15
. 
 In SOEs, the government of Pakistan holds control. The management in SOEs guard 
the interests of the government at the expense of minority shareholders. The 
government generally appoints managers and members of the board on the basis of 
their political affiliations with the government. The government has also been found not 
to consider the corporate sector knowledge, relevant experience and required 
qualification while making appointments in the board of directors in SOEs
16
. 
Normally, the State being controller of SOEs is unlikely to act against the company and 
its minorities’ interest. This is because the State has legitimate concerns to protect 
companies’ interest including that of other constituencies of the company such as non-
controlling shareholders. However, it might not always be true that the State interest 
aligns with the interest of other constituencies of the company or even the company 
                                                 
14
 See the daily DAWN an English newspaper dated  01 November, 2015 
<www.dawn.com/news/1216663> accessed 25 December 2015 : Federal Minister and Chairman of 
Privatisation Commission of Pakistan Muhammad Zubair has stated that the government will pursue 
privatisation plan extensively and will not withdraw from its plans due to opposition pressure in order  to 
achieve high growth rate and boost economy.. the government of Pakistan has started process of 
divestment in SOEs such Faisalabad Electric Supply Company (FESCO), Islamabad Electrical Supply 
Company (IESCO) and has attracted of general public in the equity market.  ‘PM stops privatisation of 
power companies - The Express Tribune’ The Express Tribune 21 July 2016< tribune.com.pk › Business 
> accessed 18 October 2016.  
15
 Karachi Stock Exchange is the largest stock exchange of Pakistan (KSE) 
16
 Ali Cheema et al, ‘Corporate Governance in Pakistan: Ownership , Structure and Control’(LUMS) 
paper series 11-12  
  4 
 
itself.
17The State may have its overarching objectives and may use SOEs’ resources to 
achieve its own policy objectives.
18
 
Minority shareholders are a vulnerable group, also in SOEs and so they are apt to be 
targeted and abused by the controllers where the State being the controller of SOEs 
attempts to gain its own benefits at the cost of the minority interest. There are a number 
of corporate scandals such as Pakistan Steel Mills,
19
 Railways,
20
 Pakistan 
Telecommunication Company Limited,
21
 National Insurance Company Limited
22
 and 
many more that offer evidence to the managerial wrongdoings in SOEs. 
Many commentators have recommended for the protection of minority shareholders 
against managerial/directorial transgressions. For example, Low regarded minority 
protection as an essential objective of good corporate governance.
23
 La Porta et al 
consider minority protection instrumental to the growth of the capital markets. They 
argue that law has a crucial role to play in improving corporate governance and 
ensuring shareholder protection.
24
 Minority protection stands out among important 
company law provisions. As explained earlier in the research background section of this 
                                                 
17
 Andrei Shleifer and Robert W. Vishny, ‘A Survey of Corporate Governance’ (1997) 52(2) Journal of 
Finance 737-783,761  
18
 Manish Singhai, ‘Shareholder Rights and the Equitable Treatment of Shareholders’ OECD , The 
Fourth Asian Roundtable on Corporate Governance; 4 
<www.oecd.org/corporate/ca/corporategovernanceprinciples/2484854.pdf >accessed 20 April 2016  
19
The Daily DAWN 07, February 2013< www.dawn.com/news/784195> accessed 24 May 2015. 
20
 The Business, 02 February 2016 < www.pakistantoday.com.pk › Business> accessed 19 April 2016. 
21
Pakistan the Banker m financial tribune of Pakistan 09 January 2015 < www.thebanker.com.pk/ptcls-
privatization-the-biggest-financial-scam-in-pakistans-his.> accessed 24 April 2015  
22
 The Daily DAWN Newspaper 26 January 2011 < www.dawn.com/news/601723> accessed 24 April. 
2015.  
23
 Low Chee Keong, Corporate Governance, An Asia-Pacific Critique (Sweet & Maxwell Asia 2002) 
612.   
24
 Rafael La Porta; Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes; Andrei Shleifer; Robert W. Vishny, ‘Law and Finance’ 
(1998) 106(6) The journal of political economy 1113-1155,1117; Ibid (n 17)774. 
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thesis, this thesis aims to explore the role of derivative litigation in improving corporate 
governance and addressing the issue of corporate accountability in Pakistan. 
This chapter first succinctly goes on explaining different enforcement mechanisms such 
as the public enforcement of law- the use of police, inspectors or public prosecutors, 
and private-sector enforcement of shareholder rights- the use of shareholder voting and 
derivative litigation. Then, it attempts to highlight flaws and the scope of the public 
enforcement mechanism that makes a point to encourage private- sector enforcement of 
the laws for disciplining management. 
While examining private enforcement mechanisms, it attempts to bear out that private 
enforcement mechanisms such as shareholder voting and independent directors have 
their own well-known limitations; therefore, they cannot be a substitute for derivative 
litigation. Thus, derivative action system as one of the ways for private-sector 
enforcement has an important role to play in undoing managerial wrongdoings and 
recovering compensation for the companies wronged by their directors.
25
 
1.2 Enforcement of Shareholders’ Rights  
Corporate laws together with securities regulations confer a wide range of rights upon 
shareholders to protect their interests. Enforcement of these laws is essential because 
shareholders feel secure in investing in firms where adequate protection is in place so 
that they might make good wrongs done to their investment.
26
 Business firms in normal 
cases show regard to corporate laws but if they fail to comply with the laws and allow 
                                                 
25
 Richardson Green shields of Canada Ltd v Kalmacoff [1995] BLR (2d) 197 (CA) at 205, see the 
decision in the court of appeal; Diamond v Oreamuno [1969]24 New York 2d 494, 248 NE 2d 910, 301 
NYS 2d 78. 
26Howell .Jackson and Mark J Roe, ‘Public Enforcement of Securities Law: Preliminary Evidence’(2009) 
93(3)Journal of Financial Economics 207-38 ; Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes and Andrei 
Shleifer, ‘ What works in Securities Law?’ (2006)61(1)  Journal of Finance 1-32,3.  
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their directors to breach their fiduciary duties then the enforcement of the laws happens 
to be of a paramount importance.
27
 
As mentioned above, corporate laws can be enforced through different mechanisms 
such as the public enforcement and private enforcement of the laws.
28
 However, this 
thesis focuses only on derivative action system as one of the ways for private sector 
enforcement mechanism.  The public enforcement is related to government-initiated 
proceeding. The violator of law is punished here by imposing civil or criminal 
penalties. 
On the other side, private enforcement is shareholders-initiated proceedings and here, 
aggrieved shareholders seek corporate remedy in terms of compensation.
29
 As the 
public enforcement provides for monetary sanctions and physical confinement; 
therefore, such severe punishments can act as deterrent against illegal activities of 
managers. As such, imprisonment not only means suffering from physical agony, it 
may also damage the reputation of wrong-doing professionals. In Pakistan like most 
other jurisdictions, a criminally convicted director is also barred to hold a public office 
in future.
30
 
It is, however, important to underscore that a meaningful deterrence effects for future 
managerial misbehaviours cannot be exercised by dint of stringent punishments in 
books but it is possible only if it is effectively enforced.
31
  In fact, weak enforcement 
                                                 
27
 John Coffee, ‘The rise of Dispersed Ownership: the roles of law and the state in the separation of 
ownership and control’(2001) 111(1) Yale Law Journal 12-78,28  
28
 Ibid, 68 
29
 Chrispas Nyombi and Alexender Kibandama, Principles of Company Law in Uganda (Law Africa 
Publishing (k) Ltd,2014) 117. 
30
 See Section 15 of National Accountability Ordinance 1999, Pakistan.  
31
Polinsky, A. Mitchell & Shavell, Steven, ‘The Theory of Public Enforcement of Law’ in  A. Mitchell 
Polinsky and Steven Shavell (eds) Handbook of Law and Economics (North Holland, 2009) Ch 6, 406 
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mars the benefits of such severe punishments provided.
32
 Unfortunately, this is the case 
with the public enforcement hierarchy, where due to strict evidentiary requirements; 
criminal prosecution of corporate misconducts is difficult to prove that makes the point 
for the private enforcement alongside to play its role in disciplining management. 
Following are the major problems with the public enforcement mechanism. 
First, it is difficult to prove a criminal guilt entailing physical confinement and 
monetary sanctions.
33
 The standard of proof required for proving a criminal case is, 
‘beyond reasonable doubt’ that follows all the attendant facts and circumstances are 
consistent with the guilt of the accused.
34
 On the other hand, civil lawsuits are not 
subject to such a strict standard of proof. Here we simply need preponderance (balance 
of probability) signifying that if evidence of one party overshadows that of the other 
party, the evidence of the former party will be given weightage. 
Second, illegal evidence ‘exclusionary rule’ applies to criminal trials. Illegal evidence 
exclusionary rule signifies that evidence put forward by a complainant in contravention 
of the defendant’s constitutional rights is not permissible.35Third, evidence required to 
be produced in a criminal case is subject to aggressive scrutiny. Civil lawsuits, on the 
other hand, are subject to more relaxed and flexible rules of evidence. Since corporate 
frauds and wrongdoings are perpetrated by intelligent minds and are executed with 
                                                 
32
 Sandefur R.L (ed.) Acess to Justice (Bingley: JAI , 2009)9; Peter-Jan Engelen, ‘Structural problems in 
the design of market abuse regulations in the EU’(2007) 19(1) The Journal of Interdisciplinary 
Economics 57-82,60  
33
 Peter-Jan Engelen, ‘Structural problems in the design of market abuse regulations in the EU’(2007) 
19(1) The Journal of Interdisciplinary Economics 57-82,64 
34
  State v Anwar Saifullah Khan [2002] Supreme Court of Pakistan, Criminal Appeal No,264. 
35
 Malcolm Richard Wilkey, ‘Exclusionary Rule: Why Suppress Valid Evidence’(1978) 62The 
Judicature 214; Donald L. Willits, ‘The Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule: The Desirability of a 
Good Faith Exception’(1982)32(2) Case Western Reserve Law Review 443-462,443. 
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caution; such a high burden of proof and rigorous scrutiny procedures make it difficult 
for the prosecution to prove criminal prosecution of a corporate misconduct.
36
 
Besides procedural restraints and rigorous evidentiary requirements, there are other 
problems with the public enforcement that render it potentially impracticable option to 
deal with all directorial misconducts. For example, public organisations/agents are not 
able to pursue each and every single illegal activity in the corporate world.
37
 The public 
agencies do have enforcement priorities due to their limited official capacity and 
financial resources. Hence, it becomes difficult for them to deal with all managerial 
misconducts apt to arise.
38
 Moreover, the public enforcement suffers from flaws such as 
the possibility that public agents may succumb to the pressure of private interest groups 
contrary to the interest the law intends to protect and political control.
39
 
In view of limitations of the public enforcement, this thesis argues that the private 
enforcement via derivative litigation has a valuable role to play in enforcing investor 
protection laws. In fact, the private enforcement can complement the public 
enforcement as it would help reduce burden of the public organisation
40
and 
bureaucratic oversight of corporate conduct.
41
 
                                                 
36
 Naylor J M, ‘The Use of Criminal Sanctions by UK and US Authorities for Insider Trading: How Can 
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37
 Arad. Reisberg, Derivative Actions and Corporate Governance: Theory and Operation (Oxford 
University Press 2007) 31; Ibid (n33)64.   
38
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Derivative Action’ (1992) 15 University of New South Wales Law Journal 149- 175, 156  
39
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to enhance access to justice ‘ in Stefan Wrbka, Steven Van Uytsel and Mathias Siems, Collective Actions 
( Cambridge University Press 2012) 99  
40
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The private sector enforcement is, therefore, needed particularly in dealing with 
managerial misconducts. For example, disgruntled shareholders are abreast of the 
identity of the wrongdoer and the wrong they suffer, which normally public 
enforcement agents come short of.
42
  The disgruntled shareholders do have benefits to 
put forward such information because gains arising out of the private enforcement 
would go into their hands.
43
The private enforcement, therefore, has a significant role to 
play in improving corporate governance. 
La Porta et al‘s study shows that private enforcement causes growth of the capital 
markets that can wield its significant governance role in aligning the interests of 
management and shareholders.
44
Nevertheless, a consideration of private sector 
enforcement cannot justify disregard of the public enforcement. In fact, the public 
enforcement does have deterrence effects against future managerial/directorial 
misconducts. 
Since the public enforcement suffers from various kinds of limitations and flaws; 
private sector enforcement needs to be relied on for the enforcement of the laws. Both 
the private and the public enforcement mechanism should go hand in hand in 
complementing each other to deal with managerial misconducts. This is because no 
isolated mechanism of accountability is sufficient enough to deal with managerial 
misconducts under all circumstances. A pertinent question that needs to be answered is 
that if private enforcement mechanisms are already in place in the form of 
shareholders’ voting and independent directors? Then, giving a consideration to 
                                                 
42
 William M Landes and Richard A Posner, ‘ The Private Enforcement of Law’(1975)4 (1) The Journal 
of legal Studies 1-46,31 
43
Mitchell A Polinsky and Steven Shavell,‘The economic theory of public enforcement of law. No. 
W6993. National bureau of economic research, (1999) 3  
44
 Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes and Andrei Shleifer ‘What Works in Securities 
Laws?’(2006) 61 (1) The Journal of Finance 1-32,25 
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derivative suits needs more justification. The answer is, those are in place, yet, they are 
lacking managerial disciplinary mechanisms due to various limitations. 
The next part of this chapter attempts at articulating the limitations of other private 
sector enforcement tools such as shareholder voting and independent directors. As this 
thesis presents the argument that derivative action system has a key role to play in 
protecting corporate assets, the next section briefly shows where other types of private-
enforcement mechanisms such as shareholders voting and independent directors cannot 
be an effective substitute for derivative litigation. 
1.2.1 Shareholder Voting  
Voting right is one of the private sector enforcement mechanisms that can serve as an 
alternative to shareholder litigation.
45
 As directors are required to serve in the best 
interests of companies and their shareholders,
46
 failing which, shareholder can get rid of 
them through exercising their voting power. As a result, shareholder voting power may 
influence managerial behaviour and hence, it may help reduce agency costs. However, 
there are various factors that render shareholder voting as an insufficient enforcement 
mechanism. 
For example, normally shareholders are unwilling to vote even if voting mechanism is 
made easier through electronic means.
47
 Shareholder voting is also an imperfect 
managerial disciplinary mechanism due to collective action problem.
48
 Furthermore, 
                                                 
45
 Gerard Hertig, ‘Convergence of Substantive law and Convergence of Enforcement: A Comparison’ In 
J. Gordon and M. Roe (eds.), Convergence and Persistence in Corporate Governance (Cambridge 
University Press  2004) 328, 336-338  
46
 Greenhalgh v Arderne Cinemas Ltd [1950] 2 ALL ER 1120. See section 172(1) of the UK Companies 
Act 2006. 
47
 Ibid (n37) 25.  
48
 Brian R. Cheffins, Company Law: Theory, Structure and Operation (Oxford University Press 1997) 
238-241.  
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shareholders show an indifferent attitude known as ‘rational apathy’ towards casting 
votes due to time and cost factors.
49
  Last but not the least, research has shown that 
shareholder proposals have not changed or influenced governance policies and firm 
valuations.
50
 Shareholder voting thus seems to be an insufficient type of private sector 
enforcement, particularly in the context of Pakistan to discipline errant directors and 
managers. (Problems with shareholder voting to discipline managers has been discussed 
in detail in chapter 3 section 3.3). 
1.2.2 Independent Directors  
The presence of independent directors commonly known as Non-Executive Directors 
(NEDs) is another private sector enforcement mechanism. The NEDs are purported to 
be the monitors in a number of ways. For example they are thought to monitor 
managerial performance and review board performance. In addition, they are expected 
to ensure alignment between the interests of major and minor shareholders and take 
lead where there arises conflict of interest problem.
51
They are also expected to 
contribute to the valuation of the corporation.
52
 
However, the effectiveness of NEDs as unbiased monitors and to control agency costs 
is subject to criticism due to various reasons.
53
  Evidence shows that the effectiveness 
of the NEDs suffers from the problem of their real independence, additional cost and 
                                                 
49
 Though casting voting is becoming easier through electronic means, some shareholders still want to 
attend meetings in person.  
50
 Karpoff J M, Malatesta P .H, and Walkling R.A, ‘Corporate Governance and Shareholder Initiatives: 
Empirical Evidence’ (1996) 42 (3)Journal of Financial Economics 365-395,383 
51
 Gibbs D, ‘Non-Executive Directors’ Self Interest: Fiduciary Duties and Corporate Governance’ (PhD 
Thesis University Anglia 2014) 
52
 Derek Higgs, Review of the role of and effectiveness of non- Executive directors, Consultation Paper 7 
June 2002 < www.ecgi.org/codes/documents/higgs.pdf> accessed 03 June.2016.  
53
 Eilís Ferran, Company Law and Corporate Finance (Oxford University Press 1999) 122.  
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insufficient business related knowledge.
54
  Moreover, an empirical study indicates the 
presence of a negative relationship between the NEDs and firm performance.
55
 As such, 
board composition does not have any significant impact on the valuation of the 
corporation.
56
 Additionally, the presence of the NEDs affects the managerial freedom to 
take risk-based, profit-generating and innovative decisions.
57
 
The evidence as to whether the NEDs are proper monitors and an adequate managerial 
disciplinary mechanism is unclear. The financial crisis in 2008 uncovered the truth that 
the NEDs framework stands out only as one of the tools to improve corporate 
governance and is not meant to replace other  managerial disciplinary mechanisms in 
this respect.
58
 Under the Code of Corporate Governance, Pakistan has introduced and 
encouraged firms to appoint independent directors and accordingly, many listed 
companies have incorporated the NEDs framework.
59
 However, the independence of 
the NEDs to effectively monitor managers effectively is subject to criticism.
60
 For 
example, many experts opine that although the idea of having in place the framework of 
                                                 
54
 Ronald J Gilson and Reinier Kraakman, ‘Reinventing the outside director: An agenda for institutional 
investors’(1991) 43 Stanford Law Review  863-906,875; Daniel R. Fischel, ‘The Corporate Governance 
Movement’ (1982) 35 Vanderbilt Law Review 1259-1262.   
55
 Anup Agrawal and Charles R. Knoeber, ‘Firm Performance and Mechanisms to Control Agency 
Problems between Managers and Shareholders’ (1996) 31(3) Journal of Financial and Quantitative 
Analysis 377-397,379. 
56
 Andy Cosh and Alan Hughes, ‘The Changing Anatomy of Corporate Control and the Market for 
Executives in the United Kingdom’ (1997) 24 (1) Journal of Law and Society 104-123,113 
57
  Brian. R. Cheffins, Company Law: Theory, Structure and Operation (Oxford University Press 1997) 
624-625. 
58
 See Walker Report, (London,the United Kingdom 2099) 
<webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http:/...hm-treasury.gov.uk/.../walker_review_2...> accessed 22 
May 2016. 
59
 The Code of Corporate Governance 2002, Pakistan  
<http://www.ecgi.org/codes/documents/code_corporate(revised).pdf>accessed 11 January 2016; Valeria 
Kozhich and Haroon H Hamid, ‘Corporate Governance in an Emerging Market; A perspective on 
Pakistan (2007) 1 (1)Journal of Legal Technology Risk Management 22-33, 25 
60
 Haroon H Hamid and Valeria Kozhich, ‘Corporate Governance in an Emerging Market; A perspective 
on Pakistan (2007) 1 (1)Journal of Legal Technology Risk Management 22-33; Arshad Hasan, Safdar Ali 
Butt, ‘Impact of Ownership Structure and Corporate Governance on Capital Structure of Pakistani Listed 
Companies’(2009)4(2) International Journal of Business and Management 50-57,55. 
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the NEDs is well conceived, yet ensuring independence of such outside directors is 
impracticable.
61
 (In chapter 3, section 3.3, problems with the framework of NEDs have 
been discussed and it follows possible solutions to the problem in Pakistan). 
To sum up, no single managerial disciplinary tool is likely to yield intended results in 
every situation. Given the context, derivative claim as one of the ways for private sector 
enforcement is becoming increasing important particularly in this modern corporate 
world that encourages shareholder activism to enforce corporate rights.
62
 
1.3 Derivative Action; A theoretical review  
A derivative suit is commenced by a shareholder usually minority shareholder in order 
to rectify any wrong done to a company.
63
 It is a fundamental principle of company law 
that a company defrauded or wronged by its directors is the rightful claimant to bring 
the wrongdoers to book. However, if the company fails to do so, the right to take action 
against the wrongdoers is transferred to its shareholders.  Shareholder’s right of this 
action against wrongdoers emanates from the company’s right of action and it is why it 
is named a ‘Derivative Action’.64 
Derivative litigation is important in the sense that when a company is defrauded and the 
board of directors fails to commence litigation against the wrongdoers due to the reason 
that the board members are themselves the wrongdoers. In another case, if the company 
is in control of dominant shareholders who, involved in wrong-doings, would supress 
                                                 
61
 Independent director’s integrity, Daily DAWN newspaper, 13 January 2013 
<www.dawn.com/news/776832/independent-directors-integrity > accessed 03 February 2016. 
62
 Ibid (n37) 20; James Kirkbride, Steve Letza, Clive Smallman, ‘Minority shareholders and corporate 
governance Reflections on the derivative action in the UK, the USA and in China (2009)51(4) 
International Journal of Law and Management206-219,206- 207. 
63
 Ibid (n 29) 117. 
64
 See Schiowitz v IOS Ltd [1971]23 DLR 3d ,102 ; EStmanco (Kilner House) v Greater London Council 
[1982]1 WLR 2QBD , the word ‘derivative claim’ was borrowed from the US. 
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litigation against them, then, it should be someone else who should call the wrong-
doers to account. This is necessary because otherwise the law would fail in achieving 
its objective of preventing corporate injustice and misdoings.
65
 
As such, when a company is wronged, the company itself is purported to be the initiator 
of legal proceeding against the wrongdoers. For example, it was remarked by Lord 
Davey in Burland v Earle case, that only the company wronged by its directors is the 
‘proper plaintiff’ and not an individual shareholder.66 In fact, the ‘proper plaintiff’ rule 
derives its justification from the fundamental principle that A cannot claim damages 
from B for the loss B has done to C.
67
 
Moreover, similar to the ‘proper plaintiff’ rule are the ‘majority rule’ and the internal 
management concept which mean that decisions as to the internal affairs of a company 
have to be made on the basis of the ‘majority rule’. Courts have, therefore, no right to 
intervene at an individual shareholder’s civil petition in the decision makings of a 
company. Likewise, in a case, the court held that shareholders are bound by the 
majority decision except where such decisions are violative of law.
68
 The ‘majority 
rule’ and the ‘proper plaintiff’ rule together69 are named as the ‘Foss v Harbottle’ rule 
(hereinafter called the Foss Rule).
70
 
Over a period of time, some exceptions as to the ‘Proper plaintiff’ rule have been 
developed that allow individual shareholders of a wronged company, in some 
situations, to initiate litigation against errant directors. However, exceptions developed 
                                                 
65
 Wallersteiner v Moir (No 2) [1975] QB 373, 390. 
66
 Lord Davey in Burland v Earle [1902] AC 83 PC , 93  
67
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68
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69
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70
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as to the ‘Proper Plaintiff Rule’ are very limited and do not cover modern conditions 
and all managerial transgressions. 
For example, a breach of directors’ duty is not actionable unless it is shown by an 
applicant ‘fraud against minority shareholders’ and the ‘wrongdoer control’.71  In this 
respect, it is difficult to assess the extent of a wrong which really amounts to a fraud on 
minority and it is why there are conflicting judgments as regards fraud on minority.
72
 
More so, it is also ambiguous whether a wrongdoer who is not in control of a company 
or a de facto controller can be proceeded against.
73
 
Furthermore, the exceptions to the Foss Rule do not include claims of negligence which 
can provide shelter to errant directors to absolve themselves of their liabilities.
74
 The 
limitations of the exceptions to the Foss Rule have been discussed in detail in chapter 3 
(Section 3.5.2). 
A statutory framework for the derivative actions is, therefore, needed so as to simplify 
the derivative actions and to improve their accessibility. This is necessary to prevent 
controllers’ abuse of the ‘proper plaintiff’ rule which signifies that it is the wronged 
company itself to bring wrongdoers to book as being a separate legal entity, not the 
shareholders of the company.
75
 Most of the jurisdictions have introduced statutory 
derivative action system. As a result, they have enabled minority shareholders to take 
                                                 
71
 Prudential v. Newman Industries (No.2)[1982] Ch. 204, 210-11 
72
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actions against errant directors and to prevent potential abuse of the ‘proper plaintiff’ 
rule by the controllers.
76
 
1.4 Scope of Derivative Action in Pakistan 
This section explains the features of derivative suits and conditions under which the 
derivation suits are desirable. The aim of this explanation is to see how a particular 
corporate environment of Pakistan measures on those conditions which underpin 
derivative litigation to prevent directorial and managerial misbehaviours. 
It is believed that presence of diffused shareholder ownership, weak institutional 
structures and collective action problems make a case for derivative litigation to be 
considered.
77
 In diffused ownership structures, shareholders face collective action 
problems that ultimately let managers to abuse corporate assets. Therefore, derivative 
actions are considered important in diffused ownership structures.
78
 On the contrary, 
where there is ownership concentration, direct action might be considered a proper 
remedy for shareholders wronged by the controllers. This is largely because a 
successful derivative action would recover losses for the company and the major 
portion of this recovery would go into the hands of majority shareholders thereby 
reducing the value of a derivative suit for minority shareholders.
79
 
Since Pakistan‘s corporate ownership structure is concentrated, one might question the 
need for derivative litigation so as to undo wrongs done to the companies in Pakistan. It 
                                                 
76
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is submitted that this is too static a view of the ownership structure. The government of 
Pakistan has divested in a number of state owned enterprises by floating more than 26 
per cent shareholdings in the privatised entities through initial public offerings (IPOs). 
The Finance minister of Pakistan, Ishaq Dar has reiterated his commitments to speed 
up the divestment of 40 per cent shares of the Pakistan Stock Exchange.
80
 
In addition, listed companies are required in Pakistan to make sure minimum 25 per 
cent public shareholdings.
81
 Given the trend of divestments in SOEs and in family-
controlled companies, it is expected that the retail investment in Pakistani companies 
will grow.
82
 Although it is very likely that the corporate sector of Pakistan will remain 
controlled, expected increase in minority shareholdings suggest that minority 
shareholders should have an adequate protection against majority abuse and 
accordingly, the case for derivative suits makes a ground. The assumption as to the 
necessity of derivative litigation only in jurisdictions with the diffused ownership has 
been proved wrong by a number of jurisdictions of highly concentrated control of 
shares, and derivative litigation is considered a key element for corporate accountability 
in these jurisdictions.
83
 
When the main concern is disciplining errant directors and controlling shareholders, 
one may argue for a direct suit to be an appropriated choice. However, a direct action is 
not an attractive option due to various reasons. For example, a salient feature of 
                                                 
80
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derivative litigation is that the wronged companies ultimately pay the legal costs.
84
 This 
is in contrast with the situation in direct actions where shareholders themselves pay the 
legal cost. Therefore, an individual shareholder would prefer not to commence direct 
suit thinking that legal cost would be higher than the potential benefit of the successful 
direct suit. 
This legal cost-benefit analysis by small shareholders is referred to as collective action 
problem. As mentioned above, due to privatisation of a number of state owned 
enterprises and the growing trend of disinvestment in family based companies, retail 
investment in Pakistan is expected to increase. As a result, enlargement of retail 
investor would obviously cause collective action problem to bring suit against errant 
directors. 
One way to address the collective action problem can be claim aggregation. However, 
claim aggregation also suffers from the problem of small shareholders’ inability, due to 
time and risk factor, to unite with other shareholders and join hands in the suit.
85
  This 
state of affairs supports derivative litigation so as to incentivise individual shareholders 
to bring suits against wrongdoers as the legal costs in the derivative proceedings are 
borne by the companies.
86
 
Besides individual shareholders of a wronged company, institutional shareholders and 
entrepreneurial lawyers would probably have sufficient incentives to bring direct suits. 
Institutional investors, however, have so far been rather passive in Pakistan and they 
                                                 
84
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85
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prefer to stick to the ‘Wall Street’ rule.87 However, professional lawyers would be more 
promising to do this job. In this regard, the contingency fee can be an economic 
incentive for such lawyers to take such riskier cases as they can be tempted to the 
benefits of the successful suits.
88
 However, the contingency fee is not allowed in 
Pakistan
89
 which makes a case for derivative litigation. In this state of affairs, derivative 
suits would be a meaningful option so as to avoid legal costs purported to be incurred 
on direct actions. 
There are also some institutional conditions such as lengthy delays in courts 
proceedings and mispricing in the stock markets that provide reasons as to why 
statutory framework for derivative actions is needed in Pakistan. For example, a 
lengthy delay in courts’ proceeding is the hallmark of the Pakistani Judicial system that 
ultimately reduces the potential gains of a suit.
90
 This may cause the potential gains 
from a suit discounted. 
For instance, suppose that there is 3000 pounds non-reimbursable legal cost of a suit 
and the potential benefit of the successful suit is 8000 pounds. If decision is made say 
after one year, (say further) the current value of the benefit is 7000 pounds and the legal 
cost of the suit is 3000 pounds. This means the suit earns 4000 pounds and it is worthy 
of bringing the suit. However, suppose that decision of the suit is made after ten years 
and the current value of the benefit is 3000 pounds but the legal costs of the suit 
remains the same because much of the legal costs are incurred at the initiation of the 
                                                 
87
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suit, then commencing the suit is of no worth. In such a situation, derivative litigation 
would be an attractive option to sue wrongdoers as the legal cost in derivative 
proceedings would be paid by the corporations.
91
 
Moreover, an efficient stock market reflects information in share prices quickly which 
is relevant in the sense that the stock prices will adjust to reflect the net gains of the suit 
once the suit has been initiated.
92
 Even though shareholders were to sell their shares 
before the pronouncement of judgment, their stock price would reflect the value of the 
suit and hence, they would implicitly receive it when they sold their shares. However, 
the situation in Pakistan is discouraging as the stock market is not that much efficient to 
reflect accurately information in share price; therefore, one should be more concerned 
about shareholders selling their shares before judgments and having no incentives to 
commence suits. This problem can be addressed by the provision of incentives to 
shareholders via derivative litigation in which legal cost is paid by the companies. 
All in all, increase in retail investment, the prohibition on contingency fee,
93
 application 
of the English rule ‘loser to pay legal costs to the winner’,94 institutional factors such as 
stock exchanges mispricing
95
 and excessive delays in judgments
96
 make a strong case 
for the statutory framework for derivative actions in Pakistan. 
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In this context, it may also be added that the culture of Pakistan is a litigious one.
97
 If 
legal remedies happen to be conducive and for that matter meaningful for retrieval and 
redressal, the aggrieved shareholders would not lag behind in having recourse to the 
relevant judicial forum for putting in claims of their staked rights. Previously, it has 
been the shareholder apathy posed by the lack of legal remedies such as inaccessibility 
to derivative litigation that stood restraining them from bringing claims against 
wrongdoers in corporations. In this supportive environment, the stance of the statutory 
framework for derivative actions is expected to receive wide acclaim by the 
commercial society in Pakistan. 
In relation to view on the utility of derivative litigation to discipline management, 
academics differ. Some scholars contend that from an economic perspective, litigation 
is not supportive to achieve good corporate governance.
98
 However, many others argue 
that derivative litigations has a key role to play in achieving good corporate 
governance, ensuring shareholder protection and punishing misbehaviour of directors.
99
 
The next part provides views from both sides and attempts to demonstrate that 
derivative actions have attained the attention of corporate law scholars as a meaningful 
solution to agency problems. 
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1.5 Theoretical underpinning of Derivative Action 
The need for the derivative actions has been widely recognised.
100
 As explained earlier, 
derivative actions are valuable not only to recover compensation for the loss suffered 
by a company but they can also act as a deterrent against future managerial 
malfeasance.
101
 Thomas contends that derivative litigation can play an important 
function in reducing agency costs and in preventing managerial/directorial 
misconducts.
102
 As such, a successful derivative action imposes liability on errant 
directors that causes damage to their reputation and other attendant financial 
loss.
103
Derivative action, in  doing so, act as a deterrence not only against future 
managerial wrongdoings in the company on whose behalf shareholders took action but 
also against future misbehaviour of directors of other companies. 
Thus, both compensatory objectives and deterrence effects of derivative actions 
together play an important role in aligning the interests of majority-minority 
shareholders that, in turn reduces agency costs. 
104
 
However, it is claimed that the central role derivative suits play lies in acting as a 
deterrent against future managerial wrongdoings but not in recovering insignificant 
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financial benefits.
105
 It does so for two basic reasons. First, it is perceived that 
shareholders selling their shares before a successful derivative suit are deprived of the 
benefits of the suits rather the shareholders who purchase the shares of outgoing 
shareholders enjoy the benefits of the successful suit. Second, since minority 
shareholders own small stakes; they get little compensatory benefits of a successful 
derivative suit as they are entitled to benefit proportionate to their shares in the 
company provided where minority shareholders are reasonably large to benefit the 
financial recovery of suit.
106
 
In fact, a significant benefit of derivative suits extends beyond the financial recovery.
107
 
As such, the significant benefit of derivation litigation is to act as deterrent agent that is 
essential to inhibit controlling managers from committing frauds on the companies and 
against minorities.
108
The deterrence effects of derivative actions yield a generic and 
public benefit as shareholders normally diversify their investments. As a result, it 
conveys the message of deterrence to all potential wrongdoers in firms.
109
 
In situations where directors are alleged to have breached their fiduciary duties, 
shareholders should be enabled to have an access to a judicial remedy. Reisberg argues 
for the derivative litigation and considers it an important tool to prevent breach of 
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directors’ duties.110  He maintains that the enforcement of directors’ duties very much 
depends on shareholder enforcement; therefore, derivative litigation as one of the ways 
for private-sector enforcement can play an important role to enforce directors’ duties.111 
1.6 Problem of Abusive Litigation  
Although derivative actions are very useful to discipline management, yet there can be 
a risk of abuse of shareholders’ right of derivative litigation.112 For example, 
shareholders’ right of derivative litigation can be misused by the opportunistic 
shareholders for achieving bad motives. They can harass directors by bringing meritless 
and vexatious actions and hence, they can obtain private benefits.
113
  
Settlement and voluntary discontinuance of a derivative suit may also affect 
shareholders’ interests. For example, shareholders may collude with management to 
settle dispute in return of bribe money and other unethical payments. The management 
may offer litigating shareholders repurchase of their shares at a price higher than the 
fair market value to win over their consent to discontinue the suits.
114
 Such settlements 
and discontinuances of derivative suits might be disadvantageous to the interests of the 
company and other shareholders who would lose indirect benefits that might have 
arisen from the successful derivative suit. 
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However, this argument lacks justification because all such dubious settlements and 
discontinuances of derivative actions are subjected to the courts’ approval.115 The 
courts must ensure that such settlements and discontinuances of actions are not against 
the company’s and its shareholders’ interests. Moreover, to address this concern, there 
needs to be special measures of screening and filtration mechanism to prevent strike out 
suits and to allow only genuine and valuable derivative suits.
116
  
It is also argued that permission to the derivative action may affect directorial capacity 
to take risk-based business decisions sometime necessary to achieve high goals of profit 
maximisation.
117
 Additionally, it is thought that giving shareholders the right to take 
derivative actions would lead to open the floodgate of litigations.
118
 As a result, 
directors and corporate officers would spend their valuable time in defending 
allegations against them instead of fulfilling their professional duties. 
 However, this argument lacks support in the light of the experience of countries such 
as Canada, the US, the UK, New Zealand and Australia where flexible and shareholder 
friendly approach has been adopted regarding derivative actions, nonetheless, there was 
no deluge of litigation in such countries.
119
 It means that if well-designed rules and 
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adequate safeguard are provided, the possibility of abuse of derivative actions can be 
avoided. 
After having examined the arguments of both sides, it is submitted that derivative 
litigation is necessary to hold wrongdoers accountable. It particularly holds significance 
in the context of Pakistan where majority shareholders control board of directors and 
members’ general meetings. Thus, in situations where they themselves are the 
wrongdoers; it is very likely that they would supress litigation against them. This is 
why the derivative litigation is regarded a paramount minority protection tool as it 
enables minority shareholders to bring action against errant directors and provides an 
important mechanism for managerial accountability.
120
 
The next section of this chapter aims to examine the role of derivative litigation in the 
public and private companies. A pertinent question arises here that since disgruntled 
shareholders in the public companies are vested with choice to leave the company by 
selling their shares; the need for derivative litigation requires more justification. This 
argument is erroneous on a number of grounds. For example, denying shareholders of 
the right to derivative litigation in the public companies would mean to ignore the 
deterrent role of derivative actions against future directorial misconducts.
121
 Moreover, 
denial of derivative litigation to shareholders means giving go-ahead to managers to 
loot company’s assets as they would get away scot-free knowingly that they would not 
be subjected to any legal action.
122
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It must be borne in mind that shareholders have right to derivative litigation where the 
board of directors fails or is unwilling to take action against the wrongdoer.  In the 
sense, derivative litigation is premised on preventing wrongdoers going unpunished.
123
 
Basically, derivative suit is a remedy for shareholders who choose to stay with the 
company and to take action against the wrongdoers. 
Although, it is believed that the outgoing disgruntled shareholders, who choose to leave 
the company, are not the beneficiaries of a successful derivative suit, even in that case 
they might not get good price of their shares if directorial illegal actions have caused 
decrease in the share price.
124
A study conducted in the US indicates that derivative suits 
were filed in the public companies more than in the closely-held corporations against 
the wrongdoers.
125
 Derivative actions are, thus, important in Pakistan where business 
families and the State hold majority shares in both the public and private companies 
and they, due to their dominant position in firms, could supress litigation against them. 
It might be argued that since the ratio of minority shareholders is low in family 
controlled companies in Pakistan, therefore, derivative proceedings needs not to be 
emphasised in Pakistan so as to discipline errant management in Pakistan. This shade of 
argument is not well-grounded as the doctrine of minority shareholding varies on case 
by case basis and even in a family-owned company, one family member might need 
protection against the possible abuses by the controlling family members. It is 
evidenced from the total number of 22 suits filed by minority shareholders to seek 
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remedies from courts in Pakistan and the data shows that out of the total, 12 suits were 
initiated by shareholders occupying shares between 20 to 50 per cent.
126
 
Thus, derivative litigation is even more important in closely-held companies.
127
 This is 
because unlike the situation in the public companies, managerial and directorial 
misconducts in the closely held corporations are not punished by market forces.
128
 As a 
result, vulnerability of minority shareholders in closely-held corporations exposes them 
to majority abuse. The derivative action system enables minority shareholders to 
protect their interests by bringing actions against errant directors in private companies. 
Empirical studies conducted in Canada and Australia show that derivative actions were 
taken frequently in private companies to undo wrongs done to the interests of the 
companies.
129
 
1.7 Derivative actions versus Market based Mechanisms 
Besides derivative litigation, there are market-based disciplinary mechanisms such as 
the capital markets and the takeover market, which may prevent management from 
oppressing shareholders’ interests.130 In order to see whether market-based managerial 
disciplinary mechanisms can act as alternatives to derivative suits, it is important to 
examine the role of such mechanisms in disciplining management.
131
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It might be argued that when market mechanisms are in place to discipline 
management, then derivation litigation need not to be emphasised as both the market-
based mechanisms and derivative litigation are meant to do the same task and that is to 
discipline management. Next section of this chapter is premised on explaining 
shortcomings and well-known limitations of the market forces which render them 
inadequate and imperfect tools for managerial accountability. 
1.7.1 The Market-based Managerial Disciplinary Mechanisms  
Market mechanisms can operate as monitors of management.
132
 According to the 
modern economic theory, market forces have ability to play an important role in 
enhancing managerial efficiency and corporate accountability.
133
 In addition, it is 
contended that the market-based mechanisms have a major role to play in the growth of 
the stock markets.
134
A pertinent question arises here that if the market mechanisms are 
efficient in terms of disciplining management, then it is implausible to look at costly 
private litigation intended to rescue minority shareholders abused by majority 
shareholders. 
 However, scholars opine that the market- based mechanisms have their own 
characteristics and well-known limitations. Their view, in this respect, is that derivative 
actions have a key role to play in redressing wrongs suffered by the companies and 
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their minority shareholders.
135
 Given the limitations of the market mechanisms, most of 
the jurisdictions have legislated on shareholders’ derivative right of action so as to 
enable shareholders to punish blatant breach of duty on the part of managers or 
directors.
136
 
The role of market mechanisms to punish managerial misbehaviour cannot be examined 
in general rather it needs to be examined from the perspective of the particular capital 
markets.
137
  Next section aims at examining the role of market-based mechanisms to 
discipline management in Pakistan. The purpose of this examination is to consolidate 
problems with and limitations of the market mechanisms that underpin derivative 
litigation to be accessed for punishing wrongdoing directors and managers. 
1.7.2 The capital Market 
The capital market is one of the market-based disciplinary mechanisms. It may function 
to discipline management on the following grounds. 
Where controlling managers abuse corporate assets for their private gains, shareholders 
normally prefer not to stay with the company and they sell their share that ultimately 
affects the company’s share price. Decline in share price is detrimental to the company 
                                                 
135
 Simon Deakin, Ellis Ferran, and Richard Nolan, ‘Shareholders’ Rights and Remedies: An Overview’ 
(1997) 1 Company Financial and Insolvency Law Review162-171, 167:John E Parkinson, Corporate 
Power and Responsibility –Issues in the Theory of Company Law (Clarendon Press  1993) 132; Ibid 
(n37) 21-23. 
136
 Many countries such as South Africa, China, Singapore, Canada, New Zealand , Australia , the US 
and the UK have introduced statutory derivative action in their company laws providing an exception to 
the proper plaintiff rule; Asian countries which have statutory derivative action system include , Japan , 
Article 847, Companies Act ; South Korea ,Article 403-406 Korean Companies Code; Taiwan , Article 
214 Company Act ; China Article 152 , Company law ; Hong Kong Part 1VAA of the Companies Law 
(Amendment by the Companies Amendment Bill 2003) ; Singapore s 216 A Companies Act 1994. South 
Africa, Company Act 2008  
137
 Luca Enriques,‘The Law on Company Directors' Self-Dealing: A Comparative Analysis’(2000) 
3(2)International and Comparative Corporate Law Journal 297-333, 298.   
  31 
 
interest in a number of ways. First, it becomes difficult for the company to raise capital 
where its share price has fallen due to directorial misconducts that in turn, creates 
liquidity problems for the firm.
138
 Second, the fall of shares price of a company also 
exposes the company to fall prey to a takeover.
139
 
It must be borne in mind that when we say that the capital markets function as to push 
management to align its interests with those of the shareholders, it means that we are 
assuming that publicly available information is reflected in share price. In fact, this 
assumption is based on Eugene Fama’s theory of efficient market hypothesis.140  In 
theory, it may be correct to say that in an efficient market, the securities price reflect 
available information. However, the ‘market efficiency thesis’ becomes questionable 
when we apply it to the inefficient markets where share price does not reflect available 
information. 
The collapse of dot.com bubble during 1999-2001 offers strong evidence to the fact of 
capital markets’ mispricing and as a result, various companies failed.141 Andrew Lo’s 
study spreading on several years indicates that it is very controversial as to securities 
price reflecting available information.
142
 Academics differ widely on the market 
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efficiency thesis as regards the securities price accurately reflecting available 
information.
143
 
When it comes to Pakistan, the prevalence of financial frauds in Pakistan indicates that 
the equity prices do not reflect available information.
144
 In a number of studies, the 
market efficiency hypothesis has been tested and results have shown that the securities 
price have not reflected available information in the companies in Pakistan.
145
  
It is, thus, risky particularly in the context of Pakistan to rely singly on the capital 
markets for disciplining errant management. In fact, the capital market as managerial 
disciplinary mechanism cannot function in isolation; therefore, derivative litigation 
should be in the list of managerial disciplinary tools to prevent corporate assets from 
being abused by controlling managers. The capital market, therefore, cannot serve as an 
alternative to derivative litigation as the effectiveness of the capital market is subjected 
to market efficiency hypothesis. It is strongly doubtful that the capital market is 
efficient and is capable of punishing errant managers/directors in Pakistan. 
1.7.3 The Corporate Control Market  
It might be argued that the corporate control market can be a substitute for derivative 
litigation. Henry Manne was the first scholar who propounded this thesis that the 
market for corporate control has a central role to play in disciplining management.
146
 
The market for corporate control works on the principle that where managerial 
wrongdoings cause reduction in share price of a company, the company may fall prey 
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to a takeover.
147
 Therefore, the underperforming managers due to the fear of being 
sacked by the acquirer are pushed to act in the best interests of the company.
148
 In this 
sense, the takeover market could influence managerial behaviour and prevent 
managerial malfunctioning. 
The effectiveness of market for corporate control is based on the assumption that 
managerial misconducts would be reflected in the capital market that in turn, would 
cause fall of securities price. The fall of securities would ultimately pose threat to the 
company to be acquired. 
The corporate control market to punish incompetent managers is also subject to various 
contingencies and limitations. For example, in practice, larger companies take over the 
smaller ones.
149
 In principle, it is possible other way round where a smaller company 
takes over the larger one but it is not a usual practice.
150
The objectives of takeovers by 
the larger companies are normally empire-building motivated rather than disciplinary 
ones.
151
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 This can be seen in the UK where takeover markets particularly, hostile takeovers have 
not been seen ‘inefficiency driven’.152 The research also indicates that large outside 
share blocks have not significantly influenced managerial behaviours.
153
 As such, there 
is no significant evidence regarding improved corporate governance after takeovers.
154
 
Second, the takeover market mechanism is an expensive route to dislodge incompetent 
management as it involves substantial transaction costs.
155
 Therefore, the bidder has to 
think of the issues as agency costs, undervalued company and transactions costs before 
making decision of the takeover. Third, the takeover market mechanism has its little 
application to closely-held companies.
156
 Although, closely-held companies have 
relatively less significance in economic terms, yet they constitute the vast bulk of 
companies in Pakistan.
157
As a result, this limits the scope of takeover market 
mechanism in Pakistan. 
Last but not the least; the takeover market mechanism works in a very limited range. 
Normally, most of the firms are out of this range where they could become takeover 
targets. For example, if managerial inefficiency does not significantly cause fall of 
share price, then the company is out of the range so as to fall prey to a takeover. 
Similarly, if managerial inefficiency is so extreme that could cause takeovers, then it 
                                                 
152
 Franks and Mayer, ‘Governance as a Source of Managerial Discipline’ Prepared for the Company 
Law Review , Committee E on Corporate Governance (2000) 18. 
153
 Ibid 18.  
154
 Andrew Cosh and Paul Guest, The long run Performance of Hostile Takeovers: the UK Evidence 
(2011) ESRC Centre for Business Research , University of Cambridge Working Paper ,1-4,30  
155
  Pauline O Sullivan , ‘Governance by Exit, An Analysis of the market For Control in Kevin Keasey 
and Steve Thompson, Corporate Governance :Economic and Financial Issues (Oxford University Press, 
1997) 122 
156
 Ajit. Singh, Alaka Singh and Bruce Weisse, ‘Corporate Governance, Competition, the New 
International Financial Architecture and Large Corporations in Emerging Markets’ ESRC Centre for 
Business Research, University of Cambridge Working Paper No.250,30 
<www.cbr.cam.ac.uk/pdf/WP250.pdf >  accessed 02 March 2016.  
157
 There are 67,623 total companies in Pakistan as of 2015. Among those, 90 per cent companies are 
private companies on 12 December 2016. 
  35 
 
can become a risky undertaking for the acquirer. The corporate takeover market, thus, 
have serious limitations in its operations as its effectiveness depends on variables such 
as ownership structure, informational requirements and defensive tactics used by 
managers of the companies which are subject to potential takeovers. 
When it comes to Pakistan, liquidity problem in the capital markets of Pakistan
158
 
informs that relying on the takeover market for disciplining errant managers may not be 
effective where families and the State hold majority equities even in the listed 
companies which can be used to avoid takeovers. Without floating shares in the market, 
control of companies remains under the heel of controlling families and in SOEs, under 
the State. The takeover market, therefore, would not be effective to discipline 
management in Pakistan where the ownership structure is concentrated and capital 
market is illiquid. 
The corporate takeover market, thus, suffers from flaws and limitations.
159
 Scholars 
argue that extra-regulatory mechanisms may not be helpful in disciplining managerial 
misbehaviour as anticipated.
160
This thesis argues that changes in the law ought to be 
made in order to provide minority shareholders with greater access to the courts to seek 
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appropriate remedies. Empirical work suggests that strengthening legal protection to 
minority shareholders causes the stock markets develop.
161
 
1.8 Concluding Remarks 
In the light of foregoing examination, it is submitted that the use of derivative action is 
not a primary protection for minority shareholders against the misbehaviours of 
directors. Indeed, it holds a very significant position in the list of managerial 
disciplinary measures. The importance of derivative actions stems from the genesis 
where majority shareholders commit frauds on a company and its minority shareholders 
and they, by virtue of their control over the company, manage to supress litigation 
against them. The derivation litigation is, in this respect, premised on preventing 
managerial/directorial misconducts going unpunished and without being redressed. 
 The discussion in this chapter has canvassed the limitations of internal and external 
managerial disciplinary mechanisms such as shareholder voting and independent 
directors which thus encourage the role of the private sector enforcement through 
derivative litigation. Finally, with these observations, this chapter examined the role of 
the market forces to discipline management. A conclusion has been reached after 
having examined the market based managerial disciplinary mechanisms that they seem 
to play an insignificant role in disciplining management in Pakistan. In a business 
environment in which the threat to minority interests is negligible, imperfect 
managerial disciplinary frameworks seem to be inconsequential. 
It comes with no surprise that the derivative actions have an important role to play in 
deterring managerial misconducts. Various countries specific studies have been carried 
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out to explore the role of the derivative suits to deter reckless behaviour of controlling 
managers.
162
 No study, in this regard, has been carried out that focus solely on the 
subject of derivative proceedings in the context of Pakistan. This thesis aims at bridging 
this gap in the literature by examining the role of derivative litigation to glass over the 
sufferings of small investors and enforcing corporate rights. 
1.9 Research Questions  
A key argument this thesis makes surrounds the need to encourage the private-sector 
enforcement of the laws through the use of derivative litigation so as to prevent 
directorial opportunism and minimise minority sufferings at the hands of controlling 
shareholders in Pakistan. In order to provide a statutory framework for derivative action 
system, the derivative action systems in other jurisdictions, particularly that of the UK 
would be looked at while bearing in mind what lesson Pakistan could learn from them 
in this regard. 
In relation to the role of derivative action system to prevent managerial opportunism 
and protect minorities’ interests, this thesis seeks to answer three main questions. 
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(1) To what extent the insiders (controlling shareholders and directors) misuse their 
authority in taking business decisions in disregard of companies and small investors’ 
interests? 
 (2) What role do derivative actions play in promoting good corporate governance and 
in preserving corporate assets? 
 (3) How can company law be reformed, simplified and modernised so as to reinforce 
enforcement power of shareholders for safeguarding their interests in Pakistan? 
1.10 Research Methodologies   
This part explains the research methods used in this study. It explains the reasons for 
choosing the methods in this PhD study. This thesis employs a multi-methods approach 
so as to answer its research questions.
163
It combines doctrinal, historical, case study, 
comparative and semi-structured interviews methods to examine in detail all 
dimensions of difficulties minority shareholders facing in Pakistan in relations to the 
enforcement of their rights.  
1.10.1 Doctrinal Analysis   
The doctrinal analysis is meant to locate and analyse the laws to reach a tentative 
conclusion, premised on solving a specific legal problem and visualising future 
developments.
164
A doctrinal approach has been applied in this thesis so as to 
encompass the theme of this thesis and to answer the research questions. As in chapters 
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3 and 4, we shall see that the doctrinal research method was important (1) in locating 
laws relating to minority rights and remedies, and (2) then analysing them. The legal 
analysis is adopted to accentuate the shortcomings in the company law of Pakistan in 
relation to minority shareholders rights and remedies. This is significant in developing 
and providing guidelines or proposals for the improvement or reform in the country’s 
current legal system. 
1.10.2 A Historical Approach  
A study that involves expropriation of minority interests by controlling managers can 
be carried out using a historical approach. Historical approach helps a researcher to 
understand the context of a phenomenon relating to the past events. It involves 
developing an understanding of the past that holds some significance for the present.
165
 
This is useful as the future, in any case depends on the past: future is not completely 
foreseen but equally it is not the result of a chance.
166
 Moreover, historical approach 
helps a researcher to understand the context of a phenomenon relating to the past 
events. 
This study adopts a historical approach in order to identify factors which led to block-
holding ownership structure posing threats to minority interests, and to analyse the 
evolution of company law and legal system of Pakistan. Watson states that historical 
background is essential to understand a particular law for the purpose of legal 
transplant.
167
 The adoption of historical approach is helpful in understanding the 
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historical insight and context to assist in proposing an effective minority protection 
mechanism notwithstanding the significant concentrated control of shareholders in 
Pakistan provides an enormous scope for corporate abuses. 
1.10.3 A Case Study Approach 
Yin recommends that case study approach should be used when a research needs 
answering ‘why’ and ‘how’ structured questions.168 Case study approach has been used 
in this thesis to investigate conflict of interest problem between minor and major 
shareholders in the selected cases and find out why and how corporate management 
takes self-serving decisions in business entities in Pakistan. According to Yin, case 
study method focuses on deep understanding of a phenomenon in an individual 
situation.
169
 Bromley also defines a case study method in a similar way. According to 
him, case study method is a systematic investigation of a phenomenon so as to describe 
and explain the studied phenomenon.
170
 In the light of the definitions, the case study 
method is a systematic investigation of a phenomenon by explaining its evolution and 
carrying out the inquiry so as to gain necessary information that could be referred in 
arriving at certain conclusions. 
Case studies can be explanatory, descriptive or exploratory.
171
 The explanatory case 
study enables cases to be used with greater rigour in a research as a tool to support 
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arguments.
172
 Accordingly, the explanatory case study format employed in this thesis 
helps to analyse the micro of the conflict of interest problems, and also to set this within 
a wider understanding of expropriation of corporate assets by the controllers in 
Pakistan. 
A case study research method is not necessarily to be either qualitative or 
quantitative.
173
It can be a combination of both; therefore, both qualitative and 
quantitative data collection tools can be used so as to gain the relevant information for 
studying a phenomenon. There is a range of data which can provide a flesh to fill in the 
skeleton of case study method.  Data required to carry out a case study may come from 
archival records, participant observation, interview, direct observation and 
documentations.
174
In this study, documentations such as the annual reports of the 
companies, investigation reports, applicable legislations, case laws, newspaper reports, 
articles and archival records are used to understand the problem of fraud committed by 
controlling shareholders on companies and their minority shareholders. 
In this thesis, multiple case study approach has been chosen to develop a theoretical 
framework for this thesis. A multiple case study approach helps to look at the findings 
from a comparative perspective that enables developing theory.
175
 The cases studied 
indicated that controlling shareholders misuse their dominant authority in disregard to 
the interests of the companies and small investors. 
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The findings from the case studies are not different to the extent of expropriation of 
corporate assets by the controlling managers that too gains support for theory 
creation.
176
 Moreover, in order to avoid reliability issues, same variables have been 
studied to create theory and allow replication of findings. Studying same variables 
makes comparisons across expropriations cases possible and supports theory creation. 
The variables studied are expropriation of corporate assets, managerial misconduct and 
weak enforcement power of small shareholders as to safeguarding corporate rights. 
An important issue that needs to be addressed explicitly relates to generalising findings 
of the cases studied to exemplify expropriation of minority interests by the controllers 
and to provide a theoretical framework for this thesis. In a qualitative research, 
generalisation of findings is problematic where those findings are based on a single 
case. However, this is not the case with multiple case studies which may provide a 
strong basis for generalising findings. As explained earlier, in this study, conclusions 
are based on investigations of multiple cases. Thus, findings from the cases studied can 
be applied to other acts of expropriation of corporate assets though modes of 
managerial misconducts and expropriation in other cases may be different. 
1.10.4 A Comparative Approach  
This thesis also employs a comparative approach
177
 for which the jurisdiction of the UK 
has been chosen as analysis sample. This is because the UK is the most advanced 
commercial law jurisdiction and it holds a significance influence over legal frameworks 
of common law countries. Being a common law country, the company law of Pakistan 
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is a remnant of colonial legal legacy and stands largely in its original form.
178
 
Furthermore, Pakistan and Britain share a common heritage of history extending over a 
period of more than one hundred year. Therefore, a comparative reflection on 
Pakistan’s legal framework cannot avoid analysis of relevant laws in its birthplace. 
A significant argument this thesis makes relates to inadequacies of law which facilitate 
pyramiding arrangements and lead to the expropriation of minority interests by 
controlling managers in Pakistan. This thesis contributes to the literature by putting 
forward future legal reform proposals regarding statutory derivative action system in 
Pakistan. Consequently, the selection of the UK for comparative analysis becomes 
important as the UK is the originator of the derivative action system which is expected 
to bring a good reference for Pakistan. 
However, it might be argued that the US is also an advanced jurisdiction and has a long 
history of derivative action system. As such, the courts are not as much willing in the 
UK as the US courts are, in accepting the application of derivative claims. To that, it is 
submitted that the main focus is on the UK derivative action system while reference 
would also be made to other jurisdictions where necessary so as to learn from their 
experiences.   
In fact, the derivative action system is not the only way of disciplining errant 
management and protecting minorities. There are other mechanisms such as the capital 
markets, the market for corporate control, the product markets, shareholder voting and 
the framework of independent directors that may function to discipline errant 
management. The role of the derivative actions depend not only on its own legal rules 
but also on other intuitional factors and managerial disciplinary mechanisms. This is 
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because corporate governance is a system that sets out the internal relations between 
various constituencies of a company. Therefore, it is right to say that the role of 
derivative actions is inversely proportional to the effectiveness of other managerial 
disciplinary mechanisms. The more effective other mechanisms are, the less the role of 
derivative actions is. 
It is, therefore, not apt to say that one jurisdiction has a better derivative action system 
than the other. As such, one cannot say that the US derivative action system is better 
than the UK’s where courts hold relatively more conservative attitude towards 
derivative claims. This is mainly due to the reason that unfair prejudice remedy is 
readily available to disgruntled shareholders in the UK and hence, derivative actions are 
not that much important. Thus, borrowing rules from other jurisdictions does not 
depend on whether those rules are good or bad but it depends on the suitability of those 
rules in the receiving jurisdictions.  
The purpose of using a comparative approach is to analyse where Pakistan can draw 
lesson from the UK so as to devise its statutory derivative action system.
179
 However, it 
is debateable whether borrowing from other jurisdictions is useful for improving legal 
frameworks. The debate over borrowing from other jurisdictions has been carried out in 
this part bearing in mind whether borrowing from the UK is possible for Pakistan. 
Alan Watson defines legal transplant, ‘as moving laws from one jurisdiction to another 
jurisdiction’.180 He is of the view that legal transplant is very useful for a legal change 
in a jurisdiction. Therefore, he recommends that understanding of legal developments 
in other jurisdictions is useful for lawmakers to have new insights into how to reform 
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their particular laws.
181
 Watson also opines that the ‘voluntary legal transplant’ can be a 
good source for developing laws in receiving jurisdictions. Given the importance of 
voluntary legal transplant, he attempts to establish his view that relationship between 
law and society is a misconceived notion. His believes that the legal origin in a society 
does not develop usually by virtue of a logical outgrowth of the society’s own 
experience.
182
 
However, contextualist and culturalist schools have criticised Watson’s view on legal 
change. The contextualist school levels charges against his ‘legal transplant’ thesis by 
stating that he ignores social structural factors and undermines the rationale for 
developing a theory of law and society.
183
 Moreover, Watson’s thesis on legal 
transplant did not remain unchallenged by the culturalist school. For example, they hold 
that a particular culture determine the development of law in a jurisdiction. They reject 
Watson’s ‘legal transplant’ thesis by claiming that law evolves historically and Watson 
overlooks a specific culture inherent in every legal system.
184
 
Given the concerns raised by the contextualist and culturalist schools, two important 
questions needs to be answered so as to justify the adoption of a comparative approach 
for this thesis. First question relates to the prospects of legal transplant in the context of 
Pakistan. Second question that requires answering relates to the efficacy of legal 
transplant in Pakistan. The first question is answered on the basis of following reasons.  
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First, Pakistan is a member of World Trade Organisation (WTO) that requires national 
laws to be more liberal and to be in congruence with international standards.
185
 To that 
end, legal transplant becomes necessary and inevitable for Pakistan. Second, cultural 
and political conditions that may resist legal transplant are inherent in the public laws 
such as criminal and constitutional laws. However, commercial laws are not that much 
closely linked to cultural and political conditions as they function according to their 
own ground rules and they work relatively in an autonomous system of law. The 
cultural differences, though important, are not fatal to the comparison in the area of 
commercial laws. Therefore, legal transplant is possible in the area of commercial laws 
and the one model governance thesis at least confirms the veracity of this statement.
186
 
Whilst legal transplant is possible, it does not mean copying laws from one jurisdiction 
to another one. The potential benefits of borrowing from other jurisdiction can only be 
achieved if it considers the legal culture and other extra-legal conditions.
187
 Though the 
legal transplant does not face as resistance in commercial laws as it may in the public 
laws-closely linked to local conditions; therefore it is important to pay heeds towards 
local conditions as each and every single rule may not function in a receiving 
jurisdiction as effectively as it does in its birthplace. Thus, when this thesis uses a 
comparative approach, it means comparative approach based on the UK’s experience 
provides guideline where relevant, in order to establish an effective derivative action 
system in Pakistan based on both doctrinal and empirical grounds. 
                                                 
185
 ‘Pakistan Ratifies WTO deals’ Daily Dawn newspaper <www.dawn.com/news/1215829> accessed  
27 February 2016. 
186
 See generally ,Arthur R. Pinto, Globalisation and The Study of Comparative Corporate 
Governance’(2005)23 Wisconsin International Law Journal 477 
187
 Daniel Berkowitz, Katharina Pistor and Jean-Francois Richard, ‘The Transplant Effect’(2003)51(1) 
American Society of Comparative Law 163-203; Ibid (n183). 
  47 
 
1.10.5 Semi-Structured Interviews 
Lack of case law, case commentaries together with weak relevant knowledge base 
require another useful source material necessary to assess and inform reform proposals 
made in this thesis by giving a sense of multiple interpretations and, by reflecting the 
reactions of the interviewees. The qualitative empirical approach employed in this 
thesis consisted of eight semi-structured interviews
188
 from local corporate lawyers, 
academics and the senior SECP officials so as to look into how statutory derivative 
action system works effectively in the marketplace. 
 Six interviews were conducted through SKYPE. Whereas two interviews were 
conducted face-to-face in the UK when some domestic corporate lawyers from Pakistan 
visited UK to attend condolence seminar organised by the Law Society, UK for the 
suicidal attack on lawyers community in Quetta, Pakistan. The aim of such interviews 
was to provide an evaluation of reform proposals made in this thesis and to incorporate 
their insightful and illustrative suggestions that had helped in proposing a workable and 
meaningful derivative action framework in Pakistan. 
The interviews included open-ended questions instead of closed ended questions where 
normally questions are sought to be answered with ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ responses.189The 
open-ended questions format was chosen so as to allow the participants to develop their 
own view on a specific legal argument and provide their comments and opinions. The 
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advantage of semi-structured interviews was to understand in-depth of an individual’s 
perspective by giving a sense of multiple interpretations. 
According to Kvale, the purpose of semi-structured interviews is to understand the 
qualitative descriptions of the phenomenon of interest.
190
This work helps to assess what 
problems minorities actually face in the enforcement of their rights in Pakistan, by 
reflecting the views of people who are involved in private litigations and policy making 
that helps in finding appropriate reform proposals. In order to undertake field work, the 
interview plan received formal ethics clearance from Research Graduate School, 
University of Bedfordshire, UK. (See Appendix 1 ethics form approval) 
The SECP officials were identified through employee’s information available at the 
SECP website, in order to recruit suitable interviewees. Other interviewees i.e domestic 
corporate lawyers and academics were selected using the ‘snowball’ sampling 
technique.
191
 This meant I approached some of the interviewees using my own personal 
contacts and then extended the sample size following the suggestions made by initially 
approached interviewees. 
In order to achieve the objectives of the research, I introduced interviewees to the 
research purposes, expected duration of interviews and the procedure employed for 
maintaining their confidentiality. I also made it clear to the participants that they might 
withdraw from participating at any stage of the interview process. Each participant was 
provided with the ‘Consent Form’ approved by Research Graduate School, UOB. All 
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the participants were requested to read and sign the form before consenting to their 
participation. 
As privacy and confidentiality is essential in all research,
192
 I assured all participants of 
keeping their identity confidential. Participants were selected from different 
backgrounds and experiences deliberately with the purpose to elicit their views on 
reform proposals. The interviews comprised of open-ended probing questions necessary 
to allow participants to respond in more depth on issues under exploration.
193
I recorded 
interviews in form of written notes and then shared those written notes with the 
interviewees so as to avoid any misunderstanding. After having got the agreement of 
the interviewees, I transcribed interviews into Microsoft Word. 
The interview data was subject to thematic analysis. Braun and Clarke’s194 six 
phases’195 format for thematic analysis was adopted that assisted this study by 
providing a transparent data analysis to assess the reforms proposals, results and 
contribution of this thesis. 
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1.10.6 Reliability and Validity 
In a qualitative research, concerns regarding reliability and validity needs to be 
addressed clearly.
196
 Frost explains reliability, an evaluation criteria for the 
trustworthiness of the research.
197
A reliability of research can be achieved by clearly 
showing the audit trail of evidence.
198
 In this study, reliability has been ensured by 
clearly stating the data collection process, data analysis tool and the process of 
developing findings. 
According to Frost, validity refers to a true reflection of a research’s findings.199 
Concerns regarding the validity of a research affect credibility of the research. In this 
study, validity was ensured by making clear the research schedule based on the 
doctrinal analysis and participants’ views and opinions to evaluate reform proposals 
made in this thesis. With validity concerns acknowledged, it helped avoid research bias. 
Secondly, the interview transcripts were shared with the interviewees so as to make 
correction of any misunderstanding that helped gain accurate information and sufficient 
assessment of the reform proposals.
200
 
1.10.7 Data Required  
In order to study managerial opportunism and protection of corporate and small 
investors’ interests, information regarding expropriation problems and shareholders’ 
enforcement powers is needed. Data has been collected from a number of authoritative 
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sources; applicable legislation, case law and other official publications. In addition, this 
study relies on secondary sources such as journal articles, practitioner textbooks and 
electronic legal databases such as Westlaw, Lexis, BAILLI, Pakistan law journal, 
Pakistan law site and Pakistan Law Digest. As explained above, eight semi-structured 
interviews were conducted in order to assess and incorporate respondents’ insightful 
suggestions as to reform proposals made in this thesis. 
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Chapter 2.  Literature Review  
2.1 Introduction  
This chapter reviews literature that significantly helps to develop understanding as to 
the unique context of managerial opportunism and dimensions of shareholder 
protection. The review of literature would shed light on the objectives of this thesis and 
strong empirical and conceptual foundations thereof. It identifies what previous 
scholars have contributed to the literature on subject of derivative litigation as to 
disciplining errant managers and recapitulates key concerns and gaps in the existing 
literature on derivative proceedings. This chapter serves as a signifying benchmark that 
this thesis advances in the literature on the subject of derivative litigation. 
This chapter reviews scholarly work on six main areas. First, it reviews a key literature 
on the subject of corporate ownership structures and protection of shareholders. 
Second, it uses agency theory tending to locate conflicts of interests between 
shareholders inter se in Pakistan. Third, significant research on Contractarian, legal and 
Communitarian theories is reviewed. Fourth, it underscores key research on corporate 
governance models and minimisation of agency costs. Fifth, this chapter largely 
examines literature on the need for law and justification as to protecting minorities. 
Finally, the gap in the existing literature is identified that this thesis aims to fill. 
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2.2 Corporate Ownership Structure 
It is imperative to first discuss literature on corporate ownership structures in order for 
providing a basis for the major issue this research seeks to address. Academics regard 
ownership structures a highly important element in governance mechanism.
1
 This is 
mainly due to the reason that the ownership structures have an immense influence over 
both governance problems as well as on formulation of governance policies.
2
 This part 
briefly explains the two mainstream structures of ownership structures namely; ‘the 
concentrated ownership structure and the dispersed ownership structure, and it 
culminates in an examination of the ownership structure in Pakistan. 
In concentrated ownership structure, shareholders use different techniques so as to gain 
control over a company. They may use ‘block-holding strategy’ in which they own 
blocks of shares which happen to be large enough to gain control over corporations.
3
 
Issuance of shares with enhanced voting rights may also provide shareholders with an 
opportunity to have control over the company.
4
 Furthermore, shareholders may gain 
control of a firm through the use of pyramid ownership structures.
5
 The pyramid 
ownership structures help majority shareholders to control both the company wherein 
they happen to be majority shareholders as well as its other subsidiaries even though 
with small equities. 
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For example, in pyramid ownership arrangements, a family based company may control 
a publicly traded company A, and then the company A controls another publicly traded 
company B and then the company B controls another company namely; C and in doing 
so, the company positioned at the upper tier of the pyramid also controls the company 
that is at the lowest tier of the pyramid often with very low shareholding. Thus, such 
ownership arrangements help the ultimate controller to control other firms in the 
pyramid structure even though with very small equities and enjoy voting rights 
disproportionate to their cash flow rights.
6
 
Cross shareholdings structures may also be used by shareholders to have control over 
the company. The cross-shareholding structures help shareholders maintain control 
over different firms by owning shares therein. For example, if majority shareholders, 
due to their majority shareholdings, have the control of a company A and if  company 
A owns majority shares of company B, this phenomenon helps the majority 
shareholders of company A to control company B alongside though they are not 
owning majority shares in the company B.
7
 
Dispersed ownership structures are typified with low ownership concentration. Due to 
scattered shareholding in the dispersed ownership structure, it becomes problematic for 
shareholders to reach an agreement in relation to decision making as it is difficult to 
persuade all the shareholders at a time.  It may also be an expensive exercise and 
sometime impracticable to call and unite all the shareholders for the purpose of making 
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decisions.
8
 Therefore, dispersed ownership structures are marked with the 
characteristics of shareholders’ indifferent attitude towards their participation in 
decision making and possible disagreements in making decisions.
9
  
Most shareholders owning small securities show an apathetic attitude towards corporate 
activities considering that their action may not bring forth significant benefits for them. 
This apathetic attitude of shareholders allows management to control and manipulate 
corporate decision making whimsically.
10
 Consequently, the management is afforded 
with an opportunity to control the agenda of meetings which, in turn, further weakens 
the control of shareholders on corporate actions.
11
 This was established by Jensen and 
Meckling’s research that the more the percentage of ownership, the less the agency 
costs shareholders have to bear.
12
 This was also supported by Deakin and Hughes’s 
study which posits that in situations where the board holds more than 50 per cent 
shares, there are less chances for agency issues to arise.
13
 Dispersed ownership 
structure is not a common phenomenon.
14
 With exception of the UK and the US, there 
are mainly concentrated corporate ownership structures with business groups and the 
states dominating the corporate sectors.
15
 
                                                 
8
 Stephen M Bainbridge,‘Director Primacy and shareholder disempowerment’ (2006) 119(6) Harvard 
Law Review 05-25, 20. 
9
 Ibid 20. 
10
 On rational apathy , see  Robert C Clark , Corporate Law (Little Brown 1986)390-2  
11
 John Cubbin and Dennis Leech, ‘The Effect of Shareholding Dispersion on the Degree of Control in 
British Companies: Theory and Measurement’ (1983) 93(370)The Economic Journal 351- 369,355 
12
 Michael C. Jensen and William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behaviour, agency costs 
and ownership structures’(1976)3(4) Journal of Finance Economics 305,308,317. 
13
 Simon Deakin and Alan Hughes , ESRC Report( ESRC Centre for Business Research, University of 
Cambridge 1999) para 4.2 , Grant Thornton Corporate Governance Review, A Changing Climate: Fresh 
Challenges ahead ? (2011) <http//www.grant.thornton.co.uk/en/publications/2011/Corporate 
Governance-Review-2011/> accessed 01 January 2017. 
14
Ibid (n5) 497. 
15
Ibid (n5) 497. 
  56 
 
In Pakistan, there is a shareholder concentration with families and business groups 
taking the dominant positions in family based as well as in the listed companies. 
Cheema et al examined factors which stood instrumental to the corporate sector 
development in Pakistan. They found that private sector was the major factor which led 
to the industrialization in Pakistan after its independence.
16
 Few families continued to 
be the main beneficiaries of the financial policies of the government of Pakistan (GOP). 
The families were given fiscal incentives, different subsidised credits and cheap import 
of capital goods which helped them gain control of the corporate sector in Pakistan.
17
 
Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto (1972-1977) contested election on the manifesto of nationalization 
of industrial sector and introduced a plan of reducing industrial concentration in the 
corporate sector of Pakistan.
18
When he came into power, his government nationalised a 
large number of industrial units. The banking industry was also nationalised which 
helped the GOP to gain control over the financial sector of Pakistan. 
However, the subsequent democratic governments in 1990s abandoned the policy of 
nationalization and revived the role of private sector in Pakistan. Nevertheless, the 
corporate ownership structure remains unchanged and business families and the 
government of Pakistan are still enjoying dominant position in the corporate sector of 
Pakistan.
19
 The researchers highlighted that due to the pyramid structures, interlocking 
directorships and cross-shareholdings, controlling stockholders extract private benefits 
at the cost of the companies’ interests. They further maintain that this high level of the 
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intra-group ownership concentration poses threats to corporations’ as well as to the 
rights and interests of small investors in Pakistan.
20
 
Tunnelling is a common form of corporate misconduct in Pakistan which is facilitated 
by complex cross-shareholding structures and further the intricate coordination of 
businesses of group of companies. The dominance of a group of shareholders can be a 
family group or can be a coalition or collection of investors dominating the 
corporations in leagues with each other’s support. These ownership settings pose 
threats to minority rights through abusive related party transactions, illegal intra-
corporate financing, inflated salaries to managers and exploitation of corporate 
opportunities. This state of affairs underpins the introduction of statutory derivative 
action system in Pakistan so as to provide shareholders with an effective weapon of 
corporate accountability. 
2.3 Background to Agency Costs 
Since Berle and Means first presented the theory of control over the corporate form,
21
 
the term ‘agency’ used in economic context is now being used in legal scholarship. 
Berle and Means have pointed out in their work, ‘The Modern Corporation and Private 
Property’ that, due to division of ownership and control, the decision making control 
has shifted into the hands of  managers.
22
  This division of ownership and control is 
necessary due to several reasons. 
First, since it is not feasible for shareholders to run and look after the business 
operations in companies, it is necessary to transfer the control of company to 
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professional managers in order to run companies effectively. This separation is also 
useful for owners themselves in a sense as it allows them to focus on their investments 
and hence, this helps capital markets develop. 
Second, the profits of a company very much depend on the efficiency of professional 
managers instead of investors’ energy and initiatives in view of the rapid growth of the 
capital markets. Originally, investors are more concerned with their property they 
invest in the companies. However, the situation is no more the same in the modern 
capital markets where investors invest in different companies and they do not worry 
about the actual property in which they have invested. In this sense, shareholders have 
become a mere supplier of capital in listed companies.
23
 
Third, professional managers are necessary to run the company in the sense that in the 
modern capital markets, quicker responses are required for market reactions which are 
unlikely to be made without professional management. Therefore, employment of 
professional management with managerial skills is highly needed in order to achieve 
competitive advantages. The division of ownership and control is, thus, necessary in a 
sense that it helps companies increase profits and also helps capital markets expand. 
However, the division of ownership and control may give rise to conflict of interests 
issues referred to by economists as ‘agency problems’ where management prefers its 
personal interests over the interests of shareholders at times when their interests 
conflicts with each other.
24
 The management is supposed to serve as being the agent of 
shareholders in the supreme interest of the company and its shareholders. 
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However, it comes with surprise that there exist no agency problems without having 
legal and extra-legal mechanisms to reduce the same. In fact, management normally 
possesses smarter access to corporate information than the shareholders have which 
makes it difficult for shareholders to make sure that managerial actions serve the best 
interest of the company.
25
 Consequently, it may lead to managerial opportunism and 
encourage management to pursue its personal interests at the expense of the company 
and its shareholders. 
Such abuse of authority affects managerial performance and hence reduces 
shareholders’ confidence to invest in the company.  The conflict of interest problem 
generates monitoring cost for shareholders wishing to monitor managerial actions and 
bonding costs for management to assure shareholders that managerial actions are 
focussed on the maximisation of shareholders’ value.26 Given the threat management 
poses to the interests of shareholders, Berle and Means suggested that law is the answer 
to discipline and control management.
27
Agency theory has explained the disjunction 
between ownership and control and the conflict of interest arising out of this agency 
relationship. 
2.4 Agency Theory  
Jensen and Meckling presented the agency theory that suggests that controlling 
shareholders, by virtue of their dominant position, may act opportunistically and hence, 
they may expropriate corporate assets at the cost of minority interests. It is, thus, 
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important to reduce agency costs in order to foster the confidence of shareholders and 
to improve the performance of management.
28
 In Pakistan, there are horizontal agency 
problems as there is no separation of control and ownership. Controlling shareholders 
place their family members and the trusted persons in managerial and directorial 
positions in family-owned companies. Similarly, managers are selected in the state-
owned enterprises on the basis of their political affiliations and personal connections 
with the government. Since management is controlled by majority shareholders; the 
actual conflict of interest emerges between shareholders inter se instead of shareholders 
and management conflict of interests in Pakistan.
29
 
The agency theorists recognise that it is not feasible that managerial contracts should 
include all aspects of managerial actions, thus allowing management to rule on such 
voids left in the managerial contracts. Such an incomplete nature of managerial 
contracts may lead to managerial misconduct and potential misbehaviour on the part of 
managers.
30
 This is mainly due to the reason that shareholders become part of contracts 
by merely purchasing shares in the public companies and hence, they are unable as to 
negotiating the terms of managerial contracts. Therefore, it is impracticable to 
renegotiate the contracts once shares have been allocated.  
Eisenhardt argues that agency theory is relevant in three eventualities; (a) where there is 
conflict of interest leading to managerial opportunism,(b) where there are attendant 
uncertainty, (c) where monitoring is difficult to perform.
31
 Such eventualities are 
present with managerial opportunism and shareholder protection. For example, 
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independent directors are required to monitor executive directors; however, due to their 
close connections with executive directors and dependence on executive members of 
the board for their re-election are few of the instances that can lead to a creation of 
conflict of interest. Therefore, the company will bear the agency costs so as to align 
interests of the constituencies. Reducing agency problems has been a principle point to 
agency debate. 
Agency theorists argued that there is an existence of agency relationship between 
owners and managers. Although, there is no as such direct link of law on agency 
relationship, yet the agency theory erstwhile used in economic terms is now being 
recognised in legal scholarship as a means to explain intra-corporate relations and has 
gained the position in legal scholarship as a basis for formative suggestions. In view of 
managerial opportunism necessitated by agency relationship, agency theorists 
recommend that there must be an effective mechanism to police managerial actions in 
order to avert conflict of interest problem.
32
 To that end, legal origin theory 
recommends that legal systems are essential to discipline delinquent managers and the 
protection afforded to minority shareholders helps the capital markets develop.
33
 
This thesis extends Jensen and Meckling’s research that there must be an effective 
mechanism to police managerial actions by arguing that agency costs can be controlled 
in Pakistan by enabling shareholders to initiate derivative proceedings against 
managerial misconducts.  Without an adequate legal protection, management may 
ignore the interests of minorities and may expropriate corporate assets for their private 
gains. One of the mechanisms to reduce agency cost can be to allow minority 
                                                 
32
 See generally, Ibid (n12).  
33
 Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes and Andrei Shleifer, Investor Protection and Corporate 
Valuation’(2002) 57(3)Journal of Finance 1147-1170,1147 
  62 
 
shareholders to litigate in the name of a company in case any wrong is done to the 
company. 
In Pakistan, inadequate legal protection available to minorities exacerbates the conflict 
of interest problem between minority-majority shareholders. Well-designed statutory 
protection in the form of derivative action system may better protect minority as well as 
company interests and may reduce opportunities for controlling managers to 
expropriate corporate assets in Pakistan. 
2.5 Legal Contractarian Theory   
The contractarians are critical of legal intervention. They opine that shareholders are 
protected through private contractual system.
34
  They opine that managerial actions are 
bound by contractual commitments and shareholders may safeguard their interests by 
exercising their contractual rights.
35
 The legal contractarian theory is subject to well-
grounded criticism. For example, Clark disregarded legal contractarian theory on 
grounds of incomplete nature of contracts and the role of corporate laws to fill void left 
in incomplete contracts. Clark criticises contractarians mainly on grounds of (1) limited 
liability concept that can exonerate errant shareholders from personal liability, (2) 
transferability of shares that may create opportunities for large shareholders to commit 
fraud on small shareholders, (3) ownership concentration that sets a governance 
environment where agency costs are obvious.
36
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Additionally, corporate law communitarians are opposed to the legal contractarians 
theory.
37
  The communitarians are also sceptical about the efficiency of private 
contractual system. They pay regards to the interest of multilateral community and 
hence, seek legal protection for non-shareholder constituencies as well as small 
investors in firms where they are affected by managerial actions.
38
 They favour legal 
intervention in corporate affairs and regulating managerial actions. According to them, 
imposition of legal duties on managers is important to promote fair play for all the non- 
shareholder and shareholder constituencies of corporations.  Sharia business principles 
as embraced and required to be adhered to by the constitution of Pakistan are analogous 
to communitarian view that is to seek protection of public interest through state 
intervention in business enterprises.
39
 
Moreover, two American law and economics theorists, Easterbrook and Fischel explain 
that managerial contracts are inherently incomplete and do not cover all managerial 
aspects. This is mainly due to the reason that contractual provisions are not sufficiently 
detailed to cover future contingencies and they are incapable of meeting every 
contingency. Moreover, fiduciary duty and structure rules fall short of covering all 
aspects of managerial actions.
40
 As a result, the incompleteness of contracts allows 
directors to behave opportunistically. Therefore, such an incomplete contractual 
relationship cannot guarantee protection of shareholders in case of any violation of their 
rights. 
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Upon bankruptcy, shareholders are a tier below the other claimants and as a result, they 
are paid last.
41
 Therefore, there should be a route by which they could make good 
wrong done to theirs’ and corporate interests. Bankruptcy laws and the terms of 
contracts protect other stakeholders such as bondholders, preferred shareholders and 
creditors in case of financial difficulty putting their investments at risks.
42
 However, 
ordinary shareholders remain unprotected being residual claim-holders. In some cases, 
even shareholders go empty-handed if nothing is left in liquidation proceedings. Thus, 
Easterbrook and Fischel supported legal protection for shareholders due to their 
residual claim-holding status and incomplete contractual relationship.
43
 
 Keay and Zhang have also explained the incomplete contractual relationship in the 
context of private companies. They opine that parties sometimes cannot foresee future 
events which may affect this contractual relationship; therefore, contracts cannot be 
sufficiently and comprehensibly graphic to cover future happenings and all aspects of 
managerial actions.
44
 This is a well-known problem with the formation of contracts that 
they cannot exist in an ideal form as it has been described by Williamson, ‘the foresight 
is, at best, imperfect’.45 This incomplete nature of contracts may provide managers with 
opportunities to engage in illegal activities because small investors may not be able to 
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foresee the misuse of incomplete provisions of contracts and consequential ex-post 
opportunism at the time of signing contracts.
46
 
Goddard has further explained the concept of incomplete contracts. He points out that 
in view of an asymmetrical relationship, minority shareholders are not acquainted with 
necessary information to negotiate a detailed contract that could safeguard their 
interests. Consequently, he observes that this asymmetric information leads to 
incomplete contracts.
47
 Thus, standard contractual provisions may not resolve all 
problems arising out of contractual relationship between shareholders and directors. 
The concept of incomplete contracts necessitates that there should be additional 
mechanisms which could complete these contracts. These mechanisms may include 
independent board directors, incentive compatible compensation and takeover markets. 
However, Michael Jensen, a famous financial economist, notes that financial markets 
and internal governance systems have their own limitations and thus, they are unable to 
push managers to serve in line with the best interests of the companies and 
shareholders.
48
 He, therefore, recommends that the imposition of legal liability on 
malfeasance managerial actions is vital in order to protect shareholders who suffer due 
to incomplete contractual provisions.
49
 
This thesis advances literature on shareholder remedial rights by arguing that law needs 
to intervene as the standard contracts do not cover all aspects of managerial actions. 
Therefore, legal remedy via derivative litigation should be available to shareholders and 
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be used in complement with other minority protection measures such as voting rights, 
independent directors and market-based managerial disciplinary mechanisms in order to 
provide a robust enforcement mechanism in the hands of shareholders so as to 
safeguard corporate assets.  
2.6 Reducing Agency Costs 
This thesis argues that law has a crucial role to play in reducing agency costs.  
However, a question may crop up that if capital markets can effectively punish 
directorial misconducts and reduce agency costs then the legal provisions for minority 
protection lose their justification. Likewise, if law can be instrumental to reducing 
agency costs, then the argument to explore market based mechanisms is weakened as 
both market mechanisms and legal provisions serve the same purpose that is to protect 
corporate assets. As this thesis argues that market based disciplinary mechanisms have 
their own well-defined limitations, at least, in the context of Pakistan due to various 
reasons that underpins shareholder litigation in order to protect their rights.
50
 
Therefore, law needs to be relied on so as to make good wrongs done to the companies 
and their minority shareholders. The limitations of market-based mechanisms have 
already been discussed in chapter 1(section 1.7). 
2.7 Legal intervention and shareholder Protection  
Literature on minority protection is mainly divided into two schools. One who believes 
in legal intervention for safeguarding shareholders’ interests and regards it essential for 
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improving corporate governance and enhancing shareholder confidence.
51
 The other 
school refutes the role of law in the protection of corporate and shareholders’ interests. 
I examine arguments of both sides in this section to see whether the law needs to be 
relied upon to protect shareholders in Pakistan or otherwise. 
The legal intervention for shareholder protection was strengthened by Rafael La Porta 
et al’s research that the success of the capital markets very much depends on legal 
protection of shareholders. They, after having conducted empirical research across 49 
jurisdictions, argue that jurisdictions embracing adequate protection attract investors 
and encourage Initial Public Offering (IPO) which ultimately provides liquidity to 
corporations that leads to the growth of the capital markets. On the other hand, 
jurisdictions where the law does not offer adequate protection to minorities, the capital 
markets do not work well. Their research concludes that investor protection and the 
developed capital markets are concomitant.
52
 In protected countries, outside investors 
such as minority shareholders feel secure and protected and hence, they finance 
corporations which, in turn, help the capital markets develop.
53
 
They argue that jurisdictions with diffused structures are more protective and the 
capital markets grow faster than the ones with block-holding ownership structures. As 
such, if investors feel insecure, they may use the strategy of owning blocks of shares to 
protect their interests which, in turn, encourage block-holding ownership structures. In 
principle, a block-holding ownership structure cannot be termed as an inefficient 
governance structure; in fact, it can better monitor managerial actions due to block of 
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shares. However, problem arises in the block-holding ownership structures where large 
investors expropriate corporate assets for their personal gains at the cost of minorities’ 
interests.  Rafael La Porta et al conclude that large investors may expropriate small 
investors’ interests by dint of their dominant authority in firms. They suggested that 
improved shareholder protection has potential to reduce disinformation detrimental to 
contractual grounds and decrease expropriation of corporate assets. They, therefore, 
recommend that in order to reduce managerial opportunism, law needs to intervene to 
protect minority shareholders in the block-holding ownership structures.
54
 
Dam is of the same view and opines that legal protection to shareholders and economic 
growth are concomitant. Therefore, he suggests that adequate legal protection needs to 
be in place for fostering economic growth.
55
 This can also be seen in the discussion of 
Judge who contends that law is a key to economic development particularly in those 
jurisdictions where protection available to shareholders is inadequate.
56
 
Coffee and Schwartz have emphasised the need for law in the context of providing a 
threat of liability on errant managers who are found involved in corporate misconducts. 
They believe that offering shareholders with the right of action against wrongdoers 
would have a public benefits and would serve as deterrent value in the long term. 
According to them, derivative litigation can provide this useful deterrence in terms of 
social and economic values to improve shareholders confidence.
57
 It is also contended 
by Ramsay and Saunders that law needs to be relied on, if not for other reasons such as 
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the economic advantages of shareholders protection, pre-eminently from the 
perspective of equity and justice in order for rectifying corporate misdoings on the part 
of directors and managers.
58
 
The viewpoint of interventionary role of law is also supported by Abugu who opines 
that the principles of justice and equity require equal treatment of shareholders in terms 
of protecting their rights.
59
 A number of other scholars argue that law has valuable role 
to play in preventing controllers from making decisions in favour of their personal 
interests where their interests conflict with the companies’.60 
2.7.1 Literature against Legal Protection  
Under company law principles, the shareholders are not to litigate in the name of the 
company in view of proper plaintiff rule.
61
 As such, the argument against legal 
intervention is supported by jurisprudential rules namely; business judgment rule,
62
 
internal management rule
63
 and majority rule.
64
 However, the argument presented in 
this thesis is that if a company is defrauded by someone who is in control of the same, it 
will lead to such wrongs go unpunished. This state of affairs underpins shareholders- 
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initiated litigation on behalf of the company in order to punish wrongdoers in the 
companies. 
It was argued by Bainbridge that a corporate governance system is designed to function 
independently and without shareholders’ interference;65 which the argument presented 
by him was also recognised by UK Law Commission that managerial actions should be 
independent of shareholder interference.
66
 This concern of the Commission was 
contested in the parliament on grounds that there are already adequate safeguards to 
avoid meritless litigation against managers. The concerns regarding the meritless 
litigation against management were considered and thus, a two-phased litigation 
procedure was suggested so as to assess the legal merits of derivative actions. 
In addition, Payne contends that the minority protection principle is deceptive and 
obscure.
67
  It is believed that enabling minority shareholders to litigate on behalf of a 
company will result in excessive litigation which, in turn, would cause waste of a 
company’s resources on frivolous and meritless cases brought by opportunistic 
shareholders.
68
 The concern of meritless litigation against directors was also considered 
by Hannigan, requiring a balance to be struck between promoting directorial 
accountability and protecting directors against frivolous litigation.
69
 
Ben Pettet is of the same view that some jurisdictions have restricted shareholders 
litigation intentionally considering that if minority shareholders are allowed to litigate, 
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it will encourage shareholders to bring suits without merits.
70
  However, it is submitted 
in this regard that denying shareholders’ right of derivative action is not justified where 
controlling managers have harmed the company as well as other minorities’ interests 
simply under presumption that courts would not be able to manage a high expected 
volume of litigation. Since minority shareholders are vulnerable in controlled firms, the 
law must be responsive to protect these vulnerable status holders in case they are 
wronged by controlling managers. So far as the question of malicious and vexatious 
litigation is concerned, courts are always able to control and manage meritless litigation 
brought by sheer opportunistic shareholders intending to exploit management for their 
private benefits. 
2.7.2 The Need for Minority Protection 
Question arises who should make decisions in today’s modern corporate world? 
Decisions in a company can be made either through consensus or through majority rule. 
As such, it is difficult to arrive at a consensus in decision making and further it may 
result in deadlock in making corporate actions. If decisions are made on the basis of 
majority rule, it may allow majority shareholders to indulge in activities of malfeasance 
which, in turn, may harm minorities’ interests. The expropriation of corporate assets at 
the cost of minorities’ interests by majority shareholders is exacerbated by weak 
statutory protection given to minority shareholders. 
This is mainly due to the reason that sometimes, general securities’ regulations and 
company’s constitution fall short of protecting minority shareholders where majority 
shareholders expropriate corporate assets without apparent violation of these 
regulations. Voting rights also do not really resolve majority-minority problem as 
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majority shareholders control firms through majority votes and thus, voting rights serve 
only the interests of shareholders holding majority votes. Law, thus, should intervene 
and prevent controlling shareholders from expropriating minority interests. Well -
designed laws can enable shareholders to safeguard their interests and hold errant 
managers and directors accountable.
71
  
In order to augment the minority protection argument, it is necessary, first to establish 
that minority shareholders are vulnerable in corporations and are subject to managerial 
misconducts. Rock and Wachter contend that, in view of extremely strong association 
between directors and majority shareholders in block-holding ownership structures, 
minorities are exposed to majority abuses as majority shareholders are able to elect 
directors of their own choice and, they, in turn, take decisions to appease majority 
shareholders.
72
 
Goddard also contends that minority shareholders are subject to majority abuses as the 
exit option for minorities is not always available. Consequently, they are left with no 
option but to stay with the company at the mercy of majority shareholders. He, 
therefore, maintains that this may endanger minority interests.
73
 Furthermore, Lazarides 
advances a similar view on the vulnerability of minorities. He opines that minority 
shareholders are amenable to expropriation at the hands of greater interest holders in a 
company as the small powerless minorities do not have adequate representation on the 
board. They further suffer due to their relative unsophisticated understanding of affairs 
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of the company.
74
  It, thus, follows that scholars are of unanimous view regarding the 
vulnerable status of minority shareholders in the concentrated ownership structures. 
2.7.3 Need for Minority Protection Law in Pakistan 
Law has a crucial role to play in protecting minorities in the context of Pakistan in view 
of widespread expropriation of corporate assets by the controlling shareholders 
exploiting their dominant authority in firms. According to Rafael La Porta et al s’ law 
theory, consideration must be given to the law in order to protect minority interests that 
ultimately improves corporate governance and helps capital markets develop.
75
 
Similarly, it is argued by communitarians that use of law is necessary so as to enforce 
the duties of directors they owe to the companies and shareholders.
76
  
This thesis argues that minority interests are subject to majority abuse in Pakistan and 
the current minority protective mechanism contains shortcomings and suffers from 
various limitations. Statutory derivative action system, thus, needs to be introduced in 
Pakistan in order to enable minorities to hold errant managers, accountable. 
There are mainly two factors namely; the economic and, the law factor that aims to 
achieve the ends of justice and fairness for all shareholder and non-shareholder 
constituencies of corporations. It is important to explain each factor in order to 
appreciate minority protection doctrine in Pakistan. 
From economic aspect, minority protection doctrine is understood to have many 
virtues. Minority protection is necessary in a sense it provides shareholders with 
security of their investments necessary for the functioning of a business operations and 
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hence, companies are urged to utilize resources more effectively, thus, supporting 
economic development and growth.
77
 Protection which can draw investment is vital in 
light of the fact that, unless shareholders are attracted to invest in a company, that 
company would not have the capacity to grow and develop steadily. Rather, that 
company will lose the capital necessary for its business operations. 
78
 
Minority protection can be instrumental to the growth and progress of the capital 
markets. It may happen where minority shareholders are vested with rights to hold 
errant managers or directors, accountable. As a result, they may be willing to pay high 
prices for shares, which in turn, may inject more capital to companies on new issuance 
of shares.
79
It is accepted that jurisdictions which offer adequate protection to minority 
shareholders possess more valuable stock markets and higher capital demand than the 
ones where protection is inadequate.
80
 It is, therefore, argued that, from an economic 
perspective alone, the minority protection doctrine is justified. John Amour et al argue 
that the economic benefit of shareholder protection can be achieved by shareholders- 
initiated derivative proceedings which have the potential to reduce conflict of interest 
problems between the major and minor shareholders.
81
 
In addition, from justice and fairness point of view, it appears to be unjustified to deny 
legal protection to minorities merely by virtue of their low ratio of shareholdings in 
firms. As such, in a number of family-controlled companies, minority shareholders are 
more in numbers than the majority shareholders; therefore, the shareholders who are 
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more in number though they hold fewer shareholdings, deserve an adequate protection 
against the majority abuse. Undoubtedly, this does not conform to what justice and 
fairness aim in reference to achieving the ends of justice. Thus, both the standards of 
justice and fairness together with the dynamism of capital input provide a solid 
legitimization for the minority shareholder to be vested with sufficient protection 
against majority misconducts. 
It might be argued that since majority shareholders are major stakeholders in a firm, 
they should be legitimately, at the helm of the affairs of the company. However, 
extraction of personal benefits by majority shareholders to the detriments of the 
company’s as well as small investors is by no wise acceptable. Moreover, regardless of 
the fact that majority shareholders in firms are occupying say 50 per cent, 60 per cent, 
or even 80 per cent of the shares in a firm, it is not acceptable that they should disregard 
minorities’ interests. Minority shareholders, thus, should have right to take legal action 
against wrongdoers which may serve as an effective tool to reduce opportunities of 
expropriation.
82
  
To this end, OECD has also stressed upon striking balance between the rights of 
majority and minority shareholders and has required States to have in place legal 
frameworks which could strengthen enforcement power in the hands of outside 
shareholders or small investors as to safeguarding their interest.
83
  
This thesis advances literature on the need for statutory protection to minority 
shareholders keeping in view their vulnerability in firms. There is an amount of 
consensus among legal scholars that puts forward the argument for reinforcing 
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enforcement power of shareholders so that they may have recourse to courts in order to 
seek redress for any violation of their rights.
84
  Minority protection is essential in the 
context of Pakistan if not for any other reason, pre-eminently from the perspective of 
justice and fairness. The literature reviewed above has pointed out that law has a crucial 
role to play in reducing agency costs and thus, protecting minority shareholders. 
 According to a fundamental rule of corporate law, a company is a legal person distinct 
from its members; therefore, it is the company itself responsible for its attendant legal 
liabilities and entitled to rights.
85
 Based on this independent legal entity concept of 
corporate law, the company is the ‘proper plaintiff’ to take action against those who 
have defrauded it.
86
  
However, one must be aware of the fact that the application of the ‘proper plaintiff’ rule 
gives birth to problems of injustice when directors of the companies are themselves the 
wrongdoers. For example, they may usurp corporate opportunities for their private 
gains that otherwise belong to the company. A classic example for the justification of 
derivative action can be where directors of a company commit fraud on the company 
and later they, by virtue of their dominant position in the company, prevented the 
company to commence litigation against them. 
It is, therefore, very unlikely that the company will commence litigation against such 
errant directors.
87
 The situation gets worse where wrongdoers involved in alleged fraud 
are the majority shareholders and controlling the decision making forums of the 
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company such as the board of directors and the shareholders’ general meetings. Thus, 
enabling shareholders to take actions derivatively is necessary in order to prevent 
majority shareholders or managers from frustrating all intended legal actions against 
them in corporations.
88
 Derivative proceedings have emerged as a valuable corporate 
governance tool in the modern corporate law. 
2.8 Derivative proceedings and Corporate Governance 
Reisberg analysed the pertinent developments of derivative action system in the UK 
and looked at the circumstances which were under consideration of the English Law 
Commission (the Law Commission) while investigating the doctrinal position of 
shareholders.
89
 The Law Commission raised objection on common law position relating 
to shareholders’ right of derivative action against management.90 The Law Commission 
termed the rule of Foss v Harbottle as rigid, redundant and inaccessible.
91
 As such, the 
Law Commission recommended the introduction of statutory derivative action system. 
It was aimed by the introduction of statutory derivative action system to develop the 
jurisprudence of minority protection as flexible and accessible.
92
 The Company Law 
Review Steering Group endorsed the reforms proposals made by the Law 
Commission.
93
 Finally, the reforms proposals of the Law Commission were accepted 
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and the statutory regime of derivative action system started with the enactment of the 
Companies Act 2006.
94
  
According to Reisberg, it is arguable that the full utilisation of shareholders’ powers 
such as the right to appoint and remove directors may exert pressure on management to 
serve in accordance with the companies’ interests. As such, it is assumed that if so 
done; the management would behave fairly, failing which, they would be under threat 
to be dislodged by the shareholders through the use of their voting power. The voting 
power has a significant influence over managerial actions which, in turn, can reduce 
agency costs to some extent.
95
 
However, the supposition that shareholders are willing to use their voting power is a 
misconstrued notion. Indeed, shareholders show an apathetic and indifferent attitude 
towards the use of their voting power even if it were made easier through electronic 
voting system.
96
Furthermore, in corporate ownership structures with high level of 
concentration such as that is in Pakistan, minorities show a ‘rational apathy’97 
considering their vote will not have any significant influence over managerial actions.
98
 
In multinational companies and groups of companies, minorities do not even get to 
know where the real governance problems lie.
99
 Locating real problems is essential to 
consider an appropriate course of action which may include either a shareholder‘s 
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resolution or initiation of litigation against wrongdoers.
100
 However, it has been found 
that shareholder voting in large companies does not have any significant influence over 
managerial actions. This is largely because of ‘collective action problem’.101 
Reisberg is of the view that derivative litigation is instrumental to promoting good 
corporate governance and preserving corporate assets. Derivative proceedings can 
reduce agency costs in a sense it poses threat of liability on potential misbehaviour of 
the management and hence, it pushes directors to serve in the best interest of the 
company.
102
 He further goes on saying that derivative action system pushes directors to 
fulfil their duties they owe to the companies. Directors are required to fulfil their duties 
in the line with the company’s interests and effectively represent shareholders who 
place them there to look after their investment. Prevention of directors’ breach of their 
duties is essential in order to confine their behaviour towards maximisation of corporate 
value. Since enforcement of directors’ duties very much depends on shareholders 
enforcement, he contends that derivative proceedings, in this regard, have a valuable 
role to play in enforcing directors’ duties.103 
This study extends Reisberg’s argument on the role of derivative litigation in 
disciplining corporate management and protecting corporate assets in the context of 
Pakistan. Since there are flaws and constraints in the current managerial disciplinary 
framework, a functional derivative action system ought to play a key role in preventing 
the potential misbehaviour of corporate management in Pakistan. 
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Some researchers seek to achieve the purpose of disciplining management in Pakistan 
by taking into consideration two-tier system of corporate governance and, by looking at 
reforms initiatives of civil law countries such as South Korea and Japan. For example, 
Adnan has analysed regulatory framework of Pakistan and outlined the legal structure 
governing the corporate sector of Pakistan.
104
 He finds problems with the current 
minority protection mechanism and recommends that minority shareholders deserve 
due protection. He is of the view that in contrast with the Berle and Means’s ownership 
model signifying division between owners and controllers, the situation is other way 
round in Pakistan signifying shareholders concentration with families and the State 
taking the dominant positions in corporate entities. The majority shareholders normally 
place their friends and family members in directorial positions and as a result, they 
maintain control over corporations. 
Being a common law country, Pakistan inherited her legal system from the United 
Kingdom. However, its ownership structure does not resemble with that of the UK 
which is characterized as a dispersed ownership structure. He maintains that the Code 
of Corporate Governance was designed in line with the reforms initiatives in the UK 
without considering dissimilarities between the ownership structures of Pakistan and 
the UK.
105
 
He believes that governance strategies designed for a market with dispersed ownership 
structure will not provide effective solutions for governance issues connected with a 
market based on a concentrated ownership structure. He recommends that looking at 
reforms initiatives of East-Asian countries, though they are civil law countries, may 
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provide a better solution to the governance issues in Pakistan. He, therefore, 
recommends that a regulatory analysis of Japanese and South Korean markets based on 
concentrated ownership structures will be more informed in order to address the 
governance issues connected with the concentrated ownership structure of Pakistan and 
thus, it may provide useful insights into devising future reforms. 
It is essential to comprehend that Japan and South Korea are civil law countries 
whereas Pakistan falls under the common law category of legal systems. Being a 
former British colony, Pakistan inherited her laws and judicial system from the United 
Kingdom. This thesis argues that it is more appropriate for Pakistan to look at the 
reforms initiatives of the UK for the purpose of learning from the English derivative 
action system. Miles and Goulding observe that Anglo-Saxon model of corporate 
governance has attained a high level of recognition all over the world in terms of 
ensuring shareholders’ protection and improving the standards of corporate 
governance.
106
  
They further suggest that Anglo-Saxon model is also useful for the countries with 
sharia law background in order to draw lesson for improving their regulatory and 
statutory frameworks. Therefore, they recommend that Anglo-Saxon model needs to be 
looked at by all the jurisdictions for evolving tools of economic developments and 
providing level playing field for all the shareholders so far as the Anglo-Saxon model 
suits the individual corporate environment of jurisdictions.
107
 Furthermore, La Porta et 
al found after undertaking comprehensive empirical research on different jurisdictions 
across the world that Anglo-Saxon legal framework offers stronger protection to 
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shareholders in contrast with civil law countries, which confer the weaker protection to 
shareholders.
108
 
It is important here to recall that the legal system of Pakistan is heavily influenced by 
the British legal system. After its independence in 1947, Pakistan inherited her legal 
framework from the UK and owes a common heritage of history of over one 
century.
109
A question arises here if Pakistan has already adopted the legal system of the 
UK in major proportions, then, why Pakistan has not adopted British laws regarding 
shareholders’ protection? There may be different factors which hindered the adoption 
of British scheme of minority protection in Pakistan. It can safely be elicited that one of 
the reasons is the government’s intention (being dominant player) to control the powers 
of judges in dealing with cases regarding expropriation of corporate assets. As a 
remedial measure, shareholders should be conferred with statutory rights to bring action 
against miscreants and recover compensation for the loss sustained by the companies. 
This thesis contributes to the research by arguing that the easiest and practical scheme 
or ways for disciplining management can be introduced in Pakistan by following the 
footsteps of the Anglo-Saxon statutory model of shareholder protection as long as it 
meets the local requirements. This is due to the reason that shareholders’ enforcement 
power in the form of derivative litigation to discipline management is still being dealt 
with common law rules in Pakistan which have been laid to rest in the UK. Therefore, 
such a transformation of shareholders remedies from common law system to statutory 
remedies would help legislators and policy makers in Pakistan to understand problems 
with the common law remedies and hence, devise statutory remedies in order to remove 
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anomalies in common law remedies. It is, therefore, easier and appropriate way to learn 
from the system on which Pakistan’s legal system is fundamentally based. 
2.9 Two-tier boar structure as a mechanism for enforcement in 
Pakistan  
Under two-tier corporate governance, two separate boards namely; executive board and 
supervisory board function independently. It is perceived that there should be a ‘third 
party’ as a part of internal monitoring mechanism which could oversee managerial 
actions. 
110
 Tahir et al have reviewed German two-tier corporate governance model and 
termed it a useful solution to the problem of directorial opportunistic misbehaviour in 
Pakistan. They suggest, besides, executive board, supervisory board (composed of the 
independent directors and representatives of shareholders and employees) should form 
part of the board structure in Pakistan in order to prevent conflict of interest problem 
between minor and major shareholders in Pakistan.
111
 Shabbir is of the same view that 
two-tier system of corporate governance can be an answer to the managerial 
disciplinary issues in Pakistan and thus, it can entice executive directors to perform 
their duties in line with the best interests of the companies.
112
 
In two-tier governance system, a hierarchical system is created in which the control of 
managing executive board lies in the hands of supervisory board. The supervisory 
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board is composed of the representatives of shareholders, these of employees and the 
independent directors. The rationale behind this hierarchical system is to put restraints 
on directors' power, which, in turn, may reduce agency costs.
113
 
2.9.1 Criticism against Two-Tier Board structure in Pakistan 
There are various reasons which suggest that the two-tier system may not function 
effectively in the context of Pakistan. For example, the representatives of shareholders 
on the supervisory board would, in fact, represent large shareholders as they are 
required to be elected democratically. This means the supervisory board is meant to 
appease large shareholders and small shareholders will continue to be unrepresented on 
the supervisory board and thus, may remain unprotected against managerial 
wrongdoings. The representatives of employees will be equally ineffective in 
disciplining dishonest behaviour of directors in view of the fact that the leaders of trade 
unions, who due to their political connections and fear of being sacked by directors, are 
expected to become puppets in the hands of controlling managers in Pakistan.
114
 
Independent directors are expected more, if given independence, but their role to 
supervise executive board can be compromised being family members and close friends 
of controlling shareholders.
115
 
Furthermore, inadequacy of professional knowledge of the representatives of 
employees and shareholders on the supervisory board may render the supervisory board 
an unnecessary mechanism in the context of Pakistan. The cost overruns might be 
another problem of this dual board system. Co-existence of supervisory board and the 
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current system of the non-executive directors (NEDs) may cause an overlap and create 
ambiguities in the rights and responsibilities of both. The failure of supervisory board 
in China offers evidence as to such ambiguities over the rights and responsibilities of 
supervisors and the NEDs. 
German scholars Schoenbaum and Lieser pointed out that supervisory board may not 
be suitable for small or medium sized companies because it is too easy for the 
controlling shareholders in these companies to control the board.
116
The problem is 
almost the same in Pakistan where the Controlling shareholders take the dominant 
position. Thus, the independence of supervisory board to monitor executive board is 
subject to question as its members are to be appointed by the large shareholders. As a 
result, the supervisory board members would be as under the subjugation of the large 
shareholders as the executive board members are in Pakistan. 
This thesis argues that law has to intervene to put constraints on directors’ duties in 
order to reduce agency costs. In this context, Kraakman et al opine that carefully 
designed legal strategies can facilitate actions to be brought against dishonest 
management, which, in turn, may reduce agency costs.
117
 Reisberg, as discussed earlier, 
holds derivative action system as an effective tool for managerial discipline in the sense 
it poses the threat of liability which may bring forth the alignment of shareholders’ 
interests with those of management.
118
 Likewise, McDonough maintains that derivative 
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action system has a key role to play in reducing agency costs as it empowers 
shareholders to make good wrongs done to the company.
119
 
This thesis contributes to the research by advancing argument in favour of rationale and 
functional derivative action system in Pakistan which can be achieved by the 
introduction of statutory derivation actions in order to reinforce shareholders’ 
enforcement power to preserve corporate assets. A coercive authority in the form of the 
state lies behind the imposition of legal liabilities on the dishonest management. 
Consequently, managerial wrongdoings can be made good; supervisory board as such 
has no role. Thus, law has an important role in rectifying infringements of shareholders’ 
rights, restoration of damaged interests and retrieval of expropriated assets.
120
 
The unfair prejudice remedy has received a world-wide approval due to its wider scope 
and accordingly flexibility of relief it provides to minority shareholders.
121
 However, 
remedy against managerial oppressions on private rights of shareholders as provided 
under section 290 of the Ordinance suffers serious shortcomings and hence, this 
provision has rarely been sought in Pakistan owing to strict requirements it demands 
and very narrow scope it seeks to cover.
122
 An effective unfair prejudice remedy like 
that in the UK does not exist in Pakistan which the situation underpins need for 
legislative amendments in order to afford due protection to minority shareholders.  
Khan has investigated minority rights and remedies provided under the Ordinance and 
termed the enforcement remedies as imperfect, remediless and claims that they fall 
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short of ending up minority sufferings.
123
He finds that the open-ended statutory 
language of section 290 of the ordinance poses a considerable degree of uncertainty that 
gives unfettered discretion to the courts to decide on the question of ‘managerial 
oppression’. As a result, courts in Pakistan have interpreted the expression of an 
‘oppressive act’ differently on similar cause of action.124 
For example, he maintains, that in Registrar v PICLD case,
125
 the court gave a very 
restricted interpretation
126
 of the term, ‘oppressive act’ on the part of the management 
whereas in Pfizer Laboratories’ case,127 the court decided by providing a very liberal 
explanation
128
 to the term of ‘oppressive conduct ‘of the management. He has 
suggested that there should be explanations for courts to interpret managerial 
oppressions against private rights of shareholders in order to avoid conflicting 
assessments in interpreting section 290 of the ordinance.  In addition, he recognises that 
the pre-requisite to seek remedy against managerial oppression is too strict as it 
stipulates that disinterested shareholders may litigate only if they occupy shares not less 
than 20 per cent in a firm.
129
 Shareholders representing less than 20 per cent shares are 
left at the mercy of controlling managers and hence they are either forced to leave the 
company or stay in the company unprotected. 
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Khan has pointed out that unfair prejudice remedy is deficient and suffers a number of 
limitations in protecting minor shareholders. This is why the remedy against managerial 
oppressions on minorities’ interests has rarely been sought by disgruntled shareholders 
owing to the strict requirements and narrow scope of this remedy in Pakistan.
130
 
Moreover, he highlights problems with the common law principles of derivative actions 
and recommends that the situation needs to be rectified by introducing a codified 
derivative action system in Pakistan. 
This thesis extends Khan‘s argument that law regarding enforcement powers of 
shareholders needs to be strengthened. This thesis goes one step further and contributes 
to the literature by putting forward reform proposals concerning statutory framework 
for derivative actions in Pakistan as other managerial disciplinary tools individually 
may not provide an effective substitute to derivative litigation. As such, the original 
contribution that differentiates this thesis from other studies can be found mainly in 
three aspects. 
First, this thesis contributes to the topic by providing an in-depth theoretical 
examination to enrich legal scholarship on derivative proceedings in Pakistan. Prior to 
this, there is no study in the context of Pakistan that determines solely the extent to 
which derivative litigation can serve as a tool to promote good corporate governance 
and prevent corporate rights from being infringed. 
Second, this study contributes by suggesting guidelines and reforms in relation to the 
statutory framework for derivative actions, clarifying the procedural route for an 
effective use of derivative litigation and prevention of abusive suits. Since the major 
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problem in Pakistan relating to derivative litigation is in reference to incentivise and 
encourage shareholders, this study also contributes to the subject of derivative litigation 
by suggesting an alternative approach to funding problems that largely operate as 
disincentives to shareholders in derivative proceedings. 
Third, prior to this thesis, there is no qualitative empirical study so as to see how 
statutory derivative action system works effectively in the marketplace. This thesis also 
contributes to the legal scholarship on derivative actions in Pakistan by reflecting the 
viewpoint of interviewees regarding the reform proposals. The comments and opinions 
of the interviewees are expected to help in providing more realistic solutions of 
enforcement problems and to suggest a meaningful and functional derivative actions 
framework for Pakistan. 
2.10 Concluding Remarks  
After having reviewed literature on current corporate governance status and managerial 
misbehavioral issues in Pakistan, it found that most of the studies are introductory in 
nature highlighting how the concentrated ownership of Pakistan poses threats to the 
interests of corporations and their small investors. There is no study so comprehensive 
and exhaustive in nature in the context of Pakistan that determines the extent to which 
derivative proceedings can promote good corporate governance and thus, help 
minorities to receive adequate protection. A significant argument this thesis makes 
relates to inadequacies of law which facilitate pyramiding arrangements and lead to the 
expropriation of corporate assets in Pakistan. 
The current commercial environment of Pakistan requires that laws regarding corporate 
governance should keep pace with the latest developments of laws in the world. The 
commercial society in Pakistan is progressively developing. With the 
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commercialisation and industrialisation in Pakistan, the Pak-China Economic Corridor 
project- the mother of associated enterprises, in the most magnificent leading factor set 
to, where has generated a tremendous economic activity, would also attract the 
attention of legislators and policy makers towards law reforms regarding shareholder 
protection in Pakistan. The momentous economic activity is likely to encourage 
significant investments in stocks and corporate sector. 
This stir up in economic field and corporate enterprise has boosted incentives across the 
society and also provided legal awareness of rights and liabilities. The recent 
unprecedented performance of the Pakistan Stock Exchange (PSE), where enhanced the 
confidence of investors, has also attracted global attention. The president of World 
Bank Jim Yong Kim has acknowledged the performance with high resounding remarks 
and word of commendation.
131
 In this context, legal conflicts are likely to emerge. This 
flourishing economic environment is, of course, likely to lend rise to legal issues, 
needing effective legal framework to keep the wrongdoers disciplined. 
                                                 
131
 See Daily ‘The News’ 22 July 2016 ‘Pakistan Stock Exchange declared Asia's best market’ 
International’ <www.thenews.com.pk › Today's Paper › Top Story> accessed 07 July 2016. 
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Chapter 3. Legal Position of Minority Shareholders in the 
Companies Ordinance of 1984  
3.1 Introduction 
The preceding chapter examined the structure of corporate ownership in Pakistan. It 
found that most of the companies (public or private) in Pakistan are governed by 
controlling shareholders exercising a disproportionate amount of control over 
companies through the use of pyramid structures of control. It affirms that controlling 
shareholders, due to their dominant position and voting power might take business 
decision in disregard of the companies’ and small investors’ interests. Furthermore, the 
previous chapter reviewed the existing empirical evidence on the necessity of derivative 
litigation as to protecting corporate and minorities’ interests. After review of scholarly 
work that addressed the question of how to deal with corporate accountability problem 
in Pakistan, a conclusion was reached that adequate legal remedies should be in place to 
discourage managerial misconducts. 
Corporate accountability is important in the sense that it fosters shareholders 
confidence and thus, attracts them to invest in companies. As such, shareholders feel 
secure and confident when remedial measures are available to them.
1
 There is no 
standardised legal framework that may be invoked to deal with specific issues 
regarding the protection of small investors in Pakistan, it is, therefore, necessary to 
investigate corporate laws in relevance to this area so as to gain the understanding of 
current doctrinal status of minority rights and to identify problems within the existing 
                                                 
1
 See OECD Principles of Corporate Governance 2004 Edition, 
<www.oecd.org/corporate/ca/.../31557724.pdf > p 40 accessed 16 July 2016.  
  92 
 
minority protection mechanism. The investigation will be carried out by elucidating 
that the law needs to be reformed so as to vow optimal protection to minority 
shareholders. 
This chapter is broken down into two parts. The discussion in the first part focusses on 
examining minority rights and protection under the Companies Ordinance 1984 of 
Pakistan (hereinafter called the Ordinance). This part of the chapter aims at highlighting 
weaknesses and shortcomings in the Ordinance not only with a view to suggesting 
evidentiary parameters with regard to weak minority protection in Pakistan, but also to 
identify areas that require urgent reformation. In particular, this examination will focus 
on various tactile manoeuvres of minority rights by the controllers and the protection 
provided under the Ordinance. 
The second part of this chapter will discuss the application of Sharia law in commercial 
matters and intends to explore the role of Islamic business rules in protecting 
minorities. It is mainly intended to examine how Sharia business principles may 
complement laws regarding minority protection in Pakistan and how it may serve as a 
remedy to the noticeable statutory gaps. It is believed that this principle might function 
just as the concept of equity in the UK. 
It is pertinent to mention here that Pakistan is an Islamic country where Sharia law 
plays a moderating role in the governance.
2
One of the main roles of Sharia law is to 
supplement any inherent statutory flaws.
3
For example, Sharia law is applied in The 
Saudi Arabian legal system as a supplementary mechanism to statutes.
4
 In fact, such 
                                                 
2
 See article 2 of the Constitution of Pakistan of 1973. 
3
 Emily Von Werlhof, ‘With Sharia in Mind: Developing the Islamic Financial Market in 
Pakistan’(2014)7Albany Government Law Review 494-507,499. 
4Sam S. Souryal, ‘The Religionization of a Society: The Continuing Application of Shariah Law in Saudi 
Arabia’(1987) 26 (4) Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion 429-449,436  
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non-codified complementary principles to the formal laws are not only applied in 
Muslim countries but are also used in some western countries. For example, the UK has 
a similar kind of non-codified obligations in the form of equity which is meant to 
bridge identifiable gaps in the law.
5
In Sharia law, the principle of Istihsan is quite 
analogous to a concept of equity as both imply need for natural justice and fairness. 
3.2 Sources of Rights conferred upon Shareholders  
There are different categories of corporate and securities laws which confer rights upon 
shareholders. Each category has its own significance and legal effects. Statutory laws 
are given priority in terms of enforcement. On the other hand, the rules and regulations 
are a complementary vehicle in nature to statutory laws. The rules and regulations 
inconsistent and incongruent with statutory provisions are treated as null and void. 
Statutory laws
6
 
Statutory laws are referred to as the ones passed by the parliament of any country. So 
far as the statutory laws are concerned, the Companies Ordinance 1984 (the Ordinance) 
is the main legislation dealing with rights and remedies of shareholders, directorial 
powers and responsibilities and shareholders’ voting rights and disclosure of related 
party transactions. The company law applies to both private and public companies. 
However, its provisions are divided into mandatory rules and default rules as regards 
their application; the mandatory rules require strict compliance while default rules can 
be dispensed with through passing a special resolution. For example, the pre-emptive 
                                                 
5
Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] UKHL 100 
6
 These laws include The Companies Ordinance  1984; The Securities and Exchange Commission of 
Pakistan Act 1997; The Listed Companies (Substantial Acquisition of Voting Shares and Takeovers) 
Ordinance, 2002  
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rights
7
 and the ‘One share, One vote’8 principle are default rules; therefore, they can be 
subject to dis-application. Private companies, due to their nature of limited activities, 
are not subject to mandatory rules while the public companies, owing to their 
involvement in the public domain, are under legal obligation to observe mandatory 
provisions of the company law. The Companies Ordinance 1984 is a special legislation 
that means that the provisions of the Ordinance would override general laws. 
The evolution of company law in Pakistan has followed the footsteps of the British 
corporate legislations enacted for the British India. The current company law
9
 of 
Pakistan is based on the law promulgated by the colonial rulers in the subcontinent 
before the independence of Pakistan. The first piece of legislation was Indian 
Companies Act 1882 which was introduced by the British government for the British 
India and was replaced with the Indian Companies Consolidation Act, 1913. The Indian 
Companies Consolidation Act, 1913 was adopted with some necessary adjustments as 
the company law of Pakistan after its independence in 1947
10
. The companies which 
opted to work within the territories of Pakistan after independence were recognised as 
registered under the companies Act 1913.
11
 
The situation remained unchanged up till 1984 when the Companies Ordinance, 1984 
(the Ordinance) came into force on 8th October 1984. The development of corporate 
sector of Pakistan came across various challenges after the independence of Pakistan. 
The Ordinance replicated a number of provisions of the Companies Act, 1913 without 
                                                 
7
 See section.86 The Companies Ordinance 1984  
8
 See section .90 The Companies Ordinance 1984 
9
The Companies Ordinance 1984 
10
Nazir Ahmed, Practical Approach to the Companies Ordinance ,1984 (4
th
 Edition Federal Law House  
2011) 2  
11
Shaukat  Muhmood, Nadeem Shaukat , The company Law( Legal Research Centre Vol-1 , Pakistan) 7 
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considering the local conditions and needs of the corporate sector
12
.The provisions 
relating to minority rights and remedies in the Companies Act, 1913 were retained in 
the Companies Ordinance, 1984. However, the Ordinance 1984 could not keep pace 
with the challenges, the corporate sector of Pakistan is facing. 
13
Besides, the Companies 
Ordinance, there are securities laws
14
 which apply only to the public companies. 
Securities laws are also important as they confer various rights upon shareholders to 
safeguard their interests. 
The Company Constitution   
The articles of association regulate the internal affairs of a company and deal with 
important governance issues thereof. For example, the articles of association deal with 
the matters of directorial appointments and removals, voting rights, rights of 
shareholders such as payment of dividends and divide powers between managers and 
owners. The articles of association have an important role to play especially in this age 
when it has become a common business practice to raise capital from overseas stock 
exchanges. In such a situation, companies may face problems of conflict of laws. The 
articles of associations can be a solution to this problem as it is easier to amend the 
articles and further, those can be conformed to the requirements of the targeted 
overseas jurisdictions to raise capital. Apart from the articles of association, there is the 
memorandum of association that deals with the object and a range of activities for 
which a company is formed and it is one of the vital documents required for the 
                                                 
12
 Ibid 8.  
13
  Haroon H Hamid and Valeria Kozhich, ‘Corporate Governance in an Emerging Market; A perspective 
on Pakistan (2007) 1 (1)Journal of Legal Technology Risk Management 22-33,31  
14
 These laws are the Companies Share Capital (Variation in Rights and Privileges) Rules, 2000; 
Securities Act 2015. 
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registration a company.
15
 The memorandum is also important as it provides penalties 
where managers violate the memorandum and deviate from the object of the company. 
Stock exchanges' listing regulations  
The listing rules apply only to the listed companies. The listing rules entails important 
shareholders’ rights such as those of disclosure standards necessary for investors’ 
information to get to know the future prospects of a company and decide whether to 
invest in a company or not. The listing rules can be a useful solution to conflict of law 
problems as they can fill voids left in statutory laws. For example, if foreign companies 
are exempted from certain statutory provisions in a country, these are the listing rules 
which apply equally to all the companies listed on a stock exchange without any 
discrimination. As a result, the listing regulations offer equal opportunities for business 
operations to both foreign and domestic companies in a jurisdiction. Stock exchanges 
have a crucial role to play in protecting minority shareholders in the events of delisting, 
by providing a fair price in absence of listing regulations. In this regard, stock 
exchanges should intervene and provide increased buyback share price to minority 
shareholders.  
The Code of Corporate Governance 
The corporate governance codes are important in improving corporate governance as 
they set forth minimal requirement of governance standards. These may supplement 
laws on the issues where States may happen to be reluctant to legislate due to the 
pressure of business families and in some cases, states’ own reluctance due to their 
overarching objectives. The revised corporate governance code 2012 of Pakistan was 
made part of the listing regulations in Pakistan with an object to improving its 
                                                 
15
 Guinness v.  Land Corporation of Ireland [1882] 22 Ch.D 349.  
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enforcement.
16
However, its enforcement is still a problem. As a routine practice, 
companies just use ‘tick box’ approach so far as the compliance of the Code is 
concerned rather than complying with the Code in its spirit.
17
 
Other Criminal and Civil laws  
Besides the corporate laws and regulations, there are civil law provisions that confer 
rights such as damages and declaration of corporate rights upon shareholders
18
.In 
addition, criminal law Codes such as Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and Code of Criminal 
Procedure 1898 envisage penalties for criminal breach of trust and corporate frauds
19
. 
National Accountability Ordinance 1999 and Prevention of Corruption Act which were 
enacted through the acts of parliament of Pakistan too provide for criminal prosecution 
of corporate fraud and expropriation of shareholders’ rights.20 
3.3 Shareholders’ Rights 
Shareholders enjoy a wide range of rights including; (1) the right to elect and fire 
directors, (2) decision making rights,(3)financial rights and (4) litigation rights.
21
  Apart 
from these rights, there are other rights available to shareholders such as information 
rights and rights to disclosure and inspection. The right to elect and fire directors is 
used by shareholders in order to elect or fire the board members. These rights are 
                                                 
16
The Code of Corporate Governance 2012, available 
<www.secp.gov.pk/CG/CodeOfCorporateGovernance_2012_Amended July2014.pdf> accessed 08 
March 2016  
17
 Country Review: Islamic Republic of Pakistan IOSCO Objectives and Principles of Securities 
Regulation Detailed Assessment of Implementation July 2015 at p 7 
18
 The Code of Civil Procedure 1908 Pakistan is the main civil law , Limitation Act 1908 , Specific 
Relief Act 1877, Contract Act  1872 are other civil laws which deals with rights and remedies for civil 
wrongs.  
19
 These laws include Pakistan Penal Code 1860 and Code of Criminal Procedure 1898.  
20
 See section 5, 9 of the National Accountability Ordinance 1999; See generally Prevention of 
Corruption Act 1947.  
21
 Julian Velasco, ‘The fundamental Rights of Shareholders’ (2006) 40(2) US Davis Law Review 407-
467,413 
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important in a sense that they are exercised in order to hold the board members 
accountable. The decision making rights confer powers upon shareholders to decide on 
important matters such as, issuance of new capital, authorization of related party 
transactions, approval of dividends and other important business transactions. In 
addition, shareholders have entitlement to financial rights such as equal treatment of 
cash flow rights and the pre-emptive rights. Last but not the least, litigation rights 
empower disinterested shareholders to take action against errant directors. Derivative 
litigation and direct actions are normally used by shareholders to take action against 
errant directors.  
A balance is required to be struck between the powers of small and large shareholders.  
If large shareholders are vested with more powers, it may endanger minorities’ 
interests. The majority shareholders or block holders in such situations may misuse 
their unrestricted powers for private gains.  Similarly, if minorities are offered more 
powers, it may create agency problems, which in turn, may create problems in arriving 
at unanimous decisions. The imbalance power structure requires to be revisited and an 
appropriate balance needs to be struck amongst the powers of major, minor and 
directors. 
Both diffused and block-holding ownership structures have problems relating to 
shareholder protection. The agency costs may be higher in the diffused structures than 
the block-holding structures because it is not easy for diffused shareholders to push 
managers to serve in the best interest of the company. The phenomenon of globalisation 
further exacerbates the situation as the foreign and domestic investors find it difficult to 
team up in holding errant managers accountable. However, minority protection issue is 
far worse in the block-holding structures than the diffused structures. In the block-
holding structure, majority shareholders may place their friends, family members and 
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other trusted persons in directorial or managerial positions. Consequently, they seize 
control over management and also misuse their authority for their private interests. 
Thus, minorities may be more vulnerable to corporate abuses in the block-holding 
ownership structures than in diffused ownership structures. 
A principal legislation which confers powers upon shareholders to decide on various 
issues of their rights and empowers them to protect their rights is enshrined in a 
company law.
22
 The company law of Pakistan have some provisions regarding minority 
rights and protection; however, these provisions are defective and deficient as regards 
minority protection. The discussion in the coming section sheds light on various ways 
of expropriation, examination of minority rights and protection provided in the 
Ordinance. The purpose of this examination is to highlight weaknesses with the current 
minority protection mechanism that requires legal amendments in order to offer due 
protection to minority shareholders against the infringement of their rights by 
controlling shareholders. 
3.3.1 Voting Rights  
Voting rights are important in governance as they provide shareholders with a self-
enforcing mechanism to protect their interests. However, problem arises when shares 
are issued with multiple voting rights to a group of shareholders and so, giving them the 
control of firms more than their cash flow rights. Such multiple voting shares help 
equity holders to misuse their voting power for private gains at the cost of other 
shareholders’ interests. On the contrary, shareholders who own non-voting shares are 
deprived of their participatory rights, necessary to safeguard their interests. The 
                                                 
22
 Irfan Ahmed Sheikh,  Company law in Pakistan: A book for lawyers, corporate professionals & 
businessmen : containing the Companies Ordinance, 1984, with up-to-date exhaustive (general rules & 
forms) rules (Mansoor Book House  1986) 6.  
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rationale behind the adoption of ‘one share one vote’ principle is to prevent 
shareholders from acquiring voting power more than their cash flow rights in a 
company.
23
 The ‘one share, one vote’ principle is meant to align economic interests 
with those of voting rights and as a result, preserves the corporate control market as a 
useful managerial disciplinary mechanism.
24
 
3.3.1.1 Improving Selection mechanism for Non-Executive Directors 
The framework of the NEDs is relevant for minority protection in view of the agency 
costs of controlling shareholders in Pakistan. Currently, the NEDs are elected or 
removed democratically and they serve at the will of the majority. The NEDs might, 
therefore, be prone to perform their duties in line with the interest of the controlling 
shareholders in Pakistan. This state of affairs mars the purposes of the appointments of 
the NEDs. Given the problems with the present board independence structure, it is 
important to take into account potential reforms to the selection mechanism of board of 
directors in Pakistan.  
It is recommended in this thesis that minority involvement in the election of the NEDs 
should be increased. This is expected to hold the NEDs accountable to both groups of 
shareholders; i.e majority and minority shareholders instead of being accountable only 
to the controlling shareholders as currently commonly practised in Pakistan. Minority 
involvement can be increased by two principle methods of voting system: (1) 
proportional representation; and (2) election of the NEDs by majority of minorities. 
Next section explains both methods so as to explain the better use of these voting 
mechanisms in order to protect minority interests in Pakistan. 
                                                 
23Bernard Black and Reinier Kraakman,‘A Self-Enforcing Model of Corporate Law’ (1996) 109 
(8)Harvard Law Review 1911-1982, 1945    
24
 Ibid 1948  
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3.3.1.2 Proportional Representation 
Proportional representation on the board of directors is important as it helps minority 
shareholders to participate in the affairs of companies as to safeguarding their interests. 
The cumulative voting system (CVS) may provide them with this opportunity to have a 
voice and proportional representation at the board of directors.
25
 Under the CVS, 
shareholders can cumulate votes and cast them unanimously in favour of their 
candidate and in doing so; they can elect their favoured nominee.
26
 
The CVS originated in Illinois under the direction of Joseph Medill who was greatly 
influenced by the English philosopher, John Stuart Mill who wrote in 1861 that 
minorities deserve adequate representation in democratic settings.
27
The CVS helps 
minority shareholders to elect at least one or more directors on the board in order to 
have their voice heard at the board meetings. Minority representation on the board can 
be useful in a number of ways. For example, a minority director may help them to get 
relevant information useful for contesting their case at members’ general meetings. The 
minority director can also be helpful in collaborating with the independent directors to 
discuss and raise matters of their rights at the meeting of the board of directors.
28
 
It is explained in the following section how minority shareholders fail in electing their 
favoured candidate under the statutory voting system and how it can be made possible 
under the CVS. 
                                                 
25
JunhaiLiu, XiandaiGongsifa, Modern Corporate Law (FalvChubanshe, Law Press 2008)284 
26
Cumulative voting is defined in section .214 of the Delaware Law. 
27
 Wendy Sarvasy, ‘J. S. Mill's Theory of Democracy for a Period of Transition between Capitalism & 
Socialism’ (1984)16(4) Palgrave Macmillan Journals 567-587,579  
28
 Luca Enriques, Henry B Hansmann, and Reinier Kraakman, ‘The Basic Governance Structure: 
Minority Shareholders and Non-Shareholder Constituencies’ in Reinier H. Kraakman et al. (eds), The 
Anatomy of Corporate Law: A Comparative and Functional Approach’(2nd edition, Oxford University 
Press, Oxford 2009) 87.  
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Statutory Voting  
Under the Statutory Voting system, shareholder holding one share may cast his one 
vote in favour of each nominee of directors but he cannot choose to cumulate all his 
votes and cast in favour of a single candidate. As a result, minority shareholders are 
unlikely to elect even a single member of the board who could represent them, whereas 
the majority shareholders manage to elect their all nominees. Thus, the minority 
shareholders fail to secure the seat for their favoured candidate.
29
 
Cumulative Voting System 
The CVS is a voting mechanism in which votes are allocated to shareholders 
proportionate to number of shares and then multiplied by the total number of seats of 
directors required to be filled. They may cast their votes to a single candidate or may 
distribute them among two or more candidates.
30
 If minorities cast their all votes in 
favour of their candidate, they will be able to elect their favoured candidate. 
Debate on the CVS: Advantages and Disadvantages  
Academics have divergence of opinions regarding the benefits of the CVS. For 
example, Campbell
31
 finds it a valuable tool for helping minorities to safeguard their 
interests. It is argued that under the CVS, minority shareholders manage to have their 
representative on the board and so, they are heard at the board that ultimately designate 
the company a going concern.
32
Moreover, Sobieski
33
 holds that the board of directors 
                                                 
29
 Security and Exchange Commission .gov, Cumulative Voting < 
https://www.sec.gov/answers/cumulativevote.htm> accessed 02 March 2016.  
30
 See section 7.28 Model Business Corporation Act.  
31
 Whitney Camphell, ‘The Origin and Growth of Cumulative Voting for Directors’(1995)10 (3)The 
Business Law 3-16,15 
32Bhagat, Sanjai, and James A. Brickley, ‘Cumulative voting: The value of minority shareholder voting 
rights’(1984) 27(2)Journal of Law and Economics 339-365.341   
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should not be considered as a social club where dissidents could be overthrown by 
those who do not like them. The CVS facilitates minority representation on the board 
and hence, it helps decisions on the board to be made fairly and equitably. Additionally, 
it may be helpful in reducing agency costs considering the possibility of the minority 
director playing the role of an arbitrator in the event of conflict of interest between 
shareholders and management.
34
 
On the contrary, the opponents of the CVS claim that it is ineffective in protecting 
minority interests.
35
They believe that normally minority stockholders do not have good 
motives; therefore, their representation on the board would affect managerial functions 
of the board. They are doubtful of the efficacy of the CVS in a sense that minority 
shareholders may not agree to vote unanimously in favour of a single candidate 
especially in listed companies where they have diverse interests. It is also argued that 
since minority shareholders are disorganised; hence the elections of directors through 
the CVS is a difficult task.
36
  They further believe that minority director on the board 
may potentially create deadlock in decision making and in doing so, may cause 
disruption in important business transactions and endless debates.
37
  
Cumulative Voting in Pakistan 
The Companies Ordinance provides for the mandatory rule on the CVS.
38
However, its 
efficacy to allow minority representation on the board is open to question. For example, 
                                                                                                                                              
33John G. Sobieski, ‘In Support of Cumulative Voting’ (1960) 15(2)The Business Lawyer 316-330,322  
34
 Ibid (n32)340. 
35
 Ralph E. Axley, ‘The Case against Cumulative Voting’ (1950) Wisconsin Law Review 278-287.  
36
 Independent director’s integrity, Daily DAWN newspaper, 13 January 2013 
<www.dawn.com/news/776832/independent-directors-integrity > accessed 03 February 2016. 
37
 Zohar Goshan, ‘Controlling Strategic Voting: Property Rule or Liability Rule’ (1996)70 Southern 
California Law Review 701-45,741  
38
 See section. 178(5)(b) the Companies Ordinance 1984.  
  104 
 
a survey was conducted by the Association of Chartered Certified Accountants 
(ACCA). It showed that more than 81 per cent of the local listed companies ignore the 
use of the CVS.
39
 The ‘one share, one vote’ rule is governed by default rules under the 
Ordinance.
40
 It is pertinent to differentiate a mandatory rule from a default rule. A 
default rule means that companies may dis-apply it by passing a special resolution
41
. 
However, a mandatory rule leaves no option for companies but to comply with it. The 
‘one share, one vote’ rule ,governed by default rules, of the Ordinance lets companies 
to issue weighted shares and shares without voting rights. As a result, the ‘one share’ 
one vote’ rule, governed by default rules of the Ordinance, helps shareholders to own 
weighted shares and thereby, maintain their control over the board of directors. The rule 
is normally used as a legal technique to acquire control over companies.
42
 
The ‘one share, one vote’ rule is recognised in both developed and developing 
countries.
43
 The issuance of weighted shares by ignoring the ‘one share one vote’ rule 
may help one group of shareholders to gain voting power disproportionate to their 
economic interests in the company. In doing so, it helps them to misuse their powers in 
order to pursue private gains. Therefore, such an issuance of shares frustrates the likely 
returns of the CVS in Pakistan.
44
 Shareholders with multiple voting rights outvote the 
chance for minority shareholders to elect their favoured candidate who can protect their 
                                                 
39
 Corporate Governance Survey in Pakistan updated 2014 
<www.accaglobal.com/pk/.../pakistan.../corporate-governance-survey.htm>  accessed 25 December 2015 
40
 See Section 90 , the Companies Ordinance 1984  
41
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interest. The CVS cannot be expected to yield positive results in protecting minorities 
in Pakistan until the system itself is given protection against the possible abuse by 
majority shareholders. As such, there is no empirical evidence showing that the CVS 
could be an effective solution to the minority protection problem. However, it can be 
made a useful tool to prevent self-serving decisions of controlling management in 
Pakistan if the system is complemented with some fundamental reforms. 
For example, declassifying board is essential to reap the benefits of the CVS.
45
 In the 
classified board structure, the board members are not elected en masse, rather, they are 
elected in fractions (often one third). Suppose that there are four vacant seats for which 
election is to be held. Under the classified board structure, the directors will be 
classified for the purpose of their election. The majority shareholders are likely to be 
able to elect all their favoured board members when election for the members of the 
board is held in fractions. In fact, the CVS allows minorities owning 25 per cent shares 
to elect at least one board member provided the election for board members is held en 
masse. 
3.3.1.3 Proposal for a ‘Percentage Voting System’ 
As mentioned earlier, a possible problem that the CVS may cause is to create division 
among board members resulting in mistrust and tension in the boardroom. For example, 
even if a group manages to have passed a resolution by majority votes at the board, 
nevertheless, it creates disagreement in decision-making that ultimately costs firm’s 
efficiency. In this thesis a ‘percentage voting system’ is suggested to avoid division in 
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 Karpoff J M, Malatesta P .H, and Walkling R.A, ‘Corporate Governance and Shareholder 
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the boardroom and at the same time, to provide minority shareholders with an 
opportunity to have their say in the election of the board members. 
It is, therefore, proposed in this thesis that the candidates for the election of the board 
should exceed a certain number of votes. For example, they should be required to 
exceed fifty per cent of the votes before being elected as board members. Such a 
requirement for the election of board members would render it difficult for controlling 
shareholders to elect all their favoured candidates. In this situation, they would have to 
have recourse to minority shareholders in order to muster their support for meeting the 
minimum threshold. This would afford opportunity to minority shareholders to have 
their say in the selection of board members and majority shareholders would, therefore, 
be prone to nominate candidate who could potentially be able to get the support of 
minority shareholders. As a result, an harmonious atmosphere would be created at the 
boardroom and a deliberate division created through the CVS could be avoided by 
adopting the ‘percentage voting system’ in Pakistan. 
Under the percentage voting system, the independent directors would be likely to 
perform their duties fairly and in the interest of minority shareholders instead of toeing 
the lines of controlling shareholders as they would be in need of support of minority 
shareholders in their future election. In addition, it would also help to allay gesture of 
hostility between the controlling shareholders and the NEDs.
46
 Thus, the percentage 
voting system should be taken into account in the new company law as a default rule.  
This is because in conditions where disagreement between minorities and controlling 
shareholders is unavoidable, and thus , the minimum voting threshold cannot be met, 
                                                 
46
 This voting mechanism is suggested in this thesis, which is expected to solve the problem of minority 
shareholders’ lack of influence in the selection of the independent directors and to help encourage a 
harmonious environment in the boardroom decision making; however, there needs to be a systematic 
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then the CVS should be used in order to resolve the deadlock. For example, candidates 
showing support of more than 50 per cent votes are to be elected through the percentage 
voting system and where the situation is other way round, the NEDs should be elected 
through the use of the CVS from the rest of the nominees. Thus, this two-phased voting 
strategy combining both the ‘percentage voting system’ and the CVS together cold help 
to solve problems of disharmonious atmosphere and voiceless minorities in the 
selection of board members in Pakistan. 
3.3.1.4 Election of the NEDs by Majority of Minorities  
In this voting method, only minorities are required to vote for the election of the NEDs. 
Under this system, the NEDs enjoy directorial incumbency only if they are supported 
by majority of minorities. This system is expected to resolve minority representation 
and the NEDs’ independence problems as the election of the NEDs falls outside the 
influence of management and controlling shareholders because they are not required to 
vote for the election of the NEDs under this system. Moreover, this system is also 
useful in conditions where the strength of the NEDs is small on the board of directors 
as currently practised in Pakistan, causing the cumulative voting system ineffective to 
solve minority representation problem. This voting system would lead to a true and 
effective representation of minorities on the board of directors and would make the 
NEDs accountable to minority shareholders for whom the framework is really meant 
for. Some states such as Italy and Israel have adopted this selection mechanism by 
having only the minority shareholders to vote for the selection of the NEDs so as to 
ensure the true independence of the NEDs.
47
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However, so far as the removal of the NEDs is concerned, there are some problems 
which need special consideration in Pakistan. For example, the protection of the NEDs 
representing minority shareholders against removal by the majority shareholders could 
be a problem in Pakistan. Even if minorities succeed in electing the independent 
directors, they may be subjected to removal by majority shareholders. This is because, 
in practice, the members’ meetings are just ‘rubber stamp’ for controllers’ decisions in 
Pakistan.
48
 Thus, the majority shareholders may reverse the benefits of the NEDs by 
removing them through using their dominant positions in the companies in Pakistan. 
In order to avoid such a reversal of the benefits of the framework of independent 
directors in Pakistan, it is important to provide stringent mechanism for the removal of 
the NEDs in the Ordinance. This purpose can be achieved by two ways. First, it should 
be made mandatory for the removal of directors to establish ‘cause’ as currently 
directors can be removed for any reason in Pakistan which the situation allows 
controlling shareholders to exercise their influence in the removal of directors.
49
 
Secondly, the removal mechanism should be subjected to supermajority requiring high 
threshold to remove the NEDs. This is important to make removal of the NEDs 
independent of the controlling majority in Pakistan. 
3.3.2 Shareholders’ right to include Resolution in the agenda of members’ 
general meetings  
An important right, shareholders are granted by the UK companies Act 2006 is to allow 
shareholders representing not less than 5 per cent of the total number and not less than 
100 members to include their proposed resolution for consideration in the agenda of 
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members’ general meeting.50 Although the Companies Ordinance of Pakistan mimicked 
the UK Company Law, yet the legislators deliberately raised this threshold from 5 per 
cent to 10 per cent and that too without mention at all of number of shareholders in this 
respect.
51
 This is unreasonable in the scenario of Pakistan where directors occupy 
majority shares directly or through proxies. 
In this eventuality, it can be added that in the event of the shares held by the 
institutional shareholders, the 10 per cent threshold for shareholders to include 
resolution may mean more than 50 per cent of shares other than majority shares in 
addition to institutional shareholders, which given their dispersion, turns it nearly 
inaccessible for such shareholders to avail themselves of this right. This, in turn, gives 
unfettered powers to directors. It is essential to move forward from the approach where 
questioning of directorial actions was considered a ‘corporate blasphemy’. 
It is also undemocratic to deny shareholders of their rights to take part and discuss 
business prospects. The OECD Corporate Governance Principles provide that 
directorial decisions should be subject to shareholders’ questions and shareholders 
should be allowed to include their resolution in the agendas of members’ general 
meetings.
52
 Thus, the company law in Pakistan, in this regard, should be amended as to 
reducing the threshold for shareholder to place their agenda in members’ general 
meeting from 10 per cent to 5 per cent and also to permit 100 shareholders to do so, on 
the pattern of the UK company law section 292. Moreover, Security and Exchange 
Commission of Pakistan should make arrangement for E-voting in order to facilitate 
disorganised minorities to exercise their right of vote in members’ general meetings. 
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3.3.3 Dilution of Shares and pre-emptive rights  
Improper dilution may be considered as the worst kind of expropriation of minority 
interest by controlling shareholders. For example, in other means of expropriation such 
as profit expropriation and tunnelling of corporate assets, shareholders may lose only 
financial interests. Here they lose both financial and controlling rights.
53
Pre-emptive 
rights
54
 are considered a kind of ownership right. They are meant to ensure protection 
of shares against improper dilution. The pre-emptive rights give priority to the existing 
shareholders in regard to buying new issue of shares before they are offered to the 
general public. If the existing shareholders were not willing to subscribe to new issue of 
shares, it would be only then the new stock would be offered to the general public. 
Without having in place the pre-emptive rights, the controlling shareholders may issue 
shares to favoured shareholders or related parties at diluting discounts.
55
 As a result, 
shareholders may face financial loss as well as reduction of voting rights. The pre-
emptive rights are, in essence, very important in a sense they provide an ‘anti -director’ 
measure to police the opportunism of controlling managers.
56
 
The pre-emptive rights of shareholders are governed by the default rules under the 
Ordinance
57
 that means shareholders can disagree to adopt this provision through a 
special resolution in members meetings. A default rule on the pre-emptive rights, 
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therefore, does not provide for a mandated protection to minority shareholders against 
improper dilution as the controlling stockholders may withdraw these rights from 
minority shareholders any time. This is because the business groups and families 
control the corporate sector in Pakistan and they, by dint of their majority shares, may 
misuse the right of dis-application of the provision for their private interest. For 
example, they may issue shares to related parties, with whom their interest is attached, 
at diluting discounts which may harm minority interest. 
The Security and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP) has recommended 
amendments in the Companies (General Provisions and Forms) Rules 1985 to the effect 
that it should be made mandatory to offer new issuance of shares to the existing 
shareholders prior to being offered to the general public. Secondly, payments should be 
made through banking channel even if new issue of shares were to be sold to the 
existing shareholders.
58
 Indeed, the Companies (General provisions and forms) Rules 
1985 have not been amended so far in this respect. 
It is recommended in this study that firms should have powers as to the issuance of 
shares at a discount to some percentage of their shares’ nominal value. This is 
necessary in order to provide companies with opportunity to float extra shares so as to 
finance their future business operations. However, this power of companies should be 
subjected to some limitations so as to prevent any abuse of it. Issuance of shares 
without pre-emptive rights should be limited to a high of 20 per cent of the share capital 
issued with the discount being 15 per cent and no more off the market price. 
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3.3.4 Dividend Pay-outs 
Two possible ways of returns investors keep in their minds while investing in a public 
company. First, they invest in a public company expecting dividends pay-outs on their 
investments. Second, they may get returns on their investments in the form of capital 
gain.
59
 Trading of shares is not easier to earn money in the form of capital gain on sale 
of stocks in immature financial markets. Due to lack of special expertise, small 
shareholders may suffer from losses in the events of sudden fluctuations in the capital 
markets. It is argued that non-payment of dividend is not harmful to equity holders as 
firms which have growth opportunities should retain their earnings to capitalize growth 
opportunities instead of paying out in the form of dividends.
60
  
Proponents of capital gains argue that retaining and reinvesting funds, instead of pay 
out, is beneficial for small investors as well.
61
 Although critics seem justified in 
presenting their view that reinvesting or retaining funds is not an issue, yet the major 
issue is misuse of excessive cash holdings, which ultimately attracts managers towards 
empire building. Therefore, payment of dividends is not only in the benefit of minority 
shareholders in terms of cash receipt but it also reduces the level of available free cash 
flows and thus, helps in curtailing opportunistic behaviour of managers. 
On that background, it is inappropriate to deny dividends to shareholder in the context 
of Pakistan where the capital market is immature and the same is controlled by 
powerful broker families who may exploit sudden fluctuation in the market. Therefore, 
shareholders are more concerned about receiving dividend pay-outs than about getting 
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the capital gain by selling their shares. In Pakistan where companies most often choose 
not to pay dividends even though possessed with excess cash,
62
it should be considered 
a purported act and hence be made redressible by paying dividends to shareholders. 
This is important because managers in such cases may go for empire building through 
opportunistic behaviour which is not beneficial for shareholders. This is also important 
because the State owns more than half of the total equities in the market, and the 
dividends received from high return yielding stocks are the main source of revenue for 
the state and non-payment of dividends is a major drag of its receipts.
63
 In 1999-2000, 
the government of Pakistan made it mandatory for the listed companies to pay cash 
dividends to shareholders through the finance bill. 
However, the government succumbed to the pressure of major business groups with 
profitable companies in cement, energy sector and textile and abandoned its stance on 
compulsory dividends pay-outs rules. In mature markets such as the markets of the UK 
and the US, it may be acceptable to deny dividends pay-outs. However, this may be 
detrimental to the interest of small shareholders in immature markets such as that of 
Pakistan where companies easily manipulate their books and even the share price 
causing damage to small shareholders. An academic when he was asked his opinion in 
this respect, said that ‘where companies are possessed with their reservoirs at the cost 
of investors-they ought to be made to share the fortunes with the equity-holders’.64  
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3.4 Types of expropriation of Corporate Assets 
Directors are required to apply their best business judgment, to act in good faith and to 
serve the best interest of the company. However, they are under question for breaching 
their fiduciary duties in the events of entering into transactions with third parties in 
order to gain private benefits.
65
 This may happen where the corporate fiduciaries have 
major stakes in the third party and the transaction with that third party results in 
benefits for them at the cost of the company’s and its minorities’ interests. 
These related party transactions have extensively been used in corporate world. This 
becomes much easier to do, when one company is operating in various countries. As 
different subsidiaries are operating under different governance mechanisms, which are 
not integrated, therefore, it becomes near to impossible for regulators to control and 
audit intra-party transactions. One viewpoint might be that such type of transfer pricing 
is in the benefit of minority shareholders as companies are more likely to move funds 
from taxed countries to tax heavens like Middle East. But it does not work always like 
this. Companies purchase raw material from subsidiaries located abroad at a price much 
higher than the market that costs a lot to minority shareholders in the purchasing 
company. Other way round, first company sells its finished goods to its subsidiaries at 
much less price causing again financial loss to first company and ultimately 
compromising with the interests of minority shareholders. 
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3.4.1 Related Party Transactions in Pakistan 
As mentioned above, related party transactions can be used by controllers to 
expropriate minority interests in pyramid shareholder ownership.
66
They may enter into 
transactions with private companies owned by them or with a public company in which 
they are large shareholders. Normally, business transactions entered into by a company 
with other companies are useful business activity to promote firms’ business. However, 
it may turn into a source of expropriation of minority interests by the controllers where 
such transactions are not at arm’s length. The transaction which is contracted at less 
than market price and the one which involves conflict of interest is termed as the one 
not being at arm’s length.67Thus, minority shareholders need protection from such 
abusive self-dealings by the controllers. 
The Companies Ordinance of Pakistan requires that transactions in which directors or 
corporate officers have their interests be disclosed and be put up for board approval.
68
 
The Ordinance also requires the directors and corporate officers to disclose their 
interests in transactions entered into by the company.
69
 Relatives of directors are 
covered as well for the purpose of disclosing their interest, if any, in the transaction.
70
 
Directors who have interests in a transaction are not allowed to make decisions and to 
take part in voting for the approval of such transaction in the meeting of directors. 
However, the provisions on self-interested transaction have flaws of their own that 
affect the interest of non-controlling shareholders in related party transactions.  In 2006, 
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the Companies Ordinance 1984 was amended, whereby, the Fourth Schedule to the 
Ordinance which defined, ‘related party transactions’ was abolished.71 The Fourth 
Schedule was removed from the Ordinance on the recommendation of the Institute of 
Chartered Accountants of Pakistan (ICAP).
72
 The ICAP recommended the deletion of 
the fourth schedule from the Ordinance arguing that disclosure of related party 
transactions was difficult for the SOEs and it was also costly.
73
 
The SOEs could have been given exemption from the disclosure of related party 
transactions in view of the problems of difficulty and the issue of costs involved in such 
disclosure.
74
 However, the SECP overlooked the option of giving exemption to the 
SOEs, and recommended for the deletion of the Fourth Schedule from the Ordinance. 
As a result, it left the term ‘related party transactions’ undefined. Neither the company 
law nor the Code of CG and Listing regulations define ‘Related Party Transactions’ that 
ultimately result in confusion regarding the scope of related party transaction.  
For example, the Ordinance prohibits only directors from entering into transactions in 
which they have their personal gains. It does not cover the controlling shareholders, 
friends, business associates and family members. In view of peculiar ownership 
dynamics such as concentration of shareholder ownership, interlocking directorship and 
cross-shareholding in Pakistan, controlling shareholders may manage to get approval of 
transactions best suited to their private gains at the expense of the company’s interests. 
It is, therefore, vital to bring the controlling shareholders within the purview of the law. 
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3.4.1.1 Definition of Related Party Transaction  
Defining ‘related party transactions’ is the basic element in the process of regulating 
such transactions. The definition of ‘related party transactions’ should cover all direct 
and indirect connected party transactions that directors or controlling shareholders may 
enter into. Following factors should be considered for defining related party 
transactions in Pakistan: 
Indirect related party transactions should be brought within the ambit of regulatory 
framework and for that purpose, an hybrid approach should be adopted which should 
entail an objective rules and principles-based definition. The objective rules regarding 
the definition of related party transactions are important as it is difficult to enforce 
subjective approach in this regard. In addition, some specific related party transactions 
should be declared abusive unless proven otherwise. 
Another problem that lies in the approval mechanism of related party transactions is to 
allow board members to approve ‘related party transactions’.75The approval of ‘related 
party transactions’ by the board members cannot ensure minority protection in ‘related 
party transactions’ as the boards are under the overwhelming influences of controlling 
shareholders, who, thereby, may get the approval of self –interested transactions from 
the board.  The approval mechanism of ‘related party transactions’ also needs 
revisiting. The minority protection objective in ‘related party transactions’ may be 
achieved if transactions exceeding a certain threshold are required to be placed for 
approval by the members’ general meetings grafting along the approach adopted in 
section 188 of the Indian Companies Act 2013.
76
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However, approval of ‘related party transactions’ by the members’ general meetings 
may also be ineffective in view of the control of majority shareholders in Pakistan. 
Therefore, they may influence other members to get the approval of related party 
transaction from shareholders’ general meetings. It can be avoided if the ‘related party’ 
is excluded from shareholders’ meeting in which the transaction is tabled for approval. 
This may help shareholders to make decisions independently and approve the 
transactions in the best interest of the company. More so, it can also be avoided if 
statutory provisions are introduced in the Ordinance requiring approval of disgruntled 
shareholders for a related party transaction grafting along the approval mechanism 
under section 190 of the UK Companies Act 2006.
77
 
3.4.1.2 Approval by Majority of Minority Shareholders 
The problem of abusive related party transactions can also be solved by having 
approval of the related party transactions from the ‘majority of minority’ or 
disinterested shareholders. However, classification of disinterested shareholders might 
be a practical problem. To that end, definition as to an ‘interested shareholder’ should 
be introduced for determining the interested shareholder and in this regards, there needs 
to be guidelines so as to clarify legal presumptions. Furthermore, shareholders should 
be asked to clarify whether or not they hold any interest in the approval of a transaction 
before voting for the transaction at the members’ general meeting. This would help the 
company to categorise interested and disinterested shareholders. More so, in order to 
control abuse by minority shareholders, there needs to be a certain threshold for votes 
in order to challenge a resolution. 
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3.4.1.3 Pre-approval of related party transactions by audit committee and 
their evaluation by third parties  
The current mechanism of audit committees’ periodic review of related party 
transactions is faulty as the audit committees are required to review related party 
transactions after they are undertaken. This mechanism is of limited use as the 
undertaken transactions cannot be overturned even if the audit committees had 
disapproved them. This problem can be solved by having prior approval by audit 
committees of major related party transactions after examining the impact of these 
transactions on the companies and their shareholders. Furthermore, the audit 
committees should be vested with the responsibility of decisions regarding 
identification of abusive related party transactions. 
3.4.1.4 Immediate Disclosure of Related Party Transactions 
There are also problems with the disclosure requirements of related party transactions 
in Pakistan. For example, currently, disclosure of related party transactions is required 
to be made on periodic basis.
78
 Disclosure of related party transactions on periodic 
basis might create problems as shareholders get to know self-interested transactions 
after they are concluded which practically mars the effectiveness of the disclosure.  
Immediate disclosure of the related party transactions is necessary so as to limit the 
possibility of abusive transactions and to enhance the quality of information. Thus, 
provisions requiring immediate disclosures of related party transactions need to be 
incorporated in the company law in Pakistan. 
Furthermore, the disclosure of related party transactions should cover description of the 
nature of transactions, the interested controlling shareholders and nature of their interest 
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in the transaction, interested directors and accordingly, nature of their interest in the 
transaction, audit committees’ approval of transactions along with reasons operating 
behind such approvals, description of dissenting directors, if any and the value of 
consideration and the manner of determination of such consideration. 
3.4.1.5 Approval of divesture decisions in Major subsidiaries  
Another problem that lies in the current legal framework is that the subsidiaries’ 
divesture decisions are not subjected to shareholder approval.  As a result, controlling 
shareholders of holding companies may make divestment of a subsidiary company 
without proper valuation, to a company in which they have larger stakes. It is, 
therefore, suggested that divestment in subsidiary companies should also be made 
subject to shareholder approval and the law in this respect needs to be amended so as to 
regulate controlling shareholders’ divesture decisions in subsidiaries. 
There are some uncertain and vague provisions in the listing Rules which aim at 
inhibiting ‘connected party transactions’ against minority interest.79However, the 
existing provisions in the Listing Rules do not appear to be protecting minority interests 
and may not be useful to prevent minority rights from being expropriated by the 
controllers. For example, the scope of current provisions in the listing rules regarding 
minority protection are not broad enough to cover ‘related party transactions’ between 
corporate directors and associated companies of  listed companies.
80
 Furthermore, 
without stringent legal requirements for the disclosure of ‘related party transactions’ 
and approval of disgruntled shareholders, the situation would continue allowing 
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controllers to expropriate minority interests in related party transactions by using the 
corporate pyramids.
81
 
Statutory backing to Code of Corporate Governance and to the listing regulations is 
also required as the violation of the Code and listing regulations are leisurely treated by 
the SECP while statutory law provisions require strict and mandatory compliance. 
Thus, there is no reason why the law should come short of an adequate protection to 
minorities against managerial wrongdoings in ‘related party transactions’ in Pakistan. 
3.4.2 Exploitation of Corporate Opportunities 
Directors may harm minority interests in areas where they pursue new business 
opportunities by using the company’s resources that serve more their interests than 
offering the benefits of those business opportunities first to the company. Business 
prospects/opportunities are considered the assets of the companies only if they were not 
exploited by corporate directors for their private gains.
82
 
Generally, corporate laws prohibit directors from exploiting business prospects and 
entering into self-interested transactions for their private benefits.
83
 The law has not 
made a significant advancement in Pakistan to restrict directors from exploiting 
business prospects and entering into abusive transactions that can endanger companies’ 
as well as shareholders’ interests. In Pakistan, business families and the State control 
the corporate sector.
84
 They may misuse their authority in exploiting business prospects 
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and may enter into self-interested transactions and in doing so; they may harm the 
company as well as its minorities’ interests. The concentration of shareholder 
ownership requires legal restrictions on directors so as to prevent them from entering 
into self-interested transactions and exploiting business prospects. 
Business prospects/opportunities are otherwise useful to promote firms’ business if 
those are not exploited by corporate fiduciaries for their private gains. Corporate laws 
in Pakistan are silent on this aspect of conflict of interest of the fiduciaries.  The law 
prohibits only the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) of public companies from engaging 
in businesses of same nature which  the company or of its subsidiaries are carrying 
out.
85
 The term, ‘CEO’ also covers his/her spouse or children and hence prohibits them 
as well from doing a business of similar nature.
86
 The CEO of a company is under a 
statutory obligation to disclose his /her interest in the competing businesses.
87
 This 
provision focusses only on the disclosure of such conflict of interest. It does not; 
however, appear to address this problem. The Ordinance envisages only a minor penal 
provision against the failure of disclosure by the CEO as regards nature of competing 
business he/she carrying out.
88
 
In addition, there is no provision in the Ordinance that prohibits directors other than the 
CEO of a company from carrying out a business of similar nature. The Ordinance does 
not prohibit directors from exploiting corporate opportunities for their private gains. As 
group of companies controlled by majority shareholders is a common phenomenon in 
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Pakistan; the problem of transferring business opportunities by the controllers to 
business entities where they have larger stakes is apt to arise. 
Such a transfer of corporate opportunities helps the controlling shareholders gain 
benefits from companies in which they have larger stakes. As a result, it may harm both 
the company and its minority shareholders’ interests. Corporate opportunities have been 
regarded as corporate assets.
89
 Therefore, regulating the exploitation of corporate 
opportunities by controllers is necessary in Pakistan so as to prevent directors and 
controlling shareholders from exploiting corporate opportunities.  
Although authorisation of conflict of interest by the board of directors can be one of the 
ways for solving this problem yet, it may not be adequately an effective solution in 
Pakistan keeping in view the ownership concentration. As majority shareholders control 
board of directors, they may misuse their influence upon the authorisation vehicle of 
conflict of interest. Minority protection problem may be resolved to some extent in 
Pakistan if the board of directors is authorised to be seized of conflict of interest only 
up to a certain limit. If the conflict of interest crosses that limit, it should be referred for 
shareholders to approve the, ‘conflict of interest’ at members’ general meetings. 
Further, if the conflicted director possesses shares in the company, he should not be 
allowed to participate in the meetings of directors and in the members’ meeting as it 
may happen that he/she may be able to persuade other members to vote in his/her 
favour. The law is, thus, required to regulate exploitation of corporate opportunities by 
the controlling shareholders so as to protect minority interest in Pakistan.  
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3.4.2.1 Liability of resigning directors on exploitations of corporate 
opportunities 
As to further clarification, the resigning directors should also be the subject of 
derivative proceedings. This is because he/she might resign from the directorship with 
an intent to exploit corporate value or opportunities which were available to the 
company during his/her incumbency.
90
 Therefore, shareholders should not be barred 
from bringing action derivatively against resigning or former directors who are alleged 
to be involved in exploitation of corporate opportunities which were otherwise 
available to the company. Moreover, same kind of fiduciary duty should apply to non-
executive directors because if they were not prevented from competing with the 
interests of corporation, it might lead to disregard of shareholders’ interests by non-
executive directors in another capacity. 
3.4.3 Pay and Perks of Corporate Management  
Protection of minority shareholders against the abuse of controlling management by 
paying inflated salaries to management is another subject of consideration in Pakistan. 
Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) in certain companies in Pakistan are being paid higher 
than their counterparts in the foreign companies.
91
 The Companies Ordinance does not 
specify limits on remuneration and perks of CEO. There is no overall cap on the 
remunerations of CEOs which the situation allows controlling shareholders to pay high 
remuneration and unquantifiable perks to their favourite managing directors and 
executives. There needs to be a limit for the remuneration of CEOs with a certain 
percentage of net profit of the company. 
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In Pakistan, many companies are managed by controlling shareholders (the promoters) 
which the situation seeks attention towards excessive remuneration of CEOs forming 
part of promoters. It is, therefore, recommended that companies should be required to 
obtain approval of shareholders for remuneration and other perks of CEOs. However, it 
is also suggested that the related or interested parties should not be allowed to vote on 
managerial remuneration and perks if it exceeds a certain limit. 
3.5 Shareholders’ Enforcement Power  
As mentioned above, management of a company is tasked with the responsibility to act 
in the best interest of the company and its shareholders.  However, problem arises 
where decisions in companies are made on the basis of majority rule. Group of 
companies controlled by majority shareholders is a common phenomenon in Pakistan. 
They are, therefore, in a position to hijack decisions made at the boards’ and members’ 
meetings. The minority interests are at the mercy of the controlling shareholders. This 
is because neither they have enough shareholding to overturn decisions made against 
their interests nor they enjoy enough voting powers enabling them to have their voice 
heard at the board of directors. 
Under the common law principles, remedies against managerial oppression on private 
rights and on corporate rights have been developed. If personal right of a shareholder is 
harmed, the common law provides harmed shareholders with a protection in the form of 
unfair prejudice remedy. Conversely, if a company is wronged (infringement of 
corporate right); shareholders of the company may take action against errant directors 
on the company’s behalf. Although the Ordinance provides remedy against managerial 
oppressions on private rights under section 290,(borrowed from section 153 (C)  of 
Indian Companies Consolidated Act 1913),yet it is too weak to adequately protect small 
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investors. The second remedial vehicle, namely derivative suit as recognised worldwide 
to undo wrongs done to companies, is not provided in the Companies Ordinance 1984 
of Pakistan.  
3.5.1 Derivative Litigation as an enforcement tool in Pakistan 
As explained earlier, derivative action system is a mechanism that provides 
shareholders with a safety valve against managerial and directorial wrongdoers and the 
same has emerged globally as an important managerial accountability measure.
92
 If a 
company is wronged, shareholders can make good the wrong done to the company by 
raising a motion in members’ meetings. Since majority shareholders enjoy absolute 
power in making corporate decisions, minority shareholders are helpless in the 
members’ meetings as they do not own enough voting shares to influence decisions 
taken by majorities to the detriments of minority shareholders. 
As a result, legal action is left the only choice with the shareholders to bring 
wrongdoers in the corporations to book. Judiciary in Pakistan seems reluctant to allow 
flexible redressal of wrongs done to corporations. This may be due to various reasons. 
For example, there is no recognition of the derivative suits in the Companies 
Ordinance. Being a common law country, judiciary in Pakistan may have recourse to 
the common law principles on derivative actions for developing jurisprudence in 
respect of derivative proceedings. However, the judiciary has failed to develop and 
apply common law principle in this regard. The strict procedural requirements and 
courts’ restrictive behaviour regarding the application of common law derivative action 
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are criticised because of rigorous procedural and substantive rules of common law 
principles on derivative actions.
93
 
3.5.2 Problems of Enforcement under the Common Law Rules on Derivative 
Actions  
There are four major problems with the common rules on derivative actions. First, the 
common rules on the derivative suits were developed many years ago and based on 
cases decided over a period of 150 years. They are inappropriate to cover modern 
conditions and all types of managerial transgressions.
94
 This was the reason why the 
UK Law Commission recommended for the replacement of the Foss v Horbottle Rule 
with its outmoded exceptions with the statutory derivative action system so as to 
simplify derivative litigation and to make it modernised and accessible to 
shareholders.
95
 
Second, derivative suits are available under the Foss v Harbottle Rule only in cases 
where wrongdoers are in control of the company. It offers no clarity as to whether it 
covers control other than voting control because in large companies, in some cases, 
directors enjoy control even without majority votes. This type of control can be 
exemplified in situations where different family members apparently in individual 
capacity own shares of a company, then jointly seize control over it. However, in 
situations where one family member (let’s say) owns 42 per cent shares, it would not be 
treated as being in control of the company although it may commit fraud against the 
company in league with another family member who holds further 10 per cent shares of 
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the same company, making it more than 50 per cent required for reaching decision 
taking threshold.  
Third, exception to the Foss rule exclude claims of negligence that is referred to as- (1) 
where management fails to act with reasonable skill, care and diligence; (2) where 
management fails to abide by its fiduciary duties.
96
  
Fourth problem with the exceptions to the Foss Rule relates to showing significant 
evidences of serious matter to be tried,
97
 which in itself, is a mini-trial before the 
intended trial of derivative action that ultimately causes the trial to be protracted with 
increased costs. As a result, seeking an appropriate remedy under common law rules of 
derivative actions for each and every single illegal activity on the part of managers is 
difficult to avail. Cost of litigation is another problem of the common law rules on 
derivative litigation that disincentives shareholders to initiate derivative proceedings.
98
 
Moreover, under the common laws rules, a shareholder who brings a derivative action 
can compromise it or may choose to discontinue the suit at his own.
99
 This would mean 
that shareholder can withdraw suits in disregard to the interests of companies and in 
return of private benefits. In recognition of the problems at common law, laws in a 
number of jurisdictions provide in their respective company laws that derivative 
proceedings cannot be compromised without the leave of the courts.
100
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Another problem with common law rules on derivative proceedings is to deny the 
derivative right of actions in the events of a company near insolvency or is insolvent.
101
 
This is necessary to permit the continuation of derivative proceedings in a company 
which is near insolvency or has become insolvent, at least, to take care of creditors’ 
interests as their interests are primarily at risks in insolvent circumstances. It is 
submitted in this regard that ‘the best interest of the company’ should be readily applied 
to companies amenable to insolvency or liquation. 
Due to the problems of the common law rules on the derivative actions, judiciary in 
Pakistan has, regrettably, failed to provide remedies for corporate wrongs to 
shareholders. As a result, shareholders have been unwilling to bring errant managers to 
book as there is, as such, no case available in Pakistan that can be referred as a 
derivative action.
102
 On the contrary, the codification of derivative actions would 
provide clear rights and is expected to remove ambiguities and restraints in the common 
law rules on derivative actions. 
In addition to the Foss v Harbotte rule, there are some other barriers that might affect 
the efficacy of derivative actions in Pakistan. For example, the ‘Clean Hand’ notion is 
applied on shareholders bringing action against wrongdoers, which implies that the 
shareholders must come with clean hands.
103
  Being a common law country, the ‘Clean 
Hand’ notion is applied in Pakistan particularly causing inconvenience to shareholders 
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to bring wrongdoers to book.
104
 It is argued that since shareholders bring action on 
behalf of the company and as a result, the benefits flowing from the action go to the 
company; therefore, the ‘clean hand’ notion in that case needs more justification to be 
applied on the plaintiff shareholders. Shareholders’ behaviour should not be considered 
in this respect because the ultimate purpose of the derivative suit is to look into the 
merits of the suits and dispensation of justice to the harmed company instead of 
scrutinising shareholders’ propriety.105 
Thus, the ‘Clean Hand’ notion should not be applied mechanically. As Payne argues 
there is no reason why to apply ‘Clean Hand’ notion in every condition where the main 
purpose of derivative litigation is to vindicate corporate rights and not the private rights 
of shareholders.
106
 Pakistan should consider the approach to this effect adopted by the 
Australian Court in Magafas v Carantinos case, in which, the court held that while 
making assessments as to derivative actions, courts should not scrutinise the applicant’s 
clean hands.
107
 
The non-codification of directors’ duties is another problem that might hamper 
derivative litigation in Pakistan. In view of the non-codification of directors’ duties, 
judiciary in Pakistan has to take guidance from common law principles in determining 
directors’ duties.108 However, the judicial response in determining directors’ duties has 
been very discouraging. Section 488 of the Companies Ordinance provides for the 
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protection of directors from liability where they have acted reasonably and honestly.
109
 
Under the umbrella of this very section, the directors in Pakistan, in normal practice, 
seek protection where they are confronted with actions of breach of their duties. The 
protection as provided to directors under section 488 is similar to the concept of 
Business Judgment Rule that grants relief to directors when acting reasonably and 
honestly.
110
 
However, the protection of directors from liability is troublesome in jurisdictions like 
Pakistan where directors are not subject to reliable threat of being called to account 
against breach of their duties. Such events happen to arise where derivative actions are 
not available to shareholders.
111
 If derivative suits are made accessible to aggrieved 
shareholders to safeguard their interests, then application of business judgment rule 
would be useful as it would enhance legal certainty and would also help reducing 
managerial risk aversion -necessary to pursue projects of net present value.
112
 
Furthermore, the ordinance does not bring controlling shareholders within the scope of 
fiduciary duty. Historically, fiduciary duty was developed in order to protect the trusted 
property from the abuse of trustee. Later on, the UK courts applied fiduciary duty to 
corporate directors and officers of companies with an object to discourage oppression 
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corporate rights.
113
 Fiduciary duty involves two kinds of obligations; firstly, it involves 
duty to care and secondly, it calls for duty of loyalty.
114
 
The duty of care requires controllers’ adherence to a standard of reasonable care to act 
in the interests of the companies. As regards duty of loyalty, controlling shareholders 
are expected to abandon their private interests for the sake of the company’s.115 The 
ordinance does not prohibit controlling shareholders, from violating provisions against 
conflict of interest which they may do by exercising their voting powers in members’ 
general meetings. This is unlike the situation in developed countries where anyone can 
be subjected to derivative actions under any corporate cause of action if wrongdoers are 
not brought to book by the board.
116
. Likewise, the US courts have extended fiduciary 
duty to controlling shareholders so as to protect minority shareholders in freeze-out 
mergers.
117
 
As mentioned above, the ownership structure in Pakistan is concentrated and so, the 
controlling shareholders place their relatives, friends and trusted persons in managerial 
positions. As a result, the managers pursue illegitimate interests of the controlling 
shareholders and not those of the company’s and its minorities’ interests. The problem 
arises when they function in a double character i.e both as shareholders and managers. 
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Being members of the board, they may directly influence boards’ decisions and 
alongside, they may indirectly influence boards’ decisions being the controlling 
shareholders.
118
 Dominance of controlling shareholders and inadequate legal protection 
place minorities at the risk of majority abuse because under the ordinance, the 
controlling shareholders are not bound by provisions against conflict of interests. 
In addition, Pakistan follows the English rule, ‘losers to pay legal costs to the 
winner’.119 Although, the courts in Pakistan award reasonable costs to winners in 
normal civil matters, yet the amount is likely to be quite significant for minority 
shareholders in matters of corporate disputes if they fail to win the suit. Thus, the ‘loser 
pays’ rule might discourage potential shareholder claimants to bring even genuine and 
valuable derivative actions. Now, the parliament of Pakistan has passed, the Cost of 
Litigation Bill, 2017.
120
 This means that the losing party will have to bear the litigation 
costs of the case and to pay fine RS.5000 per hearing as well.  This state of affairs is 
expected to discourage shareholders to take derivative actions in Pakistan unless a 
viable funding mechanism is introduced in Pakistan that could truly incentivise 
shareholders to take action against the wrongdoers in corporations. 
Additionally, the problem of plaintiff bar is one more issue that could befall against 
derivative proceedings in Pakistan as the aggregation of plaintiffs with an object to take 
collective action is not an easy job in the context of Pakistan. Besides legal costs, court 
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fee on ad-valorem basis
121
 and protracted proceedings seeking in judicial decisions 
could be other reason behind shareholders’ apathy in bringing errant managers/directors 
to book, in Pakistan. 
3.5.3 Alternative Remedies 
The Ordinance empowers courts to make order for a company to be wound up where 
there is irreconcilable deadlock and there are no prospects of the company 
continuing.
122
 The courts are also vested with the power to strike down winding up 
petition when the petitioners are seeking remedy for winding up unnecessarily.
123
The 
remedy against unfair prejudice has been provided to serve as an alternative to drastic 
option of shutting down the enterprise. Judicial level confusion on the application of 
both remedies ultimately leads towards difficulty in seeking these remedies in Pakistan. 
For example, in ABIL v EBM case,
124
 it was held that unfair prejudice remedy can be 
granted on ground(s)(1)Where managerial actions are harming members’ interests,(2) 
where there exist circumstances that provide grounds for seeking winding up remedy;   
and if the winding-up petition is successful it would unfairly prejudice members’ 
interests. 
In other words, the court held that unfair prejudice remedy could be sought on grounds 
similar to those required to seek winding up remedy. It means that losing an unfair 
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prejudice remedy would result in unsuccessful petition for winding up remedy as well. 
Since winding up remedy is an unattractive route for both litigating parties to end up 
their dispute, therefore, it should have wider scope than the unfair prejudice remedy and 
so, it should be sought after the latter has been exhausted.
125
 The condition to seek for 
remedy against managerial oppressions on private rights is to occupy at least 20 per 
cent shares. This makes the remedy practically inaccessible. Minorities are left with the 
only option to seek for the winding-up remedy which as stated above, is never a happy 
and reasonable resolution of a dispute. Furthermore, empirical data shows that from out 
of the total suits filed under section 290 of the Ordinance, in two suits, the courts 
rendered orders for the purchase of shares of the minority plaintiffs by the majority 
shareholders. However, it turned out to be a difficult situation for courts to change the 
orders of share purchase into the winding-up orders as there were insufficient funds 
with the majority shareholders to purchase the shares of minority shareholders.
126
 
On that context, derivative proceedings can provide a viable solution of the issue of 
seeking winding-up remedy because they have got no other choice. This is because 
derivative actions are purposed at correcting corporate wrongs in line with the best 
interest of the company. This signifies derivative actions for the welfare of business 
entities.
127
 In situations where a company has potential to operate profitably, this would 
never be in the interest of the company to be wound up. 
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The Ordinance provides for the remedy to wind up companies where courts find it just 
and equitable.
128
The winding up remedy has been provided by courts in Pakistan in 
some suits but with reluctance thinking that its consequences are drastic for both 
petitioner and respondents who might not be unwilling to shut down their enterprise if 
an aggrieved party is remedied adequately. This is why the remedy against managerial 
oppressions has been developed in English Law in order to provide an alternative to 
shutting down a business enterprise.
129
  
Similarly, section 314 (2) of the Companies Ordinance 1984 provides for courts in 
Pakistan to  consider first alternatives remedies  before making an order for putting the 
enterprise to an end. In this regard, the judiciary has recognised the logic behind section 
314 (2) to the effect to deny winding up remedy where making such order would  likely  
prejudice respondent shareholders. For example, in Integrated technologies and 
Systems ltd v Interconnect Pakistan (pvt) Limited case, the court remarked that where 
making winding up order is likely to prejudice the respondent shareholders and the 
creditors, the petitioner should be directed to apply for oppressive remedy provided 
under section 290 of the Ordinance.
130
The unfair prejudice remedy is specifically aimed 
at protecting minority shareholders as majority shareholders do not really need it 
because they have voting power to safeguard their interests via passing special 
resolutions in members’ meetings. 
Section 290 of the Ordinance deals with the oppressive remedy and pre-condition 
provided for the right to litigate is to occupy at least 20 per cent voting shares.
131
 This 
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demanding condition for seeking oppressive remedy has practically turned it into an 
inaccessible and an imperfect remedy. Consequently, it does not provide a mandated 
protection to minorities owning less than 20 per cent shares. There was some petitions 
dismissed ab-initio by courts merely because they did not meet the qualifying number 
of shares to bring actions against the wrongdoers.
132
The courts turned down even some 
genuine petitions lacking required 20 per cent voting shares to apply for oppressive 
remedy. 
This is the reason why there are only few instances in which minorities sought judicial 
redress for the infringement of their private rights.
133
In fact, shareholders who own 
more than 20 per cent voting rights in listed companies are substantially capable of 
safeguarding their interests. Shareholders who own less than 20 per cent voting rights 
are the real vulnerable shareholder community which deserve protection against 
managerial misconducts. It is not always true that owning a certain percentage of shares 
would best measure the managerial wrong and the benefit of suit on share value.
134
 
 As a result, minorities representing less than 20 per cent are left with the only option of 
seeking remedy from civil courts provided under general civil laws. The remedies 
provided under general civil laws may be inadequate for disgruntled shareholders due 
to a number of reasons. First, it is inadequate in the sense that courts provide remedy 
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only in terms of damages rather providing a specific remedy of corporate nature.
135
 
Second, on an average, civil court in the first instance takes five to six years to render a 
judgment and this time is further extended in first and second appeals.
136
 Third, 
Claimants routinely seek interim and permanent injunctive relief against management 
before the final disposal of the case and the relief is granted as a matter of right, which 
ultimately engenders hindrance to firms’ business. 
The UK Companies Act 2006 confers right on every disgruntled shareholder to bring 
action against the wrongdoers in the company and there is no limit of particular number 
of shares to allow for litigation against errant managers.
137
 Unfair prejudice remedy is 
an adequate legal redress mechanism in the UK for shareholders to safeguard their 
interests as it covers a wide range of managerial misconducts. Similarly, the Indian 
Companies Act 2013 allows every individual disgruntled shareholder to bring action 
against the errant managers.
138
 Thus, there appears no justification why the law should 
not allow individual shareholders to bring action against the errant managers and to 
seek an appropriate remedy against managerial oppressions. 
Moreover, section 290 has its open-ended language that on the one hand, creates a 
significant amount of ambiguity and uncertainty and on the other hand, confers 
excessive discretion on courts to exercise in defining ‘oppressive act’. The provision 
does not provide guidelines for defining the managerial oppressive acts. The term 
‘oppressive act’ can be illustrated in the context of company law; as where majorities 
exploit or waste corporate opportunities which are otherwise valuable to the company’s 
                                                 
135
 Ibid (n125) 392. 
136
 Shah, Raza Ullah, Khan , Shadi Ullah, Farid , Sumera , ‘Causes for delay in civil justice in Lower 
Courts of Pakistan : A review’(2014) 6(1) Pakistan Journal of Criminology 47-75,60.  
137
 See section .994,The UK Companies Act 2006. 
138
 See section 37, The Companies Act 2013, India.  
  139 
 
future prospects,
139
 compromising litigation on terms prejudicial to the interest of the 
company and ratifying wrongs in prejudicial manners.
140
 Additionally, a managerial 
oppressive act may include management’s deviation from the objects of the 
company.
141
A managerial oppression may also be defined in a sense where 
management deprives shareholders of their voting rights.
142
 Also, the term, ‘oppressive 
act’ applies to claims of negligence provided that the managers were the beneficiary of 
the negligence.
143
 
As stated above, section 290 of the Ordinance grants vast discretion to courts to 
exercise in determining managerial oppressive acts. As a result, courts interpreted 
managerial oppressions differently. For example, In Registrar v PICLD case,
144
the 
‘oppressive act’ has been defined in restricted  meanings.  The court has ruled that an 
isolated violation of any provision of the Ordinance does not amount to an ‘oppressive 
act’ and therefore, the violator would get punishment for that particular violation but 
not for unfairly prejudiced act. 
However, if management is involved in a series of violations of the provisions 
enshrined in the Ordinance, this would amount to an ‘oppressive act’ on the part of the 
management. In other words, a restricted interpretation of, ‘purported act’ allows 
minority interests to be expropriated by controlling shareholders so far as it involves an 
individual violation of any provision of the Ordinance. It is because of this reason that 
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petitioners normally move courts and bring various allegations of unfair prejudice acts 
together in single petition with the purpose of reinforcing their claim. To prove various 
allegations of unfairly prejudicial act together in one petition is not easier as it requires 
rigorous evidence to produce in support of the claim which ultimately causes an over-
lengthy pleading and further reduces chances to win the case.
145
 
There are also instances of ‘liberal’ interpretation of managerial oppressions. For 
example, in the Pfizer Laboratories case, the court held that denial of dividend pay-outs 
amounts to managerial oppression on private rights of shareholders.
146
  In fact, the term 
‘oppressive act’ has been borrowed from the common law to the company law in 
Pakistan. The term, ‘oppressive act’ is applied in restricted meanings in common law 
whereas the term, ‘unfair prejudice’ possesses a wider scope as developed and 
enshrined in the UK Companies Act 2006. 
 In the UK, the word, oppressive act’ was supplanted with ‘Unfair Prejudice’ with an 
object to give this remedy a liberal interpretation.
147
 As a result, unfair prejudice 
remedy pursuant to section 994 of the Companies Act 2006 has become an attractive 
remedial tool in the UK to protect minorities because it covers a wide range of 
managerial oppressions and in doing so, provides an effective alternative to winding up 
remedy.
148
 
Although, section 290 of the Ordinance extends excessive discretion and autonomy to 
courts in Pakistan to rule on managerial oppressions, yet they have failed to develop 
jurisprudence in this regard as either judiciary have given restricted interpretations to 
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managerial oppressions or it has showed an apathetic attitude towards providing wide 
range of remedies to shareholders. 
3.5.4 Why Derivative litigation is a more appropriate Remedy? 
As stated earlier, derivative action and remedy against unfair prejudice are two different 
remedial vehicles.
149
 In derivative action, shareholders bring action against wrongdoers 
on behalf of a wronged company; whereas, infringement of private rights are sought to 
be redressed by the use of unfair prejudice remedy. In unfair prejudice remedy, an 
aggrieved member of the company litigates in his own name and thus, he seeks the 
enforcement of his personal rights.
150
 Derivative litigation ensures more added values 
for the company defrauded by its directors or controlling shareholders than the unfair 
prejudice remedy.
151
 The following example highlights difference between the two and 
signifies the presence of derivative litigation as an important and separate remedy. 
Suppose that a minority shareholder is seeking court order to have the majority 
shareholders buy his shares by reason of the wrongdoings of the majority shareholders. 
Suppose that the company was deprived of expected benefits worth eight million 
pounds to which the company otherwise would have been legally entitled but for the 
actions of the wrongdoer. This would obviously have a positive effect upon the value of 
the company and its shares. 
If a lawyer advises a minority shareholder to present a simple petition of unfair 
prejudice remedy to seek court order for his shares to be purchased by the majorities, 
the lawyer would be giving an incorrect advice to his client. This is because the 
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minority shareholder would lose uplift in the capital value which was apt to rise by 
reason of a successful derivative suit.
152
 An appropriate advice would be to initiate 
derivative litigation and to apply for remedy against unfair prejudice. The unfair 
prejudice remedy proceedings could be stayed pending resolution of the derivative 
action, which, if successful, would result in ordering the wrongdoers to reimburse the 
company in respect of that loss. The stay on unfair prejudice remedy proceedings could 
then be lifted, safe in the knowledge that the increased value of minority shareholders’ 
securities availed by the blessings of the successful derivative suit would be captured in 
any valuation of the shares ordered by the court as a result of successful petition for 
unfair prejudice remedy. 
In this hypothetical scenario, a successful derivative suit can uplift the capital value of 
shares and pursuant to remedy against unfair prejudice would gain benefit for 
shareholders on transfer of their shares. This variability highlights the distinction 
between a derivative claim and an unfair prejudice remedy. Although these are similar 
and can operate hand in hand to make sure that both the harmed company and its 
shareholders can benefit the added value gained as a result of the successful derivative 
suit.
153
 This has also been recognised by Australian courts that in situation where unfair 
prejudice remedy is actionable, derivative proceedings should also be preferred if the 
facts of both of the claims are similar.
154
 It is, therefore, necessary to bear in mind that 
both the remedies are not alternative to each other and are not meant to seek the same 
redress. This was the reason the UK Law Commission recommended for these remedial 
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vehicle to be treated as two separate remedies because, in some situations, derivative 
litigation is the most suitable remedy.
155
 
The, ‘no reflective loss’ policy is another factor which underscores the importance of 
derivative claims. The ‘no reflective loss’ principle means that shareholders are not 
allowed to apply for a direct action where a loss suffered by them springs from the loss 
done to the company.
156
 In the Stein v Blake case,
157
 shareholders suffered loss in terms 
of decrease in the value of their shares and the same was caused by misrepresentation 
of the management. Indeed, loss of shareholder was not distinct from that of the 
company. In pursuant to the facts of the case, the court remarked that direct action is 
not available in events where a loss suffered by shareholders flows from the loss done 
to the company. Therefore, the court held that remedy available, in such situations, is a 
derivative suit, not a direct action. 
For example, if a direct action is allowed in such situations, errant directors would be 
under obligation to pay damages to both companies as well as to their shareholders. 
This would result in multiple recoveries of damages, which are not allowed by the civil 
law provision which provides that damages for one wrong cannot be recovered twice.
158
 
It would, therefore, be appropriate to have the company recover damages and thus, 
aggrieved shareholders of the company would automatically be remedied. The, ‘no 
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reflective loss’ principle is, therefore, meant to avoid the risk of multiplicity of financial 
recoveries from the respondents.
159
 
Moreover, the unfair prejudice remedy is, actually, considered as an exit remedy. 
Shareholders seek this remedy when they decide to leave the company by seeking court 
order for their shares to be purchased by the respondent.
160
 In this respect, if the 
complainant’s shares are purchased by the respondent upon the court order, it does not 
mean that the wrong done has been rectified in favour the company. On the other hand, 
in derivative litigation, shareholder claimants want to stay with the company and hence, 
bring action against wrongdoers for rectifying wrong done to the company and 
enforcing directors’ duties they owe to the company. This means that derivative 
litigation is aimed at preserving corporate assets in the long term business prospects of 
the company. 
Furthermore, chances of vexatious litigation in unfair prejudice remedy are more than 
in the derivative actions.  To avoid vexatious litigation in derivative litigation, there is a 
filtration mechanism so as to allow only potentially genuine actions against the 
managers. For instance, a derivative action is based on two-stage trial. At first, it is 
ensured that application for a derivative suit is based on sufficient grounds in order for 
granting leave for the full hearing. On the other hand, there is as such no mechanism in 
unfair prejudice remedy. Additionally, it is not easy to establish a single irregularity on 
the part of management which is cause of action in unfair prejudice remedy. On the 
other hand, in derivative litigation, the cause of action is breach of directors’ duties 
which is not as difficult to establish as a single irregularity is. 
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In fact, the basic purpose of shareholders’ litigation is to punish wrongdoers by 
imposing civil and criminal liabilities and thus, to act as a deterrent against future 
managerial misconducts. The derivative proceedings have greater deterrence effects 
and economic benefits than the direct actions. For example, in the successful derivative 
suits, all the shareholders and non-shareholders stakeholders receive benefits whereas 
in the direct actions, only an individual aggrieved shareholder is enriched and no 
benefit comes to the company. As such, a successful direct action enriches an 
individual aggrieved shareholders and the central purpose of shareholder litigation 
which is to ensure that justice is done, is ignored.
161
 
Additionally, it is possible that some aggrieved shareholders might not have resources 
to bring direct suits and as a result, the wrong would go unaddressed. This is opposed to 
the situation in derivative litigation where legal costs incurred on the litigation is borne 
by the company More so, in derivative proceedings , shareholders take actions on 
behalf of the wronged companies and other stockholders, and accordingly, success of 
the suits carries benefits for all the shareholders and even for stakeholders as well. The 
economic incentives for plaintiff’s lawyer are also greater in derivative actions than in 
direct actions as a derivative action seeks redress of the violations of corporate rights 
but in the direct actions, only violation of the private rights of shareholders is sought to 
be remedied.
162
 
Last but not the least, derivative actions are preferable in situations where the issue in 
dispute is common to all the shareholders or in the events where the affected 
shareholders are so large in number that taking all of them to courts is not viable.  
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3.6 Concluding Remarks 
After having examined the rights and remedies of minority shareholders under the 
ordinance against wide-ranging managerial oppressions in Pakistan, it is found that the 
Ordinance does not provide for an adequate enforcement power to small investors as to 
safeguard their interests. There are a few toothless provisions placed here and there in 
the Ordinance regarding minority protection, but, these  are imperfect and deficient and 
do not guarantee an adequate protection to minority shareholders. The Ordinance as 
such does not provide for an important remedy in the form of derivative action system - 
a major policeman of managerial integrity and accountability. 
Significantly, it is found that the absence of derivative suits in Pakistan is due to 
restraints in common law derivative actions, legal impediments, legal costs incurring on 
derivative actions, prohibition of contingency fee and absence of statutory duties of 
directors and shareholders with majority voting power. It is, therefore, essential to 
consider the codification of derivative action system that may be used in complement to 
other minority protection mechanisms so as to offer a robust minority protection system 
in Pakistan. 
Evidently, as it emerges from the problems as identified in the Foss v Harbottle rule, 
flaws of section 290 of the ordinance and the issue of legal costs combined together 
hamper shareholders’ actions against directorial and managerial wrongdoings. Thus, the 
company law needs to be delineated on aspects of the enforcement powers of 
shareholders in order to keep pace with the new demands of the corporate sector. The 
legislators, policy makers and regulators need to take the issue of the expropriation of 
corporate assets into consideration and ought to devise tools for checks and balances 
against the wrongdoings of controlling shareholders. 
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The next part of this chapter will undertake an overview of the origin of Sharia law and 
its influences upon Muslim jurisdictions like that in Pakistan. Moreover, it will dilate 
upon discussion on the application of Sharia law in corporate matters and will elucidate 
the application of the Sharia concept of accountability in the Pakistani business 
environs. Finally and most importantly, the next part of this chapter will examine how 
sharia business principles can complement statutory law and further how they can work 
to fill in statutory law gaps in the protection of minority shareholders in Pakistan.  
3.7 Role of Islamic considerations (Sharia law) to complement gaps in 
the statutory law  
3.7.1 Role of equity: complementing rules/ laws   
The term ‘equity’ connotes variegated ideas including body of rules and doctrines that 
emerged along the evolution of common law. Scholars relate its genesis to Aristotle’s 
concept of ‘epieikeia’ which is referred as to imparting flexibility to the law to avoid 
injustice. Exercise of equity is the sole discretion of the Courts.
163
 There were problems 
such as the inadequate remedies of the common law, formality of the common law, 
non-recognition by the common law of certain essential remedies, in the common law 
system which gave way to the emergency of Equity. 
Scholars appreciate the role of equity in a legal system not only as repository of rules or 
doctrines but consider it facilitating the dispensation of justice through its approach in 
legal reasoning, empowering courts for law-making process and providing a set of 
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principles that render flexibility to broaden or restrict the legal interpretations. 
164
 Legal 
rules reflecting equity are an imperative for good corporate governance.
165
  
Equity is a tool to complement the judicial system to administer justice on natural and 
ethical basis, fills lacunas of narrow definitions and supplements inadequate remedies. 
It ensures ‘fairness, impartiality and justness’ even going against the statutory laws. It 
may be inherent in the law or can be a borrowed principle from outside the system used 
to soften the judgements where callousness is imminent in following the law strictly.
166
 
Equity can replace the legal rules if they are found unyielding. It lies somewhere 
between law and ethics. Law would be rendered unjust without it.
167
 It brings harmony 
and helps adapt law to the modern needs for a healthy societal development and moral 
improvement.
168
  
Equity helped devise the procedures by which judicial power is used to dispense the 
specific relief.
169
 In absence of legal norms to resolve a problem, equity comes to the 
rescue of judges. Even it can be preferred over a legal norm or taken as a workable 
alternative if an institutional injustice is feared.
170
  It complemented the common law in 
a range of subjects by inventing new rights, relevant remedies and soft procedural 
mechanism in order to remove legal rigidity. New remedies created by equity were the 
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specific performance, rectification, rescission and injunctions which have wide 
application in dispensation of justice in the common law jurisdictions.  
Issue of appropriate compensation confronts the minority in case a law permits 
freezeout. They resort to judiciary for a fair price determination. The shareholders can 
prefer action in equity for damages. Some courts allow only judicial appraisal as an 
appropriate remedy while other grant relief in equity.
171
 Resort to equity by national 
and international courts is becoming a recurrent feature due to globalisation of views on 
law, justice and equity which is eradicating dissimilarities among the jurisdictions.
172
 
3.7.2 Misconceptions about Sharia Law 
Sharia is an Arabic word that literally means ‘the way’. Technically, it is an epitome of 
Islamic science of jurisprudence based on Quran and Sunnah (tradition of the Prophet 
Muhammad-PBUH)
173
 as the primary sources
. It determines the Muslims’ way of life 
covering all aspects of their life be it temporal or divine.
174
  
Sharia law has been viewed as ‘primitive’, ‘inferior to Western law’ or 
‘impracticable’175  being a religious law. It is due to lack of knowledge about Sharia 
law, even amongst the public figures. Remarks of US Judges, Dobie of the Fourth 
Circuit Court of Appeals in 1941 and later Justice Frankfurt in 1944 while recording 
their dissenting notes, in Clark v. Harleysville Mut. Casualty Co. and Terminiello 
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v.Chicago respectively, are reflection of this stereotypism.
176
 Max Weber also said that 
‘systematic law-making, aiming at legal uniformity or consistency, was impossible’ in 
Islamic Law.
177
 
Currently, it has been witnessed reassertion of Islamic identity and increasing influence 
on the world economy. Consequently, awareness of importance of sharia law has been 
on rise though many of its areas, especially of business law, remain relatively 
inaccessible.
178
 Sharia-compliant business solutions /practices that existed since 
centuries, attracted international attention and a boom thereafter consequent to the high 
increase oil prices.
179
 Recent popularity of Sharia-compliant commercial products like 
Islamic banking, Islamic finance and Islamic insurance indicate revival of faith in 
Islamic corporate governance system. These Islamic commercial institutions 
complement and operate alongside secular (mainly Anglo-American) systems.
180
 
Compatibility of Sharia-compliant (i.e. religion based) business framework with that of 
Anglo-American system has attracted tremendous interest due to rise in significance of 
Islamic business principles due to mutual trade amongst Muslims and Western world 
.
181
 Therefore, now we find many experts like Makdisi, rebutting misconceptions about 
Sharia law. He opines that corpus of Islamic Law has been developed by its jurists not 
only from primary sources of Quran and Sunnah along with confirmatory sources and 
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consensus but a variety of legal reasoning techniques like qiyas, istishab, istislah and 
istihsan have been employed effectively.
182
 
In another work, while discussing impacts of Sharia law on common law, Makdisi 
posits that, at least, three characteristics of the English law namely ‘action of debt, the 
assize of novel dissesin, and trial by jury,
183
 are a direct outcome of Islamic influence. 
Similarly, the English law borrowed and adopted the concept of contractual obligation 
based on commutative justice from Islamic law in 12
th
 century.
184
 
However, commercial aspects of Sharia law remained under researched until recent 
growth of Islamic finance.
185
 Islamic law is taken as ‘religious law’- a contrast to state-
based ‘Western-style law, i.e. totally independent from ruler or the state 186 yet it covers 
every aspect of human life including rules and mechanisms for commercial 
transactions.
187
 Sharia and western legal systems have been influencing each other and 
many a Sharia models were borrowed and adapted in Europe through interaction of 
traders from both the regimes.
188
 Similarly, Qadi (judge) in Islamic courts is an 
impartial and neutral umpire like a judge in the English Courts.
189
  
As both the systems served different societies with different needs, differences between 
the two would be a natural consequence.
190
 Europe’s industrial and institutional 
revolution, e.g. banking system, gave birth to modern concepts of stock / capital 
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markets and corporations having legal personality. On the other hand, sharia law 
functioned in simpler societies; therefore, it remained barren of producing such 
mechanisms.
191
 
Capitalism was taken as a challenge to Islam and due to its over-emphasis on 
individualism and materialism; it lacks balance and harmony and ignores ethical 
dimensions of the society.
192
 Many Muslims did not accept modern day stock business 
as permissible until recently and adhered to simple partnership businesses only. Now 
Islamic jurists have allowed ownership and businesses in modern forms, e.g. mutual 
funds, stocks, etc.
193
 Countries like Saudi Arabia where Sharia is the main source of 
law or Pakistan where Islam is the state religion
194
, sharia rules supplement the legal 
system.
195
 Even in states with minority Muslim population, demands are made to apply 
Islamic laws on the Muslims at least. In Muslim-majority states, states continuously 
face pressures to Islamise legal orders.
196
 
3.7.3 Sources of Sharia Law 
The Quran, direct revelations to Muhammad (PBUH)-the Prophet of Islam, and 
Sunnah, the words and deeds of the Prophet are the major sources of Islamic law. In 
addition to this, reasoning techniques like Qiyas (analogy), Ijma (consensus), Urf 
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(custom), Ijtihad (an effort to interpret the will of God in light of Quran and Sunnah) 
have also helped to erect edifice of the Islamic jurisprudence (Usul al Fiqh). These 
tools helped promote creativity in Sharia Law and its congruence to the modern 
condition and requirements.
197
 
The reasoning techniques helped an organic growth of Sharia law imbibing the changes 
of time. For example, it is Istihsan that allows admission of new rules into the body of 
Islamic law. It also allows extension or restriction of the existing laws on the basis of 
social necessity, interests, convenience or social ease.
198
 It helped Qiyas broaden its 
scope through use of arguments by analogy, argument a fortiori, argument a majore ad 
minus, argument a minore ad majus or argument a contraria. Ultimately, legal 
reasoning developed and applied through Qiyas imparted flexibility to law. Istihsan is 
indeed a hidden analogy (Qiyas) which helped reconcile the solutions to sources of 
Islamic law. This reconciliation keeps the spirit and ends of law in sight rather than 
literal interpretation.
199
 Establishing a similarity or difference between two things 
through reasoning by analogy is ‘methodological device for correcting mistakes or 
omissions’. 200 Istihsan performs this role quite aptly. 
Imam Malik used Istihsan in some of his fatawa (formal legal opinions).
201
 Later on, 
this Sharia tool was exercised by many Islamic jurists and judges of the Islamic era in 
delivering their legal opinions. Yahya ibn Yahya, the then chief justice of Spain had the 
best knowledge of the fiqh of Malik. Moreover, some cases and problems taken by 
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some of the Iraqi people to Asad ibn al-Furat upon which Ibn al Qasim gave his formal 
legal opinions according to the Malik’ legal doctrine. 
The jurists have given its example by the case of imposition of a liability on the artisans 
for the destruction or damage of the article handed over to them for working on 
payment of charges to them for the work.
202
 The general rule inquires that there should 
be liability on their part, because originally they are the trustees of a deposit in trust, 
and a trustee is not liable for loss of the deposit, as if the view of imposing a liability on 
the artisans were an exception to the general rule in public interest. The reason of 
public interest is that imposition of a liability on them ensures protection of the 
property of owners of the articles. That happened after the power of religion over the 
hearts of the people had become weak and treachery prevailed among the class of 
artisans. If we do not to take decision of imposing a liability on them, the artisans 
would make that a means to the claim of damage or destruction, the owners of the 
articles will be unable to establish their transgression or negligence, and thus the 
property will be lost. Therefore, Malik held that they would be liable until they proved 
that damage or destruction, was not caused by a transgression or negligence on their 
part, even some scholars impose a liability on them even through they prove that in 
order to block the means. 
The sharia law fills the crevices appearing in its own building blocks through time 
change. The techniques, especially Istihsan and Istislah played a role to fill the 
statutory gaps and complement laws as was done by equity in English law. Business 
based on the principles of equity and fairness only can qualify as Sharia-compliant 
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deal.
203
Thus, it erects ethical system on such sound and universal basis where every 
good corporate practice becomes as mandatory as religious obligation and commercial 
act of a Muslim becomes ibadah (worship of God). 
3.7.4 Objectives of Sharia Law and its fundamental business ethics 
The Quran also declares trade as an act liked by God and does not prohibit creation of 
wealth through rightful means, i.e. it should base on ihsan (goodness), tawhid (unity of 
God), tawakkal (trust in God) and falah (material and spiritual wellbeing of self and 
others/ society).
204
 Prophet Muhammad (PBUH) himself had been involved in trade 
personally before launch of his prophetic mission since trade was an important activity 
among the Arab tribes and different commodities from the interior of Africa and 
Europe were brought and sold there. The standards of morality applied in commerce 
were at par with religious morality. Hence, these standards coupled with pragmatism 
found way into business ethics/ legal system of Islam.
205
 
Business ethics in the modern times are being globalised rapidly and their success 
depends on defining a universal discourse on normative behaviour patterns.
206
 In 
Islamic world, Arabic word ‘Ekhlaq El-Mahayne’ is the term used for religious 
morality but has been adopted in the business world as an equivalent to professional 
morality.
207
 Unlike western law, where morality and religion are separate from each 
                                                 
203
 Ibid (n 179) 14. 
204
Ibid (n180) 133. 
205
Ibid (n175) 8. 
206
 Dove Izraeli, ‘Business ethics in the Middle East’ (1997) 16 (14) Journal of Business Ethics 1555-
1560,1559 
207
 Ibid 1556. 
  156 
 
other,
208
 sharia does not separate secular and religious principles.
209
 Therefore, sharia is 
corpus of mandatory laws for a Muslim in his business affairs as well.
210
  
Justice is fundamental to any ethics or law. It is the very cardinal principle of Islamic 
legal system and plays a pivotal role in business ethics as well. Verse 135 of Chapter IV 
( surah Al-Nisa) in the Quran demands believers to maintain justice and stand witness 
for justice, be it against one’s own self or parents or the near relative, rich or poor. Such 
an injunction calls for equal treatment in commercial relationships/ partnerships.
 211
   
Similarly, integrity, honesty and good ethics, etc. are the hallmark of Islamic way of 
life which being the ideal morals for strong corporate governance are not foreign to 
Islamic financial institutions. Without these morals, the corporate governance is 
rendered weak which may damage the social, environmental and human spheres.
212
 
Islamic ethics do not differentiate between secular and religious obligations. Every act 
of a Muslim, (including business activities), is ibadah (worship of God) if it is 
according to morals and ethics of Islam.
213
  
In business ethics, it is the fiduciary relationship which makes or breaks a business. 
Mostly its break is the cause of litigation. The modern business Corporations exist on 
basis of contracts that determine the legal relationships among the stakeholders. The 
most important feature of the contract is the fiduciary relationship among the 
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shareholders and between management (Directors) and the shareholders. Sharia law’s 
concepts of wakala (agency) and kafala (guarantee) defines relationships of partners or 
co-owners of an interest as agent and guarantor. Role of directors in a company can be 
that of ‘inan (literally meaning ‘reins’) where a partner/shareholder is restrained (as if 
by reins) from enjoying the wealth of co-owners/ shareholders unbridled.
 214
 
Contracts are basically legal promises. Sharia business ethics also impress upon its 
importance to the extent that it is considered extension of the covenant (al mithaq) 
between God and man which imposes on him duty to be faithful to Him and the breach 
of which will entail dire consequences in this world and the hereafter as well. This 
primordial covenant determines nature of human relationship in society including 
secular relationships in commercial arena which demands cooperation and forbids 
damage to others.
215
  
Another fundamental of human (including commercial) life is removing hardships to 
create ease - one of the cherished objectives of Sharia.
 216
 Therefore, enjoyment of 
property for lawful profit making is allowed but using it to create nuisance for people 
through means like extravagance, hoarding, etc. is clearly haram (forbidden).
 217
 The 
agency problem arises when the agent (management) tries to maximise their interests at 
the expense of principal (shareholders).
218
 Sharia law, contrary to a purely materialistic 
approach, ordains to attain societal justice and equality through obligation of zakah 
(compulsory charity) and sadaqah (voluntary charity). This approach is equally 
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applicable in business dealings, to help the less fortunate by the well off. 
219
 Thus, 
Sharia law envisages a corporate governance system where organisation is obliged to 
protect small investors through ease or removal of hardships and ‘sensation of 
equality’.220 
Protecting the stakeholders against the business risks is cardinal ingredient of 
governance structure expounded by Islamic law. It is reinforced through the concepts of 
masalahah {seeking benefit (manafah) or removing harm (mudarra)} which become a 
tool to achieve sublime objectives of Shariah to preserve human life, reason and 
property, etc. Opposite of masalah is ‘mafsadah’ which is construed as a failure on part 
of a believer to fulfil the divine obligation.
221
 Following this objective, Sharia does not 
allow profit making on the expense of others. Other concepts of al-kharaj bi aldaman 
and al-ghunm bi alghurm call for profit through risk and corresponding liability only.
222
 
These determine very sound principles of business ethics that promote the positive 
within an organisation and curb the negative. 
Sharia law also recognises essential elements of a contract like parties, free consent, 
intention and offer and acceptance, etc.
 223 
Keeping agreements after conclusion of 
contracts is the most important objective of western as well as Sharia law. Quran 
clearly ordains to fulfil obligations or ‘undertakings’224 that include commercial as well 
as other temporal commitments (Verse 1 of Chapter V- Al M’aida) which is equal of 
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the legal maxim ‘pacta sunt servanda’.225 Islam considers the fulfilment of contracts 
(business or of any other type)
 
in high regard and their fulfilment is a duty to God.
226
 
These promises/contracts are equally binding before God (Quran 17:34) and are 
enforceable.
227
  
 A Muslim businessman should not cheat or manipulate in his business dealings. 
Mutual consent, with the full disclosure of information, is must for sale and purchase of 
goods. Violators of these ethics are bound to lose blessings of God.
228
 Islam prohibits 
riba (usury) for it being exploitative but encourages equity holdings, partnerships and 
trading. Islamic law is distinct due its value system like respect for private property, 
reward for work, aversion to hoarding and monopoly and social responsibility through 
(zakat/tax). Concepts of partnership, reward, and risk are identical between Islamic and 
western laws.
229
 
Sharia law, therefore, provides a set of ethics, moral principles, values and standards for 
a model corporate behaviour not of a company as an entity itself but for all the 
stakeholders thereof. These Sharia injunctions can complement business ethics in any 
law, culture or a legal system.  
3.7.5 How Sharia Law can play a moderating role in corporate governance.  
Sharia law can play a moderating role in finding solutions to the challenges besetting 
the corporate governance in the modern especially the developing world. One of such 
challenges is excessive debt creation by the companies. The panacea for these 
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challenges is risk-sharing rather than risk-shifting. Islamic corporate governance 
envisages promotion of risk-sharing policy. Substituting debt-creating instruments with 
risk-sharing ones can work as anti-crises for a dilapidated corporate culture.
230
 
Sharia law, like modern western commercial law, offers a variety of mechanisms to put 
in place a  flexible and pragmatic regime for facilitation and regulation of capital 
exploitation either through a sharika (partnership) or mudaraba (a limited company). 
But an enormous challenge within the corporations (mudaraba) is maintaining 
fiduciary relationships among the stakeholders. Legal thinking of Islamic and western 
systems is similar. For example, concept of fiduciary relations and duties of English 
law are similar to that of ‘amana’ (trsut) in Sharia law.231 
The businessman must fulfil moral (fiduciary) obligations towards his co-businessmen, 
employees, consumers and even environment through trustworthiness, equity, and 
benevolence.
 Resources available at one’s disposal cannot be misused, corrupted or 
polluted.
232
 Therefore, Sharia plays a moderating role by directing to follow Islamic 
ethics not for one’s own benefits only but for the welfare of others, including the 
society as a whole.  
On the other hand, benefit of shareholders gets supremacy in Anglo-Saxon corporate 
governance model where morality and religion are separate from each other. Religion is 
a personal matter and secondary to profit maximisation duty of the management.
233
 
Every believer, called a shepherd in a Hadith, is supposed to be guardian of those under 
his care or to those whom with he has a fiduciary relationship. Hence, it is obliged to 
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provide the best possible care, advice, guidance and vision within his business 
enterprise.
234
 
The gigantic challenge for indigenous (stakeholders) as well as extraneous (state, 
courts, etc.) actors is to put in place the effective measure for corporate accountability. 
State-enacted laws or systems (i.e. western system to be precise) keep on legislating 
and adjudicating to reinforce these protections. Sharia law, along with playing a 
moderating role discussed above, also overcomes this challenge through its 
complementary role to fill the statutory gaps.  
Apart from imparting this fervour and zeal to its followers, Sharia law envisages a 
business to work not for benefit maximisation only but for the value maximisation 
which encompasses the larger objectives of societal welfare too, that have become basis 
of modern corporate social responsibility (CSR). Unlike western law, Sharia does not 
separate secular and religious morality principles.
235
 Therefore, integrity, honesty and 
good ethics, etc. do not remain the moral principles only but become mandatory law in 
the corporate world. We find Sharia playing an overarching complementary role, i.e. it 
fills legal gaps not for an individual organisation but for the legal, economic and social 
systems simultaneously. 
Though many scholars show indifference to Islamic commercial systems, yet there are 
some who think that it cannot only reform but complement the ethical corporate 
governance.
236
 It can be taken as an alternative model because it promotes instruments 
which ensure equity and risk sharing.
237
 Abu Tapanjeh, comparing Islamic principles 
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with OECD principles of 1999, which are considered as standardised and fundamental 
corporate governance principles, opines that Islamic corporate structure embodies the 
same conventional principles of justice, honesty and fairness and prohibits all forms of 
exploitation.
238
 According to the OECD definition of corporate governance, it denotes 
‘the set of relationships between a company’s management, its board, its stakeholders 
and other stakeholders’.239Corporate accountability and material information to 
shareholders are essential ingredients of good corporate governance that help achieve 
objectives of fair treatment of all the stakeholders.
240
 
Twelve principles of OECD focus business ethics, fair and just decision making, 
accountability and the mechanism for maintaining books of accounts.
241
 Like OECD’s 
concept of business ethics, Sharia law also promotes transparency and equal rule of law 
when it ordains not to betray or exploit one’s partners, business should not be for 
maximising profit only (i.e. should not ignore the welfare) and a believer should not be 
lazy or unproductive. Even the Holy Quran clearly says that the believers are ranked 
according to (degree of goodness of) their deeds (6:132).
242
 In this context, we find 
western corporate governance ‘profit driven’ (being product of market economy) while 
the Islamic obligations call for ‘value maximisation’. Therefore, Islam’s requirements 
go beyond profit-seeking that cover the modern day concept of Corporate Social 
Responsibilities (CSR) equally.
243
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There are experts who view Sharia law as a practical regime that can serve the 
contemporary commercial legal requirements.
244
 But fact of the matter is that in the 
corporate arena, development of Sharia-compliant products could not keep pace with 
the demand due to non-availability of sharia law experts in the relevant field.
245
 On the 
other hand, interest in sharia-compliant business is increasing due to the perception that 
conduct of business in today’s world lacks a moral dimension. 246 
Many academics advocate and highlight the need for associating business transactions 
with religious faith and ethical beliefs. They are of the view that Western ethical values 
are of purely utilitarian nature and are void of spiritual approach.
247
 In contrast, Islamic 
business ethics are considered as utilitarian and humane alike due to their clear 
emphasis on sacrifice, brotherhood, truthfulness, trustworthiness, justice, brotherhood 
and above all the fear of divine accountability before God. Unlike ‘shareholder 
primacy’ model of the West, corporate governance and the corporate social 
responsibility become one under sharia law.
248
 This is why Sharia-compliant 
commercial products like Islamic banking, Islamic finance and Islamic insurance have 
gained popularity. However, sharia law cannot act exclusively and directly so as to 
address the issue of managerial transgressions and protection of shareholders; the states 
shall keep on resorting to the western model for installing the complex corporate 
system and chipping in the ethics code from Sharia law. 
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3.7.6 Its function as the concept of equity in UK to fill statutory gaps  
Sharia law is not stagnant as its critics have been describing it. It allows exercising 
various legal reasoning techniques in addition to primary sources. Logically, allowance 
for expanding the scope through reasoning techniques developed to overcome new 
problems, is evidence that this legal systems allows its sources to play a complementary 
role to fill the statutory gaps. One such source in addition to primary sources Quran and 
Sunnah and the secondary sources based on reasoning techniques discussed above is 
the use of legal maxims in Islamic law. Islamic legal maxims come from variety of 
sources, Quran, traditions of the prophet (PBUH), sayings of his companions or / and 
fuqaha and mujtahid (jurisprudence experts).
 249
 Opinion or fatwa (decree) of fuqaha 
and mujtahid attains the force of a valid law.
 
Imam al-Shafi is famous for his saying 
that ‘who practices juristic preference, legislates’.250 
Every science has certain basic rules. In Arabic, the word ‘qa’ida’ which means ‘a 
foundation’ is also used for a ‘comprehensive rule that is applicable to all parts or 
components’.251 Hence, qai’da or a basic rule in Islamic jurisprudence252 is such that is 
generally applicable in cases falling under that particular subject but may not be 
covering everything. These rules may not be all-embracing maxims but may comprise 
legal basics capable of dealing with similar subject and circumstances.
 253
 However, 
they cannot be taken as permanent proof of Sharia law as they remain subject to 
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primary sources, i.e. Quran and Sunnah. The ‘synoptic and abstract’ character of 
maxims renders them versatile and timeless.
254
 
Kamali explains the maxims in Sharia law as under:-
255
 
“Legal maxims are theoretical abstractions in the form, usually, of short epithetical 
statements that are expressive, often in a few words, of the goals and objectives of 
Sharia. They consist mainly of statements of principles that are derived from the 
detailed reading of the rules of ‘fiqh’ on various themes” 
In Western law, legal maxims are neither source of law nor a law in itself but a tool to 
understand or explain a law.
 
Muslim jurists (fuqaha) take agreed upon rules as legal 
maxims for they are applied to derive meanings from injunctions.
256
 Legal maxims in 
Islamic law also function to make a reconciliatory bond between different sources of 
Sharia and formulate a new law.
257
Discussing the history and functions of legal maxims 
in Sharia at length, Kamali aptly concludes that “…..the legal maxims and statutes are 
not substitutes for one another. Legal maxims can play a supplementary role to 
substantial legislation in the Sharia dominate fields.”258  
Solving issues without maxims in sharia law will create complication.
259
 Determination 
of these basic rules, i.e. maxims in Sharia law was started by the Companions of the 
Prophet (PBUH).
260
 The practice of referring to precedents (stare decisis) is same in 
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Western law. They did not emerge abruptly rather matured and were refined by the sage 
minds, i.e. fuqaha over a long span of time
261
 and play a complementary and 
moderating role as the stare decisis do. 
Legal maxims are derived from Quran and Hadith and their wording subsequently 
refined by the leading jurists. Even if they do not reiterate a ruling of Quran or Hadith, 
these maxims are not meant to have binding effects on judges and jurists but entail a 
persuasive influence on the application of judicial mind and decisions. Legal maxims 
are meant to help understand a subject matter rather than its enforcement.
262
 Some of 
them fit in legal systems just like equity in the English law.
263
 Kamali classifies legal 
maxims into two groups. First group (normative legal maxims) contains five leading 
maxims which he considers most comprehensive applying to all matters related to fiqh. 
They are; “harm must be eliminated”; “acts are judged by their goals and purposes”; 
“certainty is not overruled by doubt”; “hardship begets facility”; and “custom is the 
basis of judgement”.264 
At times, legal maxims of Sharia law look exact replica of those found in the English 
law. For example, ‘equity looks to the intent rather than the form’265 is exactly what 
Islamic legal maxim ‘“acts are judged by their goals and purposes”266 means and 
stands for. Almost every legal maxim of English equity law can find an exact equal in 
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Sharia law or one that would be very close in meaning and purpose. Another type, 
subsidiary maxims are the ones that have been derived from these leading maxims.
267
 
Some maxims are direct rendering of Hadith, e.g. “the profit follows the responsibility.” 
Therefore, here we see that Sharia law fills a law gap by providing an equity principle 
that the ones responsible for upkeep and maintenance of an asset will enjoy the profit/ 
yield.
268
 
Modern codified law is descendent of laws contained in legal maxims. Brevity, 
illustration and ratiocination are the characteristics of maxims endowed to the statutes 
now days.
269
 Continuing the same streak in his conclusion, Kamali further elaborates 
that application of these maxims is being revived in banking and finance sectors. He 
proposes that Islamic legal maxims can also play a supplementary role to the statutory 
laws by adding them as appendix, introduction or explanatory memorandum not only 
for understanding and consolidation of legal concepts but also for facilitating 
interpretation and enforcement of laws by lawyers and judges to protect 
shareholders.
270
 
In sharia law, inter-scholastic differences over legal maxims are negligible. They 
provide useful insight into purpose of the law.
271
 Legal maxims provide an efficient 
understanding of maqasid (objectives) of sharia.
272
 Main role of sharia in commercial 
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transactions is to fill statutory gaps.
273 
Therefore, sharia can help draw general 
principles to fill gaps as the non-codified laws in the form of equity do in England. 
A legal solution derived from Quran and Sunnah by employing analogy for legal 
reasoning may be rejected by the Islamic Jurists in favour of a solution justified by 
equity.
274
 Some scholars hold that the concept of Istihsan in Islamic law, which stands 
for ‘good’ or ‘what deems well’, embodies the notion of equity.275 Some Islamic law 
experts take principle of Istihsan as counterpart of English concept of equity,
276
  
‘preference of stronger base of law over the weaker’,277 and as a ‘mitigating agent’278 in 
the body of law. Equity as a tool to achieve public utility or common good finds 
support from Islamic law scholars. Therefore, Istihsan was used as a tool to seek the 
best/ the most suitable equitable solution. It also helped implement law through 
application of human reason in absence of specific injunction from Quran and Sunnah 
to achieve the sublime goal of ‘equity’ and ‘public interest’279 which are the objectives 
very dear to God. For example, on the basis of Istihsan, methods of evidence in the law 
were extended to photograph, audio and video recording and acceptance of 
deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) as a means of evidence in view of current changing 
social conditions. 
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But many a scholars viewed the application of Istihsan limited within the sources of 
Quran and Sunnah and do not consider it an equal of ‘equity’. 280  However, there is 
another alternative concept of equal efficacy, called Istislah (consideration of the public 
interest), construed to be a ‘process of legal reasoning used to fill the gaps in the law’. 
281
 It added a new dimension to Islamic jurisprudence and broadened its scope to find 
solutions to new problems as it permits finding intention of the lawgiver even beyond 
the literal confines of Quran and Sunnah.
282
 Therefore, Istihsan combined with Istislah 
comes closer to the English concept of equity and can play effective role for minority 
protection in the same fashion and style.
 283
  
Gaps in the law cannot be filled through Qiyas (analogy) in every condition. The 
common law recognises ‘a reasoned distinction of precedent’ as corrective equivalent 
whereof is the Istihsan (Juristic Preference) in Islamic law to replace a faulty reasoning 
by analogy with better one. Istihsan fills the gap in law through notion of public policy 
by applying what is ‘right, just, fair, convenient or conducive’ to harmony.284 Further, 
even statutory gap unaddressed by Istihsan can be filled by Istislah (consideration of 
public interest, another model of legal reasoning in Islamic law).
285
 
The English concept of equity is considered as antithesis of Islamic law because the 
former is considered to derive its acceptance and legitimacy from the doctrine of 
natural right or Aristotle’s concept of justice beyond legal positivism whereas the later 
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places its reliance on revealed word of God in the form of Quran and Sunnah.
286
 But 
now there is a clear tendency among the Islamic scholars towards rational 
interpretations of Quran and Sunnah narratives and eliminating the supernatural 
ones.
287
 Consequently, it is eliminating the notional differences on equity between the 
two systems. As far as importance and nature of role of equity is concerned, both Sharia 
and the English law systems are identical. But again, the Sharia law gets precedence 
due to divine emphasis on observance of equity when we find Quran saying “those who 
avoid equity are fuel of hell.” (Quran 72:15).288 
3.7.7 Complementary role of Sharia Law in the protection of Shareholders 
The field of business ethics is underdeveloped and not institutionalised yet. 
Governments keep on fighting the managerial and directorial transgressions, in 
businesses through various agencies and mechanisms.
289
 Sharia does not address issue 
of small investor protection directly. Nor it is the role of sharia to provide a complete 
framework for protection of minority rights or enforcement of compensatory 
measures.
290 
It acknowledges diverse interests and rights of stakeholders proportionate 
to their investments and sets an efficient foundation for minority protection by making 
their treatment under the principles of justice, fairness and equality before the eyes of 
law.
291
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The rules for protection against abuse by the majority are to be determined from within 
the Sharia ideals.
292 
Sharia law provides general principles leaving the detailed 
mechanism to be devised by the state authorities. However, Sharia principles and state 
enacted laws combined together can form a sound edifice for minority protection. 
Similarly, procedures are the bylaws or modus operandi which cannot be found in 
Sharia. However, a corporation can benefit from Sharia in formulating these procedures 
imbibing high standards of corporate accountability. 
Where there are no explicit rules, masalaha or istisla, implements the intent of law. It 
provides venue for open-ended development, breaks rigidity, and rejuvenates the law 
by giving it a new meaning.
293
 This concept discourages stagnation by allowing 
incorporation of changes with the passage of time. One masalaha useful today may 
become redundant or an ‘evil’294 tomorrow. If this is not the case, Sharia law, or any 
other law for that matter, will fail to serve the needs of public interest which will be 
contrary to its purpose. The principle of ibaha (permissibility) keeps avenues for 
innovation open but within the domain of sharia objectives,
295
 thus, performing the 
moderating and complementary roles incessantly and universally. 
Though many scholars show indifference to Islamic commercial systems yet there are 
some who think that it cannot only reform but complement the ethical corporate 
governance.
296
 It can be taken as an alternative model because it promotes instruments 
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which ensure equity and risk sharing.
297
 Social and ethical purpose, in addition to profit 
maximisation, is the unique hallmark of Islamic corporate governance.
298
 Islam 
idealises ‘value maximisation’ rather than ‘profit maximisation’, to rule out a selfish 
behaviour altogether.
299
 Narrowing the distributional gap and maximum utilisation of 
economic resources is objective of Sharia law.
300
 
Expropriation of corporate assets by the controllers is the biggest venue for managerial 
transgressions in corporations in Pakistan. The equitable rule demands that a director as 
a fiduciary must not enter in engagements in which he has a personal interest 
conflicting the interests of shareholders.
301
  
It is not only a fiduciary duty of directors but a legal obligation as well, in majority of 
jurisdictions, to disclose the facts to the minority or provide them a reasonable access to 
relevant information.
 302
 Under Sharia, disclosure of information to all the stakeholders 
honestly is an obligation for which one is not only answerable to temporal authorities 
but to Allah as well. Hence, true and accurate disclosure of information is a divine 
obligation as well. Similarly, another important theme of corporate governance is book 
keeping. Emphasis on this aspect comes from the foremost source of Sharia, i.e. the 
Quran when it says. “O you who believe! When you deal with each other in contracting 
a debt for a fixed time, then write it down; and let a scribe write it down between you 
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with fairness; and the scribe should not refuse to write as Allah has taught him, so he 
should write” (Al Baqarah 2:282). 303  
The directors are obligated not to advance their personal interests over corporate 
interests. So to say, always act in good faith to meet their loyalty obligations.
 304
 They 
should not adventure opportunism on shareholders’ interest even when the firm is in the 
vicinity of insolvency.
305
 It is a fiduciary call of duty not to profit unfairly through 
assigned corporate role or take advantage of the corporate information to profit 
personal gains.
306
 Sharia law complements rather reinforces this fiduciary call of duty 
when it binds it to divine responsibility and accountability.  
It can never be construed that all Muslims will be following Sharia ethics squarely
307
 as 
there is always tendency among the subjects of a system to deviate from it.
308
 The 
foremost in commercial transactions is the breach of fiduciary obligations.  The Anglo-
American laws consider Directors’ fiduciary role in terms of agency and not 
stewardship.
 
Therefore, self-centred directors need to be watched over. On the contrary, 
Sharia law requires them to act in total fairness and honesty not only as an obligation to 
company and stakeholders but as a duty to God,
309
 where the latter inculcates more 
emphatic self-control. 
                                                 
303
 Ibid (n 238) 563. 
304
 Ibid (n171) 369. 
305
 Ibid (n171) 167. 
306
 Ibid (n171) 369. 
307
Wafik, Grais. And M, Pellegrini., Corporate Governance in Institutions Offering Islamic Financial 
Services: Issues and Options, World Bank Policy Research Working Paper. No. 4052, (01 November, 
2006) p 6 
308
Albert. O., Hirschman,(1970) Exit Voice and Loyalty: Responses to Decline in Firms, Organizations 
and States (Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts, USA) in W, Grais and M, Pellegrini, 
Corporate Governance in Institutions Offering Islamic Financial Services: Issues and Options, World 
Bank Policy Research Working Paper. No. 4052, 01 November 2006 ) p 6  
309
 Ibid (n180)136. 
  174 
 
Decision making is the core dimension of the corporate governance. This area is of 
utmost importance in the subject of corporate accountability.  Sharia considers humans 
as trustees of Allah and accountable to the Divine authority here and in the hereafter. 
Islam binds its followers to maintain good relations with superiors, clients and 
management along with observance of truthfulness, fairness, tolerance and justice.
310
 
The most important element of decision making is consultation which ensures 
participation of all the stakeholders. Even the Holy Quran assigns it very high 
importance and demands those in power to consult all the stakeholders.
 311
 It says: “And 
counsel with them in the affair; so when you have decided, then place your trust in 
Allah”.312and 
“And those who respond to their Lord and keep up prayer, and their rule is to take 
counsel among themselves, and who spend out of what we have given them” (Ash-
Shu’ra, 42:38) 
In addition to mandatory participation in decision making, tradition of accountability in 
Islam is rich. In Abbassids era, there was an institution called Hisbah which, inter alia, 
was responsible for ensuring the compliance of Islamic principles of business ethics. 
Therefore, concept of corporate governance enunciated by Shariah is broader and more 
encompassing than any model law, principles or rules, e.g. the OECD principles, on the 
subject.
 313
 By making universal business ethics as religious duty (to God especially), 
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the Sharia law principles on business even go beyond model OECD principles and are 
clearer and more comprehensive and enforceable.
314
 
3.7.8 Concluding remarks  
Improvement of corporate governance has always been a challenge. There is a 
continual effort on the intellectual plane and by every class of stakeholders be it the 
legislators, judges, academics or the practitioners.  This task becomes more challenging 
for the systems like Sharia which has a huge following and is emerging as a popular 
subject. It becomes even more daunting when many of its areas, especially the 
commercial aspects, remain under researched, its applicability or relevance in the 
modern world is questioned by the opponents and its own scholars show aversion to the 
modern demands for seeking new meaning. But now the scholastic efforts to rebut the 
misconceptions about its practicability are on the rise and there have been recognition 
that Sharia legal system can be utilised to improve the legal frameworks in jurisdictions 
where Sharia law has an influencing role on the frameworks. 
The discussion in this part of the chapter has shown that the revival of faith in Islamic 
corporate governance system has invited the scholars to research on its efficacy to fill 
the statutory gaps and complement laws, especially in corporate accountability issues. 
Western and Sharia systems emanate from different sources and have been serving 
different societies and cultures, therefore they resort to different institutional 
arrangements for realising the cherished objectives of a just, fair and transparent 
governance culture however the basic principles have been almost the same. 
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Thus, Sharia law has the potential to fill gaps in statutes/ laws through techniques of 
legal reasoning namely Qiyas, Istihsan, and Istislah. Abuse against arbitrary 
interpretations of these techniques is always checked by the supreme sources of Islamic 
law, i.e. Quran and Sunnah. However, they help fill the statutory gaps and assimilate 
whatever is right, just, fair, convenient or conducive. Conflict among rules is common 
which is removed by resorting to precedents to attain consistency, coherence and 
certainty. The conflict may occur even between a precedent and a newly enacted 
legislation. In such a case, statute being source of law will prevail. Same is true about 
Sharia law where Quran and Sunnah get precedence for being primary source.  
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Chapter 4. Case Studies on Self-Serving Behaviour of Corporate 
Management in Pakistan  
4.1 Introduction  
This thesis argues that derivative litigation has a crucial role to play in promoting good 
corporate governance which would eventually help shareholders receive adequate 
protection against managerial misconducts. In order to develop the basis of functional 
derivative action framework in Pakistan, this study needs examples of managerial 
opportunism providing data source for carrying out further analysis. There are 
theoretical claims in the existing academic literature regarding the self-serving 
behaviour of corporate management in Pakistan. However, there is no study that 
reflects this unhappy situation, explaining at length the means of expropriation of 
corporate assets and the analysis of relevant provisions of the Companies Ordinance 
and the role of SECP in respect of its objective to protect investors. The purpose of this 
chapter is to present analysis of specific examples of managerial misconducts and to 
reflect how management behaves opportunistically detrimental to the interests of 
shareholders and sometimes even against the companies. The cases studied are 
Crescent Standard Investment Bank Limited, Dewan Sugar Mills Ltd and Fazal Textile 
Mills Ltd. The analysis of these cases is aimed at illustrating that small investors are 
placed at a vulnerable position which the situation calls for them to be vested with 
adequate enforcement power to safeguard their interests. The chapter has been designed 
to examine the key issues that determine the outcome of these specific cases about 
managerial self-serving behaviour, to more general concerns of managerial 
opportunism in Pakistan. 
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4.2 Case Study: 1 Dewan Sugar Mills Limited. 
4.2.1 Introduction  
Before taking up the analytical study of this case,
1
 a generalized picture of the issue of 
unauthorized investments and siphoning of funds by the companies in associated 
undertakings may be worthy of consideration. It would unveil how often CEOs of the 
companies hand in hand with directors of the companies arbitrarily violate the 
mandatory provisions of law as laid down, in particular, under section 208(1) of the 
Companies Ordinance 1984, under one or the other excuse. This frequent phenomenon 
shed sufficient light on the aspect that although legal safeguards are provided, yet their 
enforcement mechanism is so poor that these are hardly taken seriously. Managers of 
companies are fearlessly inclined to make the best of the weaknesses in the 
enforcement mechanism, serving to escape from the mischief of law. This is because of 
many factors operating in the corporate sector, particularly, in the context of Pakistan. 
Out of these, the major factors seem to be the inadequate enforcement power of small 
shareholders to enforce the laws. This state of affairs has encouraged the tendency of 
tunnelling the funds of the holding companies to associated companies or associated 
undertakings carelessly without following legal formalities. 
The case, herein under, to be studied reflects this issue in details. 
4.2.2 Case Background and Brief Facts 
Dewan Sugar Mills Ltd. is a public limited company and is listed under Companies 
Ordinance, 1984 on stock markets Karachi and Lahore. The authorized share capital of 
the company is RS.500,000,000 divided into 50,000,000 ordinary shares of RS.10 each 
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and paid up capital of the company is RS.365,119,290, divided into 36,511,992 
ordinary shares of RS.10 each.
2
 
This company made huge advances to Bawany Sugar Mills Ltd.,(BSML)  its associated 
company, a sum of RS.284,700 millions and associated company AL-Asif Sugar Mills 
Ltd.,(ASML)  RS.25,004 millions without approval of shareholders through special 
resolution in General Meeting as required under section 208 of the Ordinance.
3
 Further, 
it did not charge any interest/mark up thereupon treating the advances as normal trade 
debt. This argument (normal trade debt) of the company could not find favour with the 
Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan, which, in turn, imposed penalty on 
CEO and five directors of the company. The case reflects siphoning of funds of the 
company without the authority of special resolution in contravention of law as 
envisaged under section 208 read with 476 of the Ordinance.
4
 
Brief facts of the case as disclosed from the record and examination of annual audited 
accounts of the company for the relevant year, reveal that huge amounts were advanced 
to the company’s associated undertakings without observing legal requirements in this 
regard. It was found in the annual audited statement that such advances were made 
without seeking the requisite approval of shareholders through special resolution.
5
 It 
was also found that these advances were not in the nature of normal trade credit and 
that no interest thereupon was charged.
6
 Obviously, such unauthorized heavy advances 
beyond the scope of mandate, exposed the company to huge losses. Thus, prime 
                                                 
2
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objective of the legislation on the subject as reflected in section 208 of the Ordinance 
was defeated, which is primarily meant to secure the interest of, particularly minor 
shareholders of the company and guard against misuse of its funds by diverting 
unwarranted benefits to associated companies or associated undertakings. 
The law is simple and clear on the point that authority of special resolution is 
mandatory while making any investment or extending any loans or advances, 
whatsoever, to associated companies or associated undertakings.
7
 Since there was not 
only formal breach of legal provisions in this respect but also huge losses to the 
company were caused by neglecting or conniving  with the charging of mark- 
up/interest, a very serious view was taken by the Commission.
8
 Thus, having found 
gross neglect and contravention of provisions under section 208 of the Ordinance, the 
Commission imposed penalty as prescribed under sub-section (3) section 208 of the 
Ordinance for violation of the mandatory provisions as laid down under sub-section (1) 
of the same. As such, a fine to the tone of RS.3, 500, 000, in totality, was levied on 
Chief Executive Officer of the company and its five directors.
9
 
4.2.3 Key Issues before the Commission   
During course of proceedings, the Commission, called upon the company to provide 
information as given below in respect of advances extended to associated undertakings; 
(a) Name(s) of the associated undertakings and breakup of RS.309,704 millions; 
(b) Dates since when these undertakings became associated with the company; 
(c) Certified copy of approval authorizing making of these advances ensuing from 
Board of Directors‘ resolution and special resolution of shareholders passed in 
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General Meeting, as specifically required under the provisions of section 208 of 
the Companies Ordinance;
10
 
(d) Copies of current accounts and ledger accounts of these associated undertakings 
maintained in the company’s book with effect from 1st October 2006 to 28th 
February 2009; and 
(e) Certified copies of toll manufacturing agreements and details of subsequent 
changes, if any.           
The company, to reply to the aforesaid queries, submitted the required information as 
follows;  
(a) The advances were made to Bawany Sugar Mills Ltd., and AL-Asif Sugar Mills 
Ltd., the associated companies, to the tone of RS.284,700 millions and 
RS.25,004 millions respectively;  
(b) The said companies became associated of the company (Dewaan Sugar Mills 
Ltd.) on 15 November ,2006 upon acquiring of majority shareholdings of 
BSML (Bawany Sugar Mills Ltd.) and ASML( AL-Asif Sugar Mills Ltd.) by 
Dewaan Mushtaq Group; 
(c) As far explanation to the contravention of section 208 of the Ordinance, the 
company contended that the provisions of section 208 were not applicable to 
their case since these advances were in the nature of normal trade debt and did 
not fall within the definition of “investment” as laid down under section 208 of 
the Ordinance; 
(d) Copies of current and ledger accounts of BSML and ASML provided; 
(e) Copies of toll manufacturing provided. 
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On being dissatisfied with the reply furnished by the company, a show cause notice 
dated 24 April, 2009 (as earlier mentioned) under section 208 of the Ordinance, was 
served on the Chief Executive of the company (namely; Deewan Mohammad Yousaf 
Farooqi) and five Directors as to why penalty for violating the provisions of section 
208, sub-section (1) of the Ordinance should not be imposed on them, in terms of sub-
section (3) of the same.
11
 
4.2.4 Plea of the company:   
In reply to the show cause notice, Mr. Haroon Iqbal , Director and Mr.Abdul Basit, the 
Company Secretary, reiterated the earlier argument to the effect that company had toll 
manufacturing agreements with BSML and ASML  and the advances extended to these 
companies were being adjusted against the toll manufacturing charges. They further 
contended that aforesaid advances made to the aforementioned associated companies 
were in the nature of normal trade credit and as such did not fall within the purview of 
section 208 of the Ordinance. That is why interest was not charged thereupon.
12
 
The company’s representative, during course of proceedings, added that in the 
beginning, the agreements entered into between Dewaan Sugar Mills Ltd. (the 
company) and ASML and BSML, required that the manufacturing fee will become due 
in favour of the companies (ASML and BSML) within twenty days of the invoices 
issued by them and will become payable accordingly. However, the aforesaid two 
companies later made requests for advance payments against the toll manufacturing 
charges, just to enable them to carry out the working capital requirements and ensure 
the supply of sugar to the company well within time. The stance of the company was 
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that such sort of mutual arrangement was on the strength of common practice prevalent 
with sugar industry that sugar manufacturing companies receive payments in advance 
and then make arrangements for delivery of goods by issuance of delivery orders to the 
customer company, which is left to its choice as when to collect it (sugar) according to 
its convenience. Based on this general practice, the company (Dewaan Sugar Mills 
Ltd.) acceded to the request for making advance payments and in this regard 
supplementary agreements were entered into with ASML and BSML accordingly. 
It was further submitted by the counsel of the company that on the basis of these 
agreements, whatever advances were made by it to ASML and BSML, were adjusted 
against toll manufacturing charges. At the time of entering into agreements with the 
companies ASML and BSML, on 1st September, 2004, these were not related to each 
other and these advances were just in the nature of usual trade deals. This status was 
kept up till 15 November, 2006 when these companies acquired the status of associated 
companies; however, the toll agreements remained the same as these were before the 
establishment of associated company relationship. The representative of the company 
(Dewaan Sugar Mills Ltd.) maintained that the purpose of agreements struck between 
the company ASML and BSML was just to carry out normal trade between the 
companies as customer and supplier by acquisition and provision of toll manufacturing 
services. As such, there is no embargo under law on extending advances in terms of 
normal trade credit to an associated company as it is not subject to the mischief of 
provisions laid down under section 208 of the Ordinance.
13
 
The company’s major stance, in nutshell, was that it is not the case of siphoning of 
funds of the company with vested interest of the CEO and its directors. In fact, the 
                                                 
13
 See section 208,the Companies Ordinance 1984. 
  184 
 
advances in question, were made against toll manufacturing services bargained by it 
with ASML and BSML before the establishment of associated relationship which 
continued even after the creation of such relationship; as such the advances remained in 
the nature of normal trade transaction falling outside the reach of provision  of section 
208 sub-section (1) of the Ordinance. 
4.2.5 The Commission’ findings     
The Commission, in turn, gave consideration to the legal propositions advanced by the 
company and concluded that it was very much case of tunnelling of company’s funds 
beyond the scope of mandate extended by law.
14
 The company had been making 
advances to ASML and BSML since 2005 and maintained this exercise even after these 
companies acquired the status of associated companies with effect from 15
th
 November, 
2006 without authorization for the same by the shareholders through special resolution 
as required under law. Further, this practice continued without charging any 
interest/mark-up thereupon. 
It was observed by the Commission that Annual Audited Accounts of the company 
disclosed that since the year 2006 (after attaining the character of associated 
relationship) onwards, the company rather chose to make added huge amounts of 
advances which even excelled the aggregate amount of charges paid by the company 
against toll manufacturing services received from the said companies, during the 
relevant years. For example, on 30th September, 2005 (i.e. before attaining associate 
relationship) advances were RS.160.562 million against 248.847 million charges of toll 
manufacturing. On the other hand, during the year ended on 30 June, 2007 (i.e. after 
attaining associate status) advances of RS .440, 980 millions were due against toll 
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manufacturing cost of only RS .284, 733 million. Statistically, the coming years 
witnessed the same trend.
15
 
4.2.6 Analysis of findings 
It transpires from the above case that advances made by the company to associated 
companies ASML and BSML, can be, by no reason, termed as normal trade credit. The 
fact that the parties to agreement have adjusted the amounts advanced by entering into 
toll manufacturing agreements thereby showing these as current assets and current 
liabilities in the respective balance sheets, do not help treating these advances as normal 
trade credit. Perusal of ledger accounts of ASML and BSML maintained in the books of 
the company reveal that the advances were open ended credit without specified 
repayment schedule, from time to time adjustments map for the outstanding amounts 
against toll manufacturing charges. Hence, these advances were just in the nature of 
open ended credit or running finance but without any interest or mark-up thereby 
causing tremendous losses to the company. The commission went to the extent of 
working out year wise split of advances outstanding against toll manufacturing charges 
indicating vast difference there between i.e. gradual increases in the advances against 
the decreases in toll manufacturing charges for the corresponding period. 
The Commission also observed (as example) with special reference to the fact that 
during the year 2008, toll manufacturing agreement with ASML was ended due to sale 
of its controlling shares by the responsible/sponsors of the company. As a result, the 
advances of ASML were adjusted/cleared out with visible fall in the total outstanding 
balance during the year. On the other hand, as regards BSML, which continued its 
associated relationship, huge amounts continued to stand unsettled. In this view of the 
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matter, the Commission categorically set aside the plea of the company that the 
advances extended to associated companies were normal trade credit falling outside the 
range of section 208 of the Ordinance. The Commission further repelled the plea of the 
company to the effect that it had been extending advances to ASML and BSML before 
these companies acquired the status of associated relationship and it simply continued 
the earlier practice (and did not introduce anything new). 
The Commission maintained that earlier practice cannot validate the act of the company 
subsequent to the date ASML and BSML became associated companies from 15 
November, 2006 onwards. According to the observations made by the Commission, the 
provision of section 208 of the Ordinance came into play strictly the day on which the 
companies started enjoying the character of associated relationship.
16
 The above 
referred provisions of the law are clear and self-evident. The facts and circumstances of 
the case and in-depth examination of the record, reveal that the Directors of the 
company failed to comply with the provisions of section 208 of the Ordinance while 
making advances to its associated companies.
17
 
Moreover, the advances had been extended to the said associated companies without 
any interest/mark-up and without obtaining the authority of special resolution by the 
shareholders of the company. As such, these advances are not normal trade credit as 
controverted by the company. Due to interest free loan/unauthorized advances, the 
company had to suffer huge losses and for meeting the situation, had to get (as 
transpired from the Annual Audited Accounts for the year ended on 30th September, 
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2008) short term loan of RS.2.754 billion from various banks at a price ranging up to 
three hundred basis points above the Karachi Inter Bank Offered Rate.
18
 (KIBOR) 
Another plea of the company to the effect that as a result of these transactions 
(unauthorized advances) there appeared positive improvement in production and sales 
over years, has also been turned down by the Commission with observation that despite 
enhanced turnover (production and sales whatever) the overall financial position of the 
company, its profits and liquidity, have declined over the period consequent to its toll 
manufacturing agreements with the said associated companies. The Commission has 
remarked so with special reference to a year wise diagrammatic picture indicating 
evident increase of out standings with visible decrease in adjustments. The financial 
statements of the company for the year ended on 30th September, 2008 clearly depict 
its losses. It discloses that after adjustment of taxation, the losses have accumulated to 
very high levels which have eroded its capital and its current liabilities have exceeded 
its current assets. 
Alongside the company remains no longer able to ensure timely repayments of debts of 
the concerned banks. This state of affairs signals a perceptible uncertainty for the 
company to survive as a growing entity. The Commission, in its judgment, observed 
that Directors owe fiduciary duties to the Company they serve and its shareholders. 
They must treat all the shareholders, irrespective of their being sponsors of the 
company or general public at large, alike. In the case under review, the Directors have 
failed to exercise the sense of responsibility expected from them by the law and 
principles of fairness. They, clearly, breached their fiduciary duty they owed to the 
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company and its shareholders with resultant voluminous losses which posed question 
mark even on the very survival of the company.
19
 
It is with these facts in view, the Commission imposed penalty of RS.3, 500, 000 in 
aggregate on the CEO and five Directors of the company, with the remarks that keeping 
in view the gravity of charge, no leniency could be exercised. Having discussed 
violation of law on the part of directors, opinion is formed on the facts and remarks 
made by the regulators that CEO and Directors of the company ruthlessly committed 
wrong against the company while extending unauthorized huge advances and those too 
interest free and so they, by no reason, deserve any leniency. 
The regulatory body imposed only 1/3rd of the maximum fine provided under law.
20
 
Sub-section (3) of section 208 of the Ordinance provides that if default is made in a 
company in complying with the requirements of this provision of law, every Director of 
the company, who is knowingly and wilfully responsible, shall be liable to fine which 
may extend to RS ten million and, in addition, the Directors shall, jointly and severally, 
reimburse to the company any losses suffered by it in consequence of any investment 
having been made in contravention of the law. 
As is clear from the wording of above said provision of law (section 208(3), the upper 
limit of fine is RS. ten million while in the case in hand, in spite of highly resentful 
observation by the regulatory body, only, 1/3rd of the maximum fine provided, has 
been imposed. This would mean, it is nothing less, leniency, in terms, which the 
regulatory body itself excluded in his remarks. Therefore, it should have been at least 
half of the upper limit or double of the volume as imposed. In fact, such are the 
leniencies which have tremendously encouraged the phenomenon of fearless violation 
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of law as the wrongdoers do not care much for low-line fines against high earnings 
through wrongful acts. 
4.3 Case Study: 2 Fazal Textile Mills Limited  
4.3.1 Case Background and Brief Facts  
 A flagship company Fazal Textile Mills Ltd. made equity investment of RS.500 
million in an associated company named “Lucky One” (Private) Ltd. (“Lucky One”) to 
build and develop a mega mall and residential towers on the company’s 10.22 acres of 
land and then run, manage and maintain it upon the terms to be settled between the 
parties. The audited financial statement of Fazal Textile Mills for the financial year 
ended 30 June 2012, after having been examined by the Director Finance SECP 
(Respondent of the case) under section 233 and section 160 (1)(b) of the Companies 
Ordinance 1984, disclosed that the company (Fazal Textile Mills Ltd.) allegedly 
received approval of the shareholders as required under section 208 of the Ordinance in 
Extraordinary General Meeting (EOGM),for equity investment of RS.500 millions in 
the said associated private company “Lucky One” for carrying out aforementioned 
mega project.
21
  
 The above said approval of the shareholders at the Extraordinary General Meeting 
dated 14 September, 2010, came subsequent to the earlier meeting of the company’s 
shareholders, held on 20
th
 October, 2012, intended to carry out a joint venture 
agreement with Lucky Textile Mills Ltd. (“Lucky One”) for execution of the aforesaid 
project. The terms and conditions of the agreement as transpired from the notice of 
EOGM, disclosed that associated company “Lucky One” shall fall under joint 
ownership and operational control of both Fazal Textile Mills Ltd. and Lucky Textile 
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Mills Ltd. itself and both shall invest in the project on share and loss basis with the ratio 
of 66.28 per cent and 33.72 per cent respectively which would be assessed on the basis 
of the land provided by each of them. On examination of the annual audited statement 
of the company for the year 2012 and 2013, it stood transpired that an amount of 
RS.157, 075,000 and RS.655, 612,000 respectively was advanced to “Lucky One”.22 
4.3.2 Key Issues before the Commission 
During examination by the Director Finance SECP, it was found that the company had 
acted unfairly against approval in the Extraordinary General Meeting held on 14th 
September, 2010 and failed to make equity investment of RS.500 million in “Lucky 
One” as approved by the shareholders. More so, the company failed to satisfy the 
mandatory requirement of disclosure of its intent to shareholders regarding its further 
plans, in clear disregard of SRO,865 (1)/2000 Dated 06 December, 2000 and the 
regulation 4(2) in subsequent General Meetings of 30 June 2011, and 30 June  2012.
23
 
It is understood that the above said SRO and regulation stipulates disclosure of certain 
material facts in the statement under Section 160 of the Ordinance accompanied by the 
notice of Meeting meant for obtaining shareholders’ approval as required under section 
208 of the Ordinance.
24
 Further, section 160 sub-section (1) requires that in case any 
decision to make investment pursuant to a resolution is not implemented till the holding 
of a subsequent meeting, the Company’s position along with the required information 
(herein under mentioned) must be shared with the shareholders through a statement as 
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per requirement of the above said provision of law (Section 160 (1) of the Ordinance.
25
 
Such statement is required to contain; 
1. Reasons for not having made investment till date; 
2. Major change in financial position of investee company since date of last 
resolution; 
3. Total investment approved in the shareholder’s meeting; 
4. Extent of investment made so far; 
5. Reasons for not making complete investment till date when resolution required 
it to be made within stipulated time; and 
6. Material change in financial statements of associated company or associated 
undertaking since date of the resolution of the approval accorded for investment 
in the investee company. 
 
As has been mentioned above, the company (Fazal Textile Mills Ltd.) failed to fulfil 
the above mentioned requirements and was called upon to explain the default identified 
on examination of the relevant record. In reply thereto, the company contended that it 
had reached a decision not to make equity investment in “Lucky One”; rather chose to 
directly carry out the project by direct financing. It further explained that the share 
capital of “Lucky One” was subscribed by two shareholders of the company (Fazal 
Textile Mills Ltd.) and one shareholder of Lucky Textile Mills Ltd. under the control of 
both the companies. Thus, the joint venture agreement was revised and submitted on 23 
February 2013 according to which “Lucky One” was accorded the role of supervision 
of the project with entitlement to supervision remuneration/fee at the rate 0.25 per cent 
of payments made to subcontractors on quarterly basis. This revised arrangement of 
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directly bearing the cost involved in the project and alongside granting mobilization 
advances to “Lucky One” instead of equity investment as initially agreed, was, 
evidently, a clear departure from the aforementioned approval extended by the 
shareholders under section 208 of the Ordinance. 
The company published a notice of Annual General Meeting on 7th October, 2013 in 
the newspapers seeking approval for amendments in the resolution passed on 14th 
September, 2010. The company, by circulation of its notice to that effect, invited 
approval of shareholders for making funding directly for the financial requirements 
involved in running the project, instead of making equity investment in “Lucky One”. 
This exercise took place consequent to modified agreement dated 23 February, 2013 
entered into between the parties on joint venture basis for direct funding along with 
supervision fee to “Lucky One” as mentioned earlier. 
On disclosure of these facts through audited statement, the director finance, SECP was 
seized of the investigation of the matter and called upon the directors of the company to 
explain for defaults in compliance of mandatory provisions contained in sections 160 
and 208 read with section 476 of the Ordinance. For facility of reference, section 
160(1) (b) and section 208 of the Ordinance are summarized as under; 
According to section 160(1) (b) when usual company business is to be transacted at a 
General Meeting, the notice of the meeting shall be accompanied with a statement 
setting out all material facts regarding such business, particularly, including the nature 
and extent of direct or indirect interest, if any, of every director and where any 
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contingency of business relates to the granting of approval to any document, the time, 
as to when and the place where the document may be inspected.
26
 
According to section 208 of the Ordinance, subject to sub-section 2(A) a company is 
debarred from making any investment in any associated company or associated 
undertaking except under the authority of special resolution which shall indicate the 
nature, period and volume of investment and related terms and conditions agreed and 
settled therein. In case of default in observance of these provisions of law or 
regulations, every director of a company who is found to be wilfully at fault, shall be 
liable to fine which may extend to RS. ten million and additionally the directors shall 
be bound jointly and individually to indemnify any loss suffered by the company 
resulting from any investment made without complying with the condition precedents 
as set out in the foregone provision of law.
27
 
As has been discussed at length in the foregoing lines, an obvious departure is 
evidenced from the company’s act. Such tactics on the part of managements seem to 
have been just adopted to hide the default. This situation led the things to be inquired 
into at the relevant forum. 
4.3.3 The Commission’s Investigation of the Case  
On having taken up the matter, SECP’s authority(Director Finance) went into detailed 
probe and examined the provisions of the law, which relate to  investment in associated 
companies and associated undertakings, laid down under sections 160, 223, 208, and 
476 of the Ordinance. Regulation 2012, 4(2)-SRO NO.865 (1)/2000 dated 06 December 
                                                 
26
 See Section 160(1), the Companies Ordinance 1984. 
27
 See section 208 (2)(A), the Companies Ordinance 1984. 
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2000 was also referred to.
28
  According to the facts, the company was accorded 
approval by the shareholders under section 208 of Companies Ordinance, 1984 in 
Extraordinary General Meeting (EOGM) for equity investment of RS.500 million in the 
associated company “Lucky One”. The company failed to act in obedience to 
shareholder’s approval as it had not made equity investment according to the mandate. 
Further, the company also failed to satisfy the requirement of disclosure as required 
under SRO NO, 865(1) 2000 dated 06 December 2000 and regulation 4(2) relating to 
companies’ investment in associated companies or associated undertakings as also 
regulation 2012 in subsequent General Meeting. 
The Directors of the company were required to justify the defaults (show cause notice) 
in reference to requirements of sections 160 and 208, read with section 476 of the 
Ordinance. After due deliberations, the commission, being dissatisfied with the reply 
tendered by the company, imposed penalty of RS.100,000 under sections 160 and 208 
of the Ordinance on the Chief Executive Officer of the company and the Directors of 
the company were issued warning for ensuring strict compliance of the relevant 
provisions of the Ordinance, in future. The reasoning and rationale in reaching this 
verdict was that the shareholders of the company accorded approval for equity 
investment in terms of section 208 of the Ordinance and SRO NO.865 (1)/2000 dated 
06 December 2000 which required listed company to furnish update information 
regarding the progress on implementation of the project approved by the shareholders 
through resolution in subsequent General Meeting. Such information was required to 
include reasons for not investing in the project so far and major changes in the financial 
position of Investee Company but the company failed to do so. Thus, the company was 
                                                 
28
 See section 160,223, 208,476, of the Companies Ordinance 1984; SECP issued Notification No. SRO 
865 (1)/2000- dated 06 December, 2000 < https://www.secp.gov.pk/wp-
content/uploads/2016/05/dec_06_00.pdf> accessed 27 June 2016.  
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found to have committed wilful default and was penalized accordingly as it published 
the notice of Annual General Meeting in the newspapers in a bid to get shareholders’ 
approval for modification in earlier resolution only, after receipt of the notice issued by 
the SECP, which, itself seems to be evidently an afterthought move in itself. 
4.3.4 Analysis of findings  
This verdict of penal action against the company was challenged by way of appeal 
before the tribunal comprised of Zafar Abdullah Commissioner (SCD) and Fida 
Hussain Sumoo Commissioner (insurance) against the impugned order (of imposing 
penalty on the company i.e. its CEO of the company and its Directors).
29
 
The appellant (company) raised, amongst others, the following grounds; 
1. That the appellant had been confirmed with the requisite authority by the 
shareholders vide special resolution to perform and take any acts, deals and 
decisions as may be required from time to time,  
2. That the management of the company wields more than 92 per cent 
shareholding of the company and 100 per cent of its joint venture associate 
Lucky Textile Mills Ltd. and thumping majority in Director’s meeting as 
well as in General Meeting and as such they could have no problem in 
getting approval of any special resolution and modification therein as may 
be required; 
3. That the company alongside kept aware of the shareholders about the 
advancement of the project through Director’s report and changes, if any; 
4. That the company belongs to a renowned Younis Brothers Group, reputed 
for best practices. 
                                                 
29
 Muhammad Sohail Tabba-Appellant vs. Director Enforcement, SECP [2016] CLD 1697.  
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The Appellate Bench, as per procedure, called upon the SECP investigator/respondent 
to put up their reply to the above mentioned contentions agitated by the company in its 
appeal. 
The SECP representative strongly rebutted the argumentative stance advanced by the 
company, summarized as below; 
1. The company’s contention that it was conferred with the authority by special 
resolution dated 14 September, 2010, to take and perform all acts, deals and 
decisions, wherever required, is contravention of express provisions 
contained in section 160 of the Ordinance which calls for the company to 
update the shareholders of resolutions passed, which the company failed to 
do; 
2. According to special resolution dated 14 September, 2010, the company was 
authorized only to make equity investment of RS.500 millions in “Lucky 
One” but no such investment was made; instead, investment was made in 
“Lucky One” through mobilization advance which the act of the company 
was contrary to the mandate given in this regard; 
3. The company issued notice of Annual General Meeting on 7th October, 
2013, only on receipt of explanation letter from SECP, in order to get 
approval from shareholders for modification in resolution of September, 
2010, which the act of the company clearly indicates that where it was fully 
aware of legal requirements was also bold enough to go for contravention 
thereof.  
The Appellate Bench, after detailed discussion, dismissed the appeal of the company 
upholding the decision of SECP of imposing penalty of RS.100, 000 upon the Chief 
Executive Officer of the company and issuance of warning to its directors to behave in 
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future as per legal requirements expressly set out in the relevant law. The Bench 
particularly took keen notice of two major irritants widely prevalent in corporate sector 
of Pakistan and those are the expropriation of minority interests by tunnelling and like 
methods and exercise of personal influence regarding deals of choice without taking 
into confidence the minority shareholders of the company. 
The majority shareholders, loudly, contended during hearing that they enjoyed 
overwhelming majority of 92 per cent in company’s shareholdings and 100 per cent of 
its joint venture associate (Lucky Textile Mills) and that it is a privileged giant YB, 
Group one of the largest business group of Pakistan. These two stances, in particular, 
seem to have not found favour with the Appellate Bench, rather irritated it for the 
obvious reasons that the company in its defence proudly relied upon and, in a way, 
owned what otherwise is a major causative factor leading to frequent managerial 
wrongdoings. These factors count on overwhelming statistical majority and owning 
social influence as reflected in the stance raised on the strength of Y.B Group’s social 
position.
30
 
The Bench, in a way, ridiculed these contentions observing that what they (the 
company) own and contend in their favour, the same, in essence, goes against them, 
independent of any other piece of evidence, if any. In fact, this contention is 
counterproductive which leads to the detriment of oppressed minority at the hands of 
majority shareholders. For example, a few cases may be referred here in this context, 
having identical issue of tunnelling and the flagship companies by dint of their 
dominant positions, with resultant similar outcome at the end of the day. In Monno 
Industries Ltd.-Appellants v. Executive Director (CLD) Securities and Exchange 
                                                 
30
 Muhammad Sohail Tabba-Appellant vs. Director Enforcement, SECP [2016] CLD 1697.  
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Commission of Pakistan-Respondent,
31
 annual audited statement of Monno Industries 
Ltd., disclosed an amount of RS.8.516 as due from associated undertaking made as 
advance thereto, without authority through special resolution. 
Later, requisite ratification was attempted to be made through subsequent special 
resolution. It was found that post facto approval of investment in associated company 
through special resolution, could not relieve the company of accountability. This act 
was found to have violated the express provisions contained in section 160(1) (B) and 
section 208 of the Companies Ordinance. During course of investigation as also at 
judicial level, the company begged pardon which, nevertheless, meant its 
acknowledgement of the wilful default. In the context of proceedings in the instant 
case, reliance was also placed on Gharibwal Cement Ltd. v Executive Director SECP
32
 
wherein it was held that prior consent of shareholders is mandatory and is a prerequisite 
and as such any investment made in associated company cannot be regularized or 
validated on account of subsequent ratification by shareholders. 
Eventually, being dissatisfied with the contentions urged by the company’s 
representative, penalty to the tone of RS.10, 000 was imposed on the Chief Executive 
Officer of the company and its directors for each default aggregating to a sum of RS.30, 
000 each. 
Similar tunnelling mischief cropped up in another case namely; Nasim Saigal v/s 
SECP.
33
 In this case, the company made unauthorized investments in associated 
companies and undertakings and advanced amount thereto for the purchase of Textile 
                                                 
31
 Monno Industries Ltd.-Appellants v. Executive Director (CLD) Securities and Exchange Commission 
of Pakistan-Respondent[2012] CLD 691  
32
 Gharibwal Cement Ltd. v/s Executive Director SECP [2003] CLD 131  
33
 Nasim Saigal v/s SECP [2013] CLD 1179  
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machinery and Cotton etc. Such advances were not in the nature of normal trade credit 
thereby coming within the mischief of section 208 of the Companies Ordinance.
34
 
Later, that project was abandoned due to the machinery not being up to the mark. In 
this eventuality, instead of recovering the advance from the associated company, the 
company extended further credit, which was too not in the nature of normal trade debt. 
Although according the explanation contained in section 208, “investment” includes 
“advance” but the provision of law in the aforementioned section (208) stipulates it to 
be made through special resolution and with the prior approval of the shareholders. The 
company, instead, made unauthorized advance payment and converted the same into 
open ended credit to associated company and failed to recover the same.  
4.4 Case Study: 3 Crescent Standard Investment Bank Limited 
4.4.1 Introduction 
This case portrays another picture of corporate wrongs.
35
 The list of misdoings is so 
wide that hardly there seems anything to have escaped from the excesses of the 
management. It includes omissions, commissions, transgressions, negligence, and other 
corporate frauds. It also includes frank admissions of irregularities having taken place 
although with certain untenable stance. For instance, appellant NO.8 raised the 
contention that he submitted his resignation from his office as he came to know about 
the irregularities and made excuse of his ignorance when the same were in progress. 
The CEO and the Director of the CSIBL who was also director of an associated 
                                                 
34
 See section 208, the Companies Ordinance 1984.  
35
 The case titled Shahid Anwar, Tariq Aleem, Dr. Wasim Azhar , Mazurul haq, Shaid Latif Dar, Ifran 
Qamar& others, Mehmood Ahmed Shezi Nackvi v Chairman Securities and Exchange Commission of 
Pakistan [2015] Appellate Bench Security and Exchange Commission of Pakistan.  
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company, in clear terms declared in a press conference that he was unaware of self-
interest transactions within the bank.  
The irregularities at a glance are;  
1- Maintaining two parallel books of accounts with undisclosed balance of assets 
and liabilities; 
2- Investment in associated companies/undertakings without approval of the 
shareholders through special resolution; 
3- Real estate transactions without license(legally required) for Housing Finance 
Services;   
4- Violation of prudential regulations; and 
5- Violation of delegated authority of Board by the Chief Executive Officer (of 
CSIBL). 
4.4.2 Brief Description of the Company 
Crescent Standard Investment Bank Ltd. (CSIBL) was a public limited company 
incorporated as Non-Banking Finance Company (NBFC). It was a listed company with 
its shares offered on the Stock Markets of Pakistan operating in various cities. CSIBL 
obtained licenses from the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan to carry 
out the business of Investment Finance Services and Leasing services within the 
meaning of Non-Banking Finance Companies (Establishment and Regulation) Rules, 
2003 (NBFC Rules). 
4.4.3 Nature of the Scam  
Security and Exchange Commission of Pakistan (SECP) had been receiving unofficial 
reports since May 2006 regarding a number of acts of expropriation of corporate assets 
by the management of Crescent Standard Investment Bank Limited (CSIBL) .It was 
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further confirmed when CSIBL did not circulate the audited accounts for the year 
ending on 31 December, 2005 even as late as August 2006. After investigations carried 
out by the SECP, the internal management was found involved in acts of 
misappropriations, concealments, maintenance of parallel accounts, misrepresentation 
and massive unauthorized funding to the companies of crescent group.
36
 CSIBL was a 
well reputed Pakistani concern business company and its shareholding structure 
consisted of general public and the crescent group of companies being the majority 
shareholders. 
The Crescent Investment Standard Bank developed after mergers with other companies 
and started its business venture in the capital market after the mergers of First Standard 
Investment Bank Limited and First Crescent Modarba
37
 in the year 2003.In 2005, the 
Modarba business gained growth but at the same time, it faced a tough competition 
from commercial banks. Some gains were achieved on the stock market; however, the 
spread income was poor with low profitability. The government of Pakistan established 
the Religious Board for the Modarba in 2005 with the expectation of opening up new 
business opportunities. 
 The Security and Exchange Commission of Pakistan encouraged acquisitions and 
voluntary mergers in order to improve the risk absorption capacity of the Modarba 
sector. There were a number of mergers of various companies which bespeaks of 
general strategic shift towards consolidation, being really required for the financial 
stability and operational flexibility. Security and Exchange Commission of Pakistan 
also issued the prudential regulations with the purpose of facilitating the operation of 
                                                 
36
 See Daily Business Recorder 16,2006.   
37
  Modaraba is a kind of partnership by which one party provides the capital to the other to carry out 
business. The profits made are shared between the parties.  
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non-banking companies in 2006.The objective of issuing prudential regulations was to 
improve the governance of Modarba companies.
38
In the year 2005, the Bank appeared 
progressing well as per the rating of the JCR-VIS Credit Rating Company limited 
which categorized it as ‘’BBB+/A-2’’ uplifting it from BBB/A-3.  The rating was based 
on all financial indicators.
39
 
 However, in the year 2006, it came as a surprise for the market to see a huge loss of RS 
2.118 billion shown by the company and the loss per share was calculated as RS 16.85 
and the share price was negative by RS.6.85. Although the CSIBL had in place the 
main corporate governance mechanisms such as, consistent board meetings, internal 
audit committee, and statement of compliance with the corporate governance code and 
also, as stated earlier, the bank was rated good by the JCR-VIS Credit Rating Company, 
yet the bank suffered a huge loss. The CEO and director of the CSIBL who was also 
CEO of an associated company declared in a press conference that he was not aware of 
the self-interested deals within the bank. He asserted that the board’s approval was not 
taken in self-interested transactions with connected parties such as the Javid Omar 
Vohra transaction and in selling bank’s assets, practically rendering the board of the 
bank irrelevant in this behalf.
40
 Furthermore, another board member confirmed that 
board resolutions were overlooked, and also ignored. 
                                                 
38
 Prudential Regulations for Non-Banking Finance , SECP 
<www.secp.gov.pk/corporatelaws/pdf/.../Prudential Regulations_2004_Amended.pdf>> accessed 27 June 
2016 
39
 See JCR-VIS < www.jcrvis.com.pk/docs/CSIBLComment.pdf> accessed 27 June 2016.  
40
 CEO and Director Mazhar ul Haq made this statement in a press conference, Business Recorder, 19 
September, 2006. 
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4.4.4 Commission’s Proceedings 
On receipt of complaints/reports, the Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan 
took up the matter and made orders as to on-site inspection of the records of CSIBL in 
exercise of its powers under section 282(1) of the Companies Ordinance, 1984.
41
 A 
team of experts comprised of seven members, was appointed to carry out on-site 
inspection of the company (bank) at its main office supposed to be in safe custody of all 
relevant record. The team of inspectors traced a series of mismanagements, omissions 
and transgressions, in the record and operations of CSIBL, in contravention of law, 
rules and regulations in this regard. The inspectors drew up the detailed report dated 10 
March 2006, highlighting all the irregularities committed by the management. 
Each irregularity as detected and incorporated in inspectors’ report needs to be 
recapitulated in some detail as below in order to have a complete picture of the state of 
affairs; 
4.4.4.1 Parallel Books  
The report disclosed that two parallel books were maintained by the CSIBL 
management with undisclosed balance of assets and liabilities under the pretext of 
“Managed Portfolio”. This undisclosed balance amounts to RS.5.252 billion. On the 
other hand, the statement of accounts published by CSIBL for the half year ending 30 
June 2005 depicted an asset volume of RS.9.559 billion while, on inspection, the 
parallel balance sheet reflected an assets balance of RS.5.252 billion which indicates 
that the balance RS.5.252 billion which was not incorporated in the published financial 
statement of CSIBL, for the notice of shareholders and general public. It was obviously 
an attempt towards camouflaging. 
                                                 
41
 See Section 282(1), the Companies Ordinance 1984.  
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In fact, this parallel balance sheet was hidden with ulterior motives and published 
report was publicized with an intent to dishonestly misinform and defraud all the people 
staked on the company. The ulterior motives operating behind the undisclosed accounts 
as transpired from the investigation report of the SECP were making illegal payments 
to various parties from the money raised through borrowing from various financial 
institutions as well as the general public and getting away with the liability.
42
 The 
inspection report by the inspection team has elaborated item wise as to on what footing 
above said assets of RS.5.252 billion were generated and then hidden through parallel 
books of accounts. As per inspection report, this all fell within the purview of the 
violation of provision envisaged under section 230 and 234 of the Companies 
Ordinance and rule 7(1)(a) of the NBFC Rules.
43
 The said provisions of law clearly 
demanded CSIBL to keep proper books of account, balance sheet and profit and loss 
statements reflecting a true and a fair picture of the company’s operations.44 
4.4.4.2 Investment in associated companies/undertakings without proper 
approval. 
The report further disclosed that CSIBL had invested in its associated companies and 
associated undertakings through investment in their shares amounting to a total of 
RS.562.027 million for the year ended 30 June 2005, without obtaining shareholders’ 
approval through a special resolution, which the act constitutes contravention of section 
                                                 
42
 See Shahid Anwar, Tariq Aleem, Dr. Wasim Azhar , Mazurul haq, Shaid Latif Dar, Ifran Qamar& 
others, (former auditors of CSIBL), Mehmood Ahmed Shezi Nackvi v Chairman Securities and 
Exchange Commission of Pakistan [2015] Appellate Bench Security and Exchange Commission of 
Pakistan. 
43
 See Section 230 and 234 of the Companies Ordinance 1984; See Rule, 7 (1), Non-Banking Finance 
Companies (Establishment and Regulation) Rules, 2003 (NBFC Rules).  
44
 Ibid  
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208(1) of the Ordinance.
45
 Further, as it transpired from the inspection report, CSIBL  
was also found to have entered into “Musharka” ventures involving real estate business 
with its associated company namely Mughreb Development Corporation Ltd. (private) 
for an aggregate amount of RS.1.540 billion (RS.655 million shown on parallel books 
of accounts maintained by CSIBL under the head of “Managed Portfolio”. As per the 
borrower’s basic fact sheet and corporate application form provided to the inspection 
team, appellant NO.7 namely Mr. Mahmood Ahmad was at the same time CEO of 
associated company MDPL and Mr.Tariq Saleem was at the same time director of the 
same. Evidentially, MDPL was an associated company of CSIBL but no authorization 
as to investment in or strike financial arrangement with the associated company, was 
obtained from the shareholders or the Board of Directors. 
4.4.4.3 License for Housing Finance Services 
On the one hand, CSIBL entered into real estate transactions with MDPL and alongside 
carried out similar financial arrangements of real estate venture with property dealers. 
However, the point to be noted is that CSIBL struck all these deals without having a 
proper license required for Housing Finance Services. The inspection report taking 
keen notice of this omission took it as violation of section 282 (2) c of the Companies 
Ordinance.
46
 
4.4.4.4 Violation of Prudential Regulations 
CSIBL had invested in group companies by way of investment in their shares to a total 
sum of RS.2.163 billion for the year ending 30 June 2005. Besides, as mentioned 
earlier, CSIBL was affording financial facilities to the tone of RS.1.540 billion, to its 
                                                 
45
 See section 208(1),the Companies Ordinance 1984.  
46
 See section 282(2), the Companies Ordinance 1984. 
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associated company MDPL. Thus the total CSIBL’s exposure to its group companies 
comes to RS.3.703 billion which considerably exceeded the statutory limit as provided 
in regulation 1(2) of part 2 of the Prudential Regulations. The inspection team 
calculated it item wise which perhaps needs not to be put in detail here to avoid 
unnecessary length. 
4.4.4.5 Violation of Board Authority 
Besides the above said irregularities, the CEO of CSIBL transgressed the power 
delegated to him by the Board of Directors of the company. The Board in its meeting 
held on 19 July 2003 clearly fixed limit requiring the CEO to remain within that. 
Regarding these exposure limits, the CEO was empowered to approve long-term and 
short-term financing through “Modarba” and “Musharka”, discount/purchase of 
promissory notes against Bank Guarantees and cash collateral (deposit certificates) of 
an amount not exceeding 25 per cent of the liquid net worth of CSIBL. The liquid net 
base of CSIBL was RS.415 million on 30 June 2005. Thus, keeping in view the 
condition of 25 per cent limit, only 103 million could have been approved by him. The 
CEO, however, stepped far beyond his authority as per item wise analysis by the 
inspectors in their report. 
On these bases, the Commission issued SCN dated 17 March 2006, 03 May 2006 and 
04 May 2006 served on appellant Mr. Mahmood Ahmad CEO, Mr. Shahid Latif Dar 
appellant NO.5 CFO of CSIBL and other directors of the Board who are 
appelants1.2.3.4.8. SCN dated 11 May 2006 was also served on appellant NO.6 (M/S 
Syed Hassan & CO. Chartered Accountants) being the auditors of CSIBL. 
The submissions made by the appellants in reply thereto, are summarized as below; 
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1-  Appellant 2’s major thrust was that he was non-executive director and could 
not be equated with CEO of the company. According to him, he had no role to 
play in operations of CSIBL. 
2- Appellant NO.5 contended that decisions taken by him in his capacity as CFO 
of CSIBL were taken bona fide. He rebutted the allegation that he failed to 
maintain proper books of accounts of CSIBL and wilfully made statements 
which were false knowing them to be false. He further submitted that financial 
statements were checked by the Chief Internal Auditor and also by Chartered 
Accountants Firm as External Accountants before his signing or recommending 
to the Board of Directors. 
3- Appellant 7 submitted that investments in real estate were undertaken by 
MDPL, hence, it could not be alleged that CSIBL made investments in real 
estate without possessing a license for House Financing Services, in violation of 
section 282 (c) of the Ordinance. He further submitted that maintenance of 
separate books of accounts in respect of “Managed Portfolio” was based on 
bona fide understanding that CSIBL was required to treat such accounts as 
separate from its other activities. As soon as CSIBL apprised that it was not in 
accordance with Commission’s advice, it immediately took steps to rectify the 
situation. 
4- Appellant NO.8 submitted that non-executive directors (including him) were 
informed by CEO and CFO and Internal Auditors that accounts were in order in 
all respects. He alleged that real situation was kept suppressed and he 
immediately resigned as soon as instances of mismanagement of the affairs of 
CSIBL came to his knowledge. 
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5- Appellant NO.6 submitted that impugned order was full of contradictions. He as 
“External Auditor” acted under the provisions of sections 255, 260 and 292 of 
the Ordinance and had no mala fide intention and had not gained any benefit 
from the alleged defaults.
47
 
The respondent, Chairman SECP, in response thereto, rebutted the arguments relied 
upon by the appellants. These are put briefly as under; 
1- CSIBL had undisclosed investments in Musharka/Mudarba real estate ventures 
and in doing so used its owned subsidiary i.e. MDPL whose CEO was also 
respondent NO.7. 
2- CSIBL was not in possession of license for Housing Finance Services, as 
required under section 282c of the Ordinance read with NBFC Rules.
48
 The 
appellant NO.7 failed to explain as to why some of the accounts were shown on 
the books of accountants CSIBL while the rest kept off? 
3- Appellant NO.5, being the CFO of CSIBL was supposed to be aware of each 
and every financial transaction taking place within the company. He pleads 
unawareness and lack of knowledge but according to globally accepted 
principle, it is by no means a tenable excuse. Further, he did not raise his voice 
on these irregularities and so is unmistakably, considered a privy and party to 
the wrongdoings of the management.  
4- Appellant NO.2 claimed his non-existence during alleged irregularities and non-
acceptance of the offer of his duties. This contention is not supported by the 
factual position. He had been appointed as CEO on 04 June 2005 as per record, 
but in support of his non-acceptance stance, no email was received from him 
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 See sections 255, 260, 292 of the Companies Ordinance 1984.  
48
 See Section 230 & 234 of the Companies Ordinance 1984; See Rule, 7 (1), Non-Banking Finance 
Companies (Establishment and Regulation) Rules, 2003 (NBFC Rules).  
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clarifying his position that he had not accepted the offer. It is pertinent to note 
that half yearly accounts were drawn during that period. 
5- As far appellant NO.6, obviously the duties of External Auditors are supposed 
to be in the best interest of the shareholders of the company under audit. 
However, they failed to highlight the violations and dubious transactions in their 
audit report.  
In the purview of the above given facts and figures, the Commission/the Chairman 
having found violation of regulatory framework by the management of CSIBL, 
imposed a penalty of RS.1,000,000 for contravention of section 208 of the Ordinance, 
and also a further penalty of RS.5,000,000 for violation of section 282(j) of the same.
49
 
The appellant NO.6 as auditors was found to have violated the provisions of section 
260 of the Ordinance and a penalty of RS.100, 000 was imposed on every partner of the 
auditor’s firm. Further, appellant NO.6 was also found to have violated the provision of 
section 492 of the Ordinance and a further penalty of RS.100, 000 was imposed on 
every partner of the Audit Firm. 
4.4.5 The Judgement of the Bench 
The impugned order imposing aforementioned penalties, was challenged by way of 
independent appeals NOS, 22, 23 24, 25, 29, 30, 31, 33 of 2007 before the Appellant 
Bench comprised of Mr. Fida Hussain Sumoo Commissioner (insurance) and Zafar 
Abdullah Commissioner (SCD) , which were jointly taken. 
The Appellate Bench, having given consideration to both the contesting parties, 
dismissed the appeal, maintaining the impugned order vide its order dated 13 October 
2015, with no orders as to costs. 
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 See section 208, 208(j) of the Companies Ordinance 1984. 
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The Bench, in nutshell, maintained and reiterated the stance of the Commission based 
on inspection report and made item wise observations to the effect that there is found an 
email on the record informing the management of CSIBL that appellant NO.2 had 
accepted the responsibility of the office of CFO. However, contrarily, there is nothing 
of the sort on record to show that he had turned down the offer (his main contention) to 
act as the CFO of CSIBL. This state of affairs clearly indicates that the irregularities in 
question occurred during his incumbency. 
Respondent NO.7 in his turn, failed to show satisfactorily how the affairs of the 
company escaped his notice and knowledge. He also failed to convince that separate 
books of accounts were of discretionary clients as opposed to what the inspection report 
claimed. Moreover, the findings of the Commission/inspectors that CSIBL had 
undisclosed investment of RS.1.3 billion in Musharka/real estate without possessing 
license for Housing Finance Services in violation of section 282 (c) of the Companies 
Ordinance, 1984, also carry weigh.
50
 Therefore, there appears no reason to interfere 
with the impugned order. Hence, the commission dismissed their appeal.   
4.5 Evaluation of Findings  
The findings from the case studies have shown that directors failed to discharge their 
duties in accordance with the law on four key aspects. First one relates to unauthorised 
inter-corporate financing and extending unauthorised advances and loans. Second, 
shareholders were deprived of their right to participate in the affairs of the companies 
due to the reason that annual general meetings of the companies were not held. Third, 
directors misstated facts to shareholder and failed to provide material information to 
shareholders. Fourth, directors abused their powers in keeping parallel books of 
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accounts and straightaway misappropriating corporate assets for their private gains. The 
findings from the case studies are consistent with the problem of self-serving behaviour 
of corporate management in Pakistan.  
According to a former SECP chairman, listed companies by and large in Pakistan hold 
eight, on average, subsidiaries or non-listed small business entities. He expressed that it 
is a normal practise in Pakistan that the holding companies advances loans to their 
subsidiaries and in most cases, these loans and advances are not recovered.
51
 Mr. 
Fawad Hashmi, the head of the Pakistan Institute of Corporate Governance in his off-
hands comments indicated that no denying the fact, it is a burning issue required to be 
looked into, monitored and meticulously taken care of, in the country.
52
 
Another businessman from Karachi, with different business interests, remarks that 
some daring steps need to be taken. He had the reservation to point out names, but 
made gestures as to who were misdoing.
53
 He was afraid of saying that tunnelling and 
associated party transactions were being carried out with least fear of punitive action. 
He maintained that the conditions are the same, be it textile, media, cement, fertilizers, 
drugs, FMCG companies and auto giants, etc. According to him, the big concerns were 
growing bigger in the shortest time and enjoy liberty to have recourse to any 
malpractices which paves way to multiplicity of their riches. Majid Aziz, a leading 
business man in Karachi is of the view that earning of a flagship companies who have 
earned unlimited wealth, are at liberty to support associated smaller companies in the 
                                                 
51See Daily DAWN, 06 January 2013, Independent Director’s Integrity’ <www.dawn.com/news/776832 
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52
 See Daily DAWN , Murky Corporate Segment 23 December 2012< 
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ownership of a group on business friendly terms with it. He commented that many 
people do not hesitate while appeasing regulators and abusing laws on the subject.
54
 
Khalid Mirza, a member of Corporate Appellate Tribunal in his comments, classified it 
a core global issue of governance, in particular, in the context of Pakistan, where 
institutions are not strong enough to ensure effective implementation of laws and a 
segment of corporate players is not prepared to take things seriously. Very often 
directorial body disregards their prime responsibility and fiduciary duty to behave 
responsibly and manipulates decisions serving their personal ends in disregard of their 
mandate subordinated to the companies’ interest.55  
Managerial transgressions go mostly by tunnelling which denotes the utilization of the 
companies’ assets for benefitting small firms under their control. It is a frequent 
phenomenon that they (the dominating shareholders) siphon off finances from where 
they wield low cash flow rights to firms where the situation is other way round i.e. high 
cash flow rights. Despite that, derivative proceedings are not recognised in the 
company law in Pakistan. Although, SECP, being a regulatory body, took notice of 
these managerial irregularities and to some extent punished the violators of law, yet as 
mentioned in chapter 1, public agencies do have enforcement priorities due to their 
limited official capacity and financial resources. Hence, it becomes difficult for them to 
deal with all managerial misconducts apt to arise. Moreover, the SECP also suffers 
from problems such as non-professionals serving in the SECP, the possibility that 
employees may succumb to the pressure of private interest groups, corruption and 
political control of the regulatory body. 
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For instance, numbers of managerial transgressions have been reported in SOEs, 
however, there is no worthwhile example in which the SECP took up the matter and 
punished the wrongdoers in SOEs.
56
 Thus, this study argues that apart from the public 
enforcement, the private-sector enforcement has to play its role via derivative litigation 
to discipline errant management in Pakistan. On that background, it is the primary duty 
of shareholders to come forward and take actions against the violators of law in 
corporate entities. In order to incentivise and activate shareholders to play their role in 
directorial accountability, there needs to be an effective enforcement power in the 
hands of shareholders to enforce their rights.  In the light of findings from the case 
studies, law in relation to reinforcing shareholders’ enforcement power so as to 
preserve corporate assets is justified. 
4.6 Concluding Remarks 
In order to provide basis and justification for studying the subject of derivative actions 
to discipline corporate management in Pakistan, a question was asked in the beginning 
of this thesis as to what extent theoretical claims made by a number of researchers 
about managerial misconduct in Pakistan are true. The findings from the case studies 
have illustrated the managerial misbehaviour that supports strengthening of 
shareholders’ enforcement power to enforce laws in relations to corporations’ rights. 
The introduction of a statutory framework for derivative actions is compounded by the 
weak alternative disciplinary mechanisms to discipline directors and managers in case 
they choose to ignore corporate and small shareholders’ interest and serve their private 
interests. In order to address problems shareholders are facing in enforcing corporate 
rights, reform are suggested in the next chapter to facilitate a functional derivative 
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 Scams in SOEs in Pakistan such as, PIA, Railways, Pakistan Steal Mills, NICL and PTCL and many 
more have been reported in the national Newspapers. 
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action framework as an instrument for shareholders to redress corporate wrongs. It is 
hoped that reform proposals made in this study would help to revise enforcement power 
mechanism of shareholder as to vindicating their rights. 
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Chapter 5. Reform Proposals for a functional Derivative Action 
framework  
5.1 Introduction 
The findings in the previous chapters have provided a platform for a discussion on 
reform proposals made in this thesis to find ways for an effective use of derivative 
actions in Pakistan. The previous chapters have shown that small investors are placed in 
a vulnerable position in predominantly family-dominated and state-controlled 
companies in Pakistan. Most importantly, the evidence in chapter 4 reflects that 
controlling shareholders misuse their dominant positions and make self-serving 
decisions detrimental to the companies’ as well as small investors’ interests. In order 
for reducing conflict of interest problems occurring largely between controlling and 
non-controlling shareholders, regulatory and market-based managerial disciplinary 
mechanisms have been examined in chapter 1. It has been found that the extra-
regulatory mechanisms have their own limitations; they cannot be a substitute for 
derivative litigation. Towards that end, chapter 1 suggests that derivative litigation as 
one of the legal mechanisms can be a meaningful disciplinary framework in Pakistan. 
In chapter 3, problems as regards the rights of minority shareholders and their possible 
solutions have been discussed in the process of analysis of minority rights under the 
Ordinance. As discussed in chapter 3, the Ordinance does not recognise derivative 
litigation. In order to provide a greater enforcement power to minorities, it is imperative 
to consider codification of derivative action system that could be used in complement to 
other deficient managerial disciplinary mechanisms. The need for the statutory 
framework for derivative actions as identified in chapter 3 emerges from the problems 
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reflected in the Foss v Harbottle rule, inadequacy of alternative remedies and the issue 
of legal costs combined together, hamper shareholders’ actions against wrongdoers. 
In this thesis, a complete framework for statutory derivative action system is offered for 
improving the enforcement of shareholders’ rights in Pakistan. According to Watson, 
borrowing from other jurisdictions can be a useful source of law reforms in a particular 
jurisdiction.
1
 To that end, the UK statutory derivative action system has been chosen for 
comparative analysis so as to see what is replicable while making reform proposals in 
order to facilitate a meaningful statutory framework for the same in Pakistan. 
The jurisdiction of the UK can be a good candidate for this comparative analysis 
because the UK has codified derivative action system and it would be helpful to learn 
from her experience and avoid mistakes. Moreover, where necessary, reference has also 
been made to other jurisdictions with a view to meeting the specific needs of Pakistan 
as to simplification, modernization and improvement as regards accessibility to 
derivative actions. In the light of problems with the shareholders’ enforcement power, 
following three concrete recommendations are considered in this chapter, explaining 
how codified derivative action system can function effectively and if rendered more 
simplified with easier access to shareholders enabling them to have sufficient ability to 
oversee managerial and directorial decisions. 
1 To develop a functional statutory framework for derivative actions.   
2 To simplify and clarify the procedural route for derivative actions. 
3 To improve accessibility to derivative actions. 
Each reform proposal made in this study is discussed hereunder;  
                                                 
1
 Alan Watson, ‘Aspects of Reception of Law’ (1996)44 American Journal of Comparative Law 335- 
351, 335 
  217 
 
5.2 To develop a functional statutory framework for derivative action 
Being a common law jurisdiction, it might be argued that the common law rules on the 
derivative actions can be invoked by the Pakistani courts so as to enable minority 
shareholders to seek actions against wrongdoers. The problems of the common law 
derivative action system have been discussed in detail in chapter 3. However, it is 
pertinent to reiterate briefly the problems of the common law. In order to understand 
the scattered common law rules, one has to examine reported cases decided over a 
period of 150 years; therefore the law in this respect is virtually inaccessible, save to 
the lawyers specialising in the field. 
Furthermore, these cases come short of covering modern conditions and all types of 
managerial transgressions.
2
 To exemplify, claims of negligence which are referred to 
as- (1) where management fails to act with reasonable skill, care and diligence; (2) 
where management fails to abide by its fiduciary duties, are not actionable under the 
common law.
3
 Moreover, infringement of a personal right of an individual shareholder 
is not actionable under the common law rules of derivative actions.
4
 This would mean 
that if an individual aggrieved shareholder does not have resources to take direct action, 
the wrongdoers would get away with their liability. This is because in direct actions, 
aggrieved shareholders themselves have to bear the costs of the suits. 
Additionally, derivative actions are available at common law only in situations where 
wrongdoers have control over the company and the right of derivative litigation is not 
available outside these circumstances. There is also little guidance as to what 
                                                 
2
 Arad Reisberg, Derivative Actions and Corporate Governance: Theory and Operation (Oxford 
University Press 2007) 90, he has discussed in detail all the circumstances that may and should arise as 
managerial oppressions.  
3
 Ibid 127.  
4
 Matthew  Berkahn, ‘Derivative Action in Australia and New Zealand: Will the Statutory Provisions 
Improve Shareholders' Enforcement Rights’(1998) 10 (1) The Bond Law Review 74-100,76  
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circumstances would evidence control.
5
This situation might operate to the detriment of 
shareholders in companies where directors enjoy control even without majority votes. 
This type of control can be exemplified in situations where different family members 
apparently in individual capacity own shares of a company, then jointly seize control 
over it. However, in situations where one family member (let’s say) owns 42 per cent 
shares, it would not be treated as being in control of the company although it may 
commit fraud against the company in league with another family member who holds 
further 10 per cent shares of the same company, making it more than 50 per cent 
required for reaching decision taking threshold. 
In recognition of the problems of common law, many common law jurisdictions have 
introduced codified derivative action systems in their legal framework so as to make 
shareholders’ remedies more affordable and appropriate in modern 
conditions.
6
Likewise, the English Law Commission recommended for putting the 
common law regime of derivative actions to an end with statutory derivative action 
framework in the UK so as to achieve greater transparency and accountability in an age 
of increasing globalisation of investment.
7
 In response to the recommendations of the 
UK Law Commission, a new statutory regime of derivative actions has started in the 
UK with the enactment of the Companies Act 2006. 
8
 Under this statutory regime, the 
cause of action and range of applicants have been broadened. The courts have been 
conferred with wide powers and discretion to determine whether a derivative action is 
in the interest of a company and if so, to permit the continuation of the suit. 
                                                 
5
 Chrispas Nyombi and Alexender Kibandama, Principles of Company Law in Uganda (Law Africa 
Publishing (k) Ltd, 2014)121.  
6
  Countries such as the US, Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Japan, South Korea, China, Hong Kong, 
South Africa among others which have codified derivative action systems.  
7
The UK Law Commission, Shareholder Remedies: para 6.4,6.9, 6.1  
8
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Many commentators have also urged the expediency of codification of derivative action 
framework. For example, according to Reisberg, common law rules on derivative 
actions are complicated and ambiguous; hence, there is a need for more flexible, 
modern and easily accessible criteria for permitting the continuance of derivative 
actions.
9
 This is also seen in the discussion of another commentator who argues that if 
derivative litigation has to be a key element in preventing breach of directors’ duties, it 
needs to be simplified and modernised so as to make it accessible to shareholders.
10
 
Moreover, Nyombi and Kibandama have criticised the common law situation on 
derivative proceedings and highlighted three key problems namely, restricted standing 
requirements, ratifying issues and litigation costs as the fundamental restraining issues 
for shareholders to initiate actions which the situation needs to be rectified through 
codified derivative action system.
11
 In the light of the problems at common law, 
codified derivative action system also needs to be considered in Pakistan so as to offer 
clarity in reference to the rights of shareholders for bringing derivative actions. As 
opposed to the common law that is scattered, outdated and confines the courts to follow 
old case law, a codified law offers following advantages;  
First, clear statutory rules would remove all ambiguities at common law and provide a 
certainty as to the procedural route of shareholders’ right of derivative litigation. 
Second, courts would be having an independent view in relation to the determination of 
derivative proceedings in the interest of the companies. Third, statutory provisions 
would enable courts in exercising their powers as to order legal costs instrumental to 
                                                 
9
 Arad Reisberg, ‘Shareholder Remedies: The Choice of Objectives and the Social Meaning of Derivative 
Actions’ (2005)6(2)European Business Organizations Law Review 227-268, 258  
10
 Andrew Keay, ‘Assessing and rethinking the statutory scheme for derivative actions under the 
Companies Act 2006 (2016) 16(1) Journal of Corporate Law Studies 39-68, 47  
11
 Ibid (n 5) 132-133. 
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encourage shareholders to step forward and initiate actions against wrongdoers. Fourth, 
without statutory right of the derivative actions, a local shareholder of a company listed 
in any other country would be barred by the operation of the derivative action under the 
common law. 
Last but not the least, ratification would not operate as a bar to derivative litigation as it 
is not always clear in which circumstances ratification would be effective and it might, 
in some situations, result in the unjust outcome.
12
 In this respect, some guidelines are 
recommended for courts in Pakistan to exercise their discretions in accepting 
ratification of wrongs by the wrongdoers. 
 It is submitted that ratification by the defendants of their own misdoings should not be 
accepted by courts in order to deny continuation of derivative litigation. The courts 
should, in particular, disregard ratification when made by the wrongdoers who have 
substantial influence over the decisions of the company. Moreover, the courts should 
consider the quality of information shareholders had at the time of ratifying the wrong. 
If material information is not disclosed to shareholders causing ill- informed decision of 
ratification of the wrong by the shareholders, the courts should disregard such 
shareholder ratification. Additionally, types of companies should be taken into account 
by the courts as to whether accept or deny the ratification. For example, ratification of 
wrong should be reluctantly accepted in the public and widely-held companies. This is 
because shareholders in such companies show apathy and remain inactive in corporate 
affairs. 
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5.3 To simplify and clarify the procedural route for Derivative Action 
5.3.1 Derivative Claimants 
As stated above, derivative litigation is not recognised by the Companies Ordinance in 
Pakistan. Likewise, judiciary in Pakistan has not advanced jurisprudence in respect of 
standing rules and the range of actions in derivative proceedings. As opposed to the 
situation in Pakistan, the UK Companies Act 2006 provides for the range of applicants 
who can bring derivative proceedings and ample scope of actions which can be 
subjected to derivative litigation.
13
 It provides that an individual shareholder regardless 
of his/her voting power has the locus standi (standing) to initiate litigation against 
errant directors and managers. 
The right to bring a derivative action is also vested with shareholders who become 
shareholders by the operation of law.
14
 The term, ‘by the operation of law’ means, 
transfer of right or liability to a party by the operation of legal principles without the 
intention of the party to that effect. The Act provides that there is no condition for 
minimum requirement of shares to bring a derivative suit. In other words, a shareholder 
who owns even a single share may bring a suit derivatively. However, the UK 
Company Act does not recognise standing rules namely; ‘Contemporary Stock 
ownership’, ‘Continuous Ownership Requirement’, the ‘Double Derivative Actions’ 
and the rule of ‘Adequate Representation of Companies’ and other Stockholders’ 
Interests’. 
These standing rules are of paramount importance in the context of Pakistan so as to 
bring greater clarity as to the standing rules of derivative claimants. It is recommended 
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in this thesis that these rules need to be taken into account in the future legal 
amendments in the company law in Pakistan. Explanation and basis for the 
consideration of these standing rules are discussed below; 
5.3.1.1 Contemporary Stock Ownership  
The rule of ‘contemporary stock ownership’ requires a shareholder applicant to be the 
owner of shares at the time of the occurrence of an alleged fiduciary wrong.
15
Under this 
rule, a shareholder who purchases shares after the alleged wrong is disqualified from 
suing errant wrongdoers. Under the UK Companies Act, there is no such restriction to 
commence derivative proceedings.
16
 However, the ‘contemporaneous ownership 
requirement’ is necessary in the context of Pakistan so as to prevent vexatious litigation 
and to discourage malicious purchasing of shares simply for bringing suits.
17
 In the 
absence of ‘contemporary ownership requirement’ a shareholder might purchase shares 
with an object to bring a derivative suit and may have ulterior motives operating behind 
bringing the suit.
18
 
However, it might be argued that derivative litigation is initiated by a shareholder 
where the board of directors fails to hold wrongdoers in the corporation, accountable. In 
this situation, the board commits a wrong in the sense that it fails to hold the 
wrongdoers accountable. The omission on the part of the board of directors eventually 
leads all the present shareholders to suffer regardless of the fact as to when they 
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purchased the shares. Therefore, an after-acquiring shareholder,
19
 along these lines, 
should be qualified to initiate derivative proceedings.
20
  
Moreover, it is contended that since in a derivative suit, a corporate wrong is sought to 
be remedied and for that matter not a private wrong; question of present or after-
acquiring shareholder in this respect becomes immaterial.
21
 This is why because 
benefits of successful derivative suits accrue to the wronged corporation in either way 
whether the suit is brought by a contemporaneous shareholder or by an after-acquiring 
shareholder.
22
 However, in this respect, it is submitted that despite the fact that a 
successful derivative suit promises compensation for the wronged company, the 
‘contemporary stock ownership requirement’ holds its significance in Pakistan for 
discouraging purchasing of litigation. 
For example, without ‘contemporary stock ownership requirement’, a market for claims 
is apt to arise. Some unscrupulous investors may buy shares in companies where 
managerial illegal activities have been unleashed so as to commence litigation with 
ulterior motives operating behind this option. Unfounded litigation motivated by 
personal hatred, family feuds, other ulterior agendas such ‘gold digging’ might be such 
bad motives bringing no benefit but the cost to the company.
23
 In other words, 
purchasing of shares might be advantageous to companies in financial terms, however, 
in the long run; it may encourage a market for claims to grow which, of course, cannot 
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be morally justified. Growing of a market of claim would also have detrimental impacts 
on the progress of the capital markets in Pakistan where society is litigious. 
24
 
Thus, allowing after-acquiring shareholder to initiate derivative proceedings might 
aggravate the situation and may create a culture of litigation feuds detrimental to the 
emerging commercial society in Pakistan. In the corporate world, a healthy competition 
is necessary for bringing about socio-economic change. However, a society which is 
already a litigious one, absence of ‘contemporary stock ownership requirement’ may 
boost baseless litigation which, in turn, would affect business operations. 
Therefore, it would be better to accommodate the ‘contemporary stock ownership 
requirement’ in the statutory framework for derivative actions in Pakistan. The 
contemporaneous ownership requirement is recognised in a number of jurisdictions so 
as to prevent unjust enrichment of shareholders who get to be the shareholders after the 
occurrence of the alleged fiduciary wrong.
25
 Likewise, the rule is recognised by the 
company law and accordingly, by the judiciary in South Africa.
26
 For example, in the 
case of Brown v Nanco (Ptv) Ltd, the court denied continuation of the suit due to the 
fact that the appellant had walked away from the company by selling his shares and the 
existing shareholders were not in favour of bringing the suit.
27
 Moreover, in recognition 
of the utility of contemporary stock ownership requirement, many commentators have 
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argued in favour of this standing requirement for derivative claimants in order to 
discourage purchasing of litigation.
28
 
5.3.1.2 Continuous ownership requirement 
Under ‘Continuous ownership requirement’, a shareholder applicant must maintain his 
status of being shareholder up till the derivative litigation is disposed of.
29
A shareholder 
applicant, who chooses to sell his shares before the final disposal of the suit, ceases to 
be the rightful plaintiff in the suit. The reason behind the ‘continuous ownership 
requirement’ is the prevention of vexatious and unfounded litigation.30 For example, a 
former shareholder who has quitted the company, before the final disposal of the suit, 
may be tempted to accept bribe for the purpose of withdrawing from the suit. To that 
end, he might be willing to accept an inappropriate settlement as he/she no longer 
occupies any financial stakes in the company. 
In this context, a pertinent question arises as to whether a former shareholder, who 
commenced the suit and later on, walked away from the company, should be allowed to 
continue to follow the suit?  And if the answer is not in affirmative, what would be the 
legal basis to restrict him/her from continuing to pursue the suit?  
In respect of the ‘Continuous Ownership Requirement’, the British company law 
provisions on the standing rules of derivative actions are silent.
31
 However, it is 
submitted that ‘continuous ownership requirement’ ought to be considered as far as the 
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standing requirements of derivative actions are concerned in Pakistan. This is because a 
former shareholder, who has quitted the company, might not behave honestly and 
adequately represent the interest of the company as he/she no longer carries any 
financial stake in the company. 
 Moreover, even if a former shareholder is allowed to pursue the suit, the suit may be 
dismissed by courts on grounds of non-existence of his/her direct interest in the suit. 
This is because the Pakistan Code of Civil Procedure provides that a suit in which the 
applicant has no direct interest is liable to be dismissed except in the interpleader suit. 
32
 Therefore, the applicant should be disentitled to pursue the suit. Furthermore, a 
shareholder claimant derives his standing to derivative proceedings from his position of 
being a shareholder in the company and, if he ceases to continue as such, he, as the 
logic follows, loses his right of a corporate action.
33
 
 5.3.1.3 Double Derivative Actions 
The rule of ‘Double Derivative Actions’ is recommended in this study so as to enable 
shareholders of holding companies to bring suits against errant directors/managers of 
the subsidiaries. A derivative action initiated by a shareholder of a holding company 
against the errant directors/managers of one of the subsidiaries is called ‘Double 
Derivative Action’.34 For example, A is a minor shareholder in a company M Ltd that 
owns a company N Ltd- the subsidiary of M Ltd. If A wishes to bring suit against the 
                                                 
32
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errant directors of the company N Ltd, it is called a double derivative action or a 
multiple derivative action. 
Although, a shareholder applicant of a holding company does not have direct interest in 
the subsidiaries, yet he/she may suffer indirectly from a wrong done to a subsidiary 
company and also, the holding company itself does not remain unaffected by the wrong 
done to its one of the subsidiaries. In this respect, permitting multiple derivative actions 
would be a useful standing rule in the context of Pakistan where groups of companies 
are controlled by majority shareholders. The aim is to hold wrongdoers in direct or 
indirect subsidiary companies which are not independent of the control of the board of 
directors of the holding company, accountable. This is important to avoid unwanted 
situations where fraudsters may choose direct or indirect subsidiaries instead of holding 
companies for commission of wrong. 
Multiple derivative actions have received acceptance and approval in many 
jurisdictions such as Canada, Australia, New Zealand, the US and Germany.
35
 The 
legislative position as to the multiple derivative actions was not clear in the UK as 
section 260 of the Act does not expressly provide for multiple derivative actions. 
However, in the recent past, courts have cleared ambiguities regarding the acceptability 
of the double derivative actions in the UK. For example, in Universal Project 
Management Services Ltd v Fort Gilkicker Ltd ors
36
, the court held that the multiple 
derivative actions are available to shareholders of holding companies to call errant 
directors of the direct or indirect subsidiaries to count. The court referred the judgment 
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of Slington Borough Council v Uckac
37
in which it was held that if it is not expressly 
provided, the common law principle would be construed as survived. 
Moreover, in a very recent case, ‘Bhullar v Bhullar’38, the court ruled that the double 
derivative action is necessary to avoid the risk where wrongdoers may choose 
subsidiary companies instead of the holding company, to commit frauds. Thus, ‘Double 
Derivative Action’ is recommended to be incorporated in the statutory framework of 
derivative actions in Pakistan in order to enable shareholders of holding companies to 
bring suits against errant directors/managers of the subsidiaries. In addition, it is also 
important to allow, ‘Double Derivative Action’ in view of international joint venture 
disputes involving structures with layer of companies incorporated in different states. 
5.3.1.4 Adequate representation of the companies’ as well as other 
stockholders’ interests 
Another standing requirement for derivative claimants namely ‘adequate representation 
of the companies’ as well as other stockholders’ interests, needs to be taken into 
account in Pakistan. Since derivative proceedings are initiated by shareholders for 
redressal of corporate wrongs, adequate representation of the companies’ interest is 
essentially needed to be considered in this respect.
39
 In order to ensure adequate 
representation of the companies’ as well as other stockholders’ interests, following 
factors need to be taken into account by courts. 
First, it is necessary to make sure that the claimant shareholder’s personal interest does 
not overshadow that of the company and to ensure further that the suit would not 
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operate to the detriment of the company’s interests. Second, it is to be ensured that the 
claim is represented by competent lawyers and should not be put in the hands of an 
inefficient counsel. Third, courts must also ensure that the suit is pursued vigorously 
and prosecuted diligently. The UK Companies Act does not expressly provide for the 
conditions requisite for ‘adequate representation of the companies’ as well as other 
stockholders’ interests.40 It is worth mentioning here that the requirement of adequate 
representation of the companies’ as well as other stockholders’ interests cannot be 
compromised in Pakistan due to the following reasons; 
First, society in Pakistan is highly litigious; as such risk of vexatious litigation is ever 
so impending. In this respect, courts must ensure adequate representation of the 
companies’ as well as other stockholders’ interests before granting leave for derivative 
litigation. Second, an individual shareholder applicant might engage an incompetent 
lawyer to pursue the suit which may result in the dismissal of the suit. Such a lawyer 
may also enter into dubious deals with the management to receive illegal gratification 
as a reward for not pursuing the suit with vigour. Third, adequate representation of the 
companies’ interest is also necessary so as to avoid multiplicity of proceedings relating 
to the same corporate wrong. 
For example, other shareholders, besides the original shareholder applicant, or even the 
company itself may choose to bring suit on same cause of action under the presumption 
that the former suit was not pursued proficiently. The company itself or other 
shareholders inclined to bring a twin suit, in such situations; would be barred by law as 
suits already adjudged by courts cannot be reinitiated. The rule of res-judicata applies 
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to such situations and bars the commencement of a fresh suit, already adjudicated upon 
by a competent court.
41
 
Application of the rule of ‘adequate representation of the companies’ interest’ is 
essential because it allows shareholders to bring suits only where these advance the 
companies’ interest at an optimal level. An insufficient and abortive derivative 
litigation is always likely to result in the corporate wrong going without being rectified 
as the rule of res-judicata forbids double jeopardy, i.e a fresh suit on the same cause of 
action and aims at avoiding conflicting treatment of wrongs by courts.
42
 
It is, therefore, suggested in this thesis that the requirement of ‘adequate representation’ 
of the companies’ interest’ should  be taken into account so as to avoid shareholders’ 
manipulation in respect of derivative suits. 
5.3.2 Actionable Wrong 
This part of the discussion aims at clarifying corporate cause of action and elucidates as 
to who should be subjected to derivative proceedings. The Companies Ordinance holds 
only directors accountable for breaching their fiduciary duties. Corporate actions which 
are independent of the actions of directors are not actionable under the Ordinance. The 
Ordinance does not regulate shareholders enjoying majority voting power (controlling 
shareholders) and accordingly absolves them of their fiduciary duty. 
Fiduciary duty involves two kinds of obligations; first, it seeks duty to care and second, 
it envisages duty of loyalty.
43
The duty of care requires controlling shareholders to 
adhere to the standards of reasonable care to act in the interest of the company. As to 
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duty of loyalty, controlling shareholders are expected to abandon their private interest 
for the sake of securing the company’s interest.44The Ordinance does not expressly 
prohibit controlling shareholders from violating provisions against conflict of interest 
which they can do by exercising their voting powers in members’ general meetings. 
5.3.2.1 Regulating Majority Voting Power 
It is suggested in this thesis that the Companies Ordinance should regulate majority 
voting power. This is because group of companies controlled by majority shareholders 
is a striking feature of the corporate sector of Pakistan. Controlling shareholders place 
their relatives, friends and trusted persons in managerial positions. As a result, the 
managers advance the interests of the controlling shareholders in disregard of the 
company’s and its minorities’ interests. 
The problem arises when they function in a double character i.e both as shareholders 
and directors. Being members of the board, they may directly influence boards’ 
decisions and also, they may indirectly influence boards’ decisions as being the 
controlling shareholders.
45
 Dominance of controlling shareholders and insufficient legal 
protection place minorities at the risk of majority abuse as under the Ordinance, the 
controlling shareholders are not bound by provisions against conflict of interests. 
Manipulations at the hands of controlling shareholders by their dominant positions, 
generate a serious agency problem that signifies mistreatment to minority shareholders. 
Normally, shareholders are vested with voting power so as to safeguard their interests 
regardless of the concern whether the voting power is exercised in accordance with the 
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company’s or other shareholders’ interests.46 However, voting power of shareholders 
needs to be subjected to some limitations. It must be exercised bona fide where it is 
used for the alteration of the articles of association. As such, it is difficult to assess, in 
practise, the bona fide use of the voting power. The bona fide use of voting power 
should be subjected to pass the Allen Test that interprets the use of voting power, for the 
benefit of the companies as a whole.
47
 The Allen Test requires that a resolution for the 
alteration of articles of association should not place minority shareholders at a 
disadvantageous position. If it does so, it fails the Allen Test.
48
The test is treated as 
passed where a person of ordinary prudence considers alteration of the articles of 
association in the interest of the company.
49
 
Moreover, the use of majority voting power should not be exercised to ratify breach of 
directors’ duty. It is a fundamental rule of the fiduciary law that breach of fiduciary 
duty can be excused by the beneficiary.
50
 However, application of this rule in the 
company context would mean to allow controlling shareholders to ratify breach of 
directors’ duty by passing an ordinary resolution in members’ general meeting.51 
Directors may breach their fiduciary duties to reward controlling shareholder and the 
controlling shareholders, in return, may absolve the errant directors of their liability, by 
ratifying the breach through passing of an ordinary resolution. Controlling 
shareholders, therefore, should not exercise their voting power so as to commit fraud 
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against small investors as well as to ratify a breach of directors’ duty detrimental to the 
interests of the company. 
As such, regulation of controlling shareholders is inseparable from the regulation of 
directors.
52
 The regulation of controlling shareholders may be done in two different 
ways. First, they can be directly recognized as the ‘shadow directors’53 and thus, be 
made subject to fiduciary duties owed by directors. Second, directors can be made 
liable for the conduct of controlling shareholders in disregard of the companies’ as well 
as other shareholders’ interests. 
5.3.2.2 Standing of companies in derivative action 
It is important to determine the standing of a company in derivative proceedings. This 
is because derivative proceedings are initiated by shareholders in the name of the 
wronged company when the company or the board of directors fails to hold wrongdoers 
accountable.
54
 In this context, the companies are isolated from litigation because 
shareholders step into the shoes of the company and thus, they are called the claimant. 
However, so far as the outcome of derivative litigation is concerned, the companies do 
not remain unaffected by the derivative proceedings. As the Companies ordinance does 
not recognise derivative litigation, there is no clarity as to the position of companies in 
derivative litigation. A decision of a court, however, determines the status of companies 
as the defendants in the derivative proceedings.
55
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It is submitted that the companies should not be regarded as defendants in the 
derivative actions. This is because of the existence of conflict of interest between the 
fraudsters and the companies in derivative proceedings. As such, considering 
companies as defendants would lead to confusion as to identification of the real 
defendants in derivative suits. However, it might be argued that if a company is not a 
defendant in a derivative suit, then, naturally, it has to be designated as the applicant. 
As the logic follows, companies cannot be referred to as ‘applicants’ in the derivative 
suits. This is because the right to sue wrongdoers in corporations is transferred to 
shareholders when companies fail to hold wrongdoers accountable. In that context, the 
companies cease to be the rightful applicants. 
The companies can neither be identified as the applicants nor as the defendants in the 
derivative ligation. Nonetheless, companies need to be recognised with a legal status in 
derivative litigation. This is because the ultimate beneficiary of the successful 
derivative suit is the company and in this respect, it remains connected with the 
litigation. In this regard, it would be worthwhile that the companies should be 
categorised as ‘third parties’. 
The ‘third party’ is a legal concept which denotes that a party who has no direct claims 
in the litigation, yet it has legal interests in the litigation is referred to as the ‘third 
party’. However, one may argue against it that since companies are the beneficiaries of 
successful suits, it gets for the companies ‘direct claims’; therefore, the companies 
cannot be categorised as ‘third parties’. In this respect, it is submitted that the 
companies lose their position as direct claim holders when they refuse or fail to bring 
suits against wrongdoers; then naturally, the right to direct claim is transferred to the 
shareholders. 
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5.3.2.3 Derivative Proceedings against Non-Executive Directors  
According to the common law rules of derivative actions, in order to initiate derivative 
litigation, the wrongdoer has to be in control of the firm.
56
 The ‘wrongdoer control’ bar 
under the common law rules absolves non-executive directors of their liability. In this 
context, derivative proceedings against non-executive directors would be difficult to 
prove due to the ‘wrongdoer control’ barrier as the non-executive directors do not own 
majority voting power to exercise control over the companies. This state of affairs gave 
rise to the problem of establishing cases against wrongdoing non-executive directors in 
the UK. For example, there were only two suits brought against non-executive directors 
prior to the Companies Act 2006 and the same were unsuccessful.
57
 
In response to the problems of common law rules of derivative actions, the ‘wrongdoer 
control’ bar has now been removed under the Act and thus, shareholders are now 
allowed to take actions against errant non-executive directors in the UK.
58
 The real 
independence of non-executive directors is a problem in Pakistan due to the adoption of 
conventional so-called practice of hand picking while filling in non-executive 
directorial positions. Therefore, it is recommended in thesis that wrong-doing non-
executive directors should be subjected to derivative proceedings for the breach of their 
duties in order to provide an effective ex-post control over executive directors in 
Pakistan.  
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5.3.2.4 Corporate cause of action 
Under the present law, only directors are accountable for the breach of their fiduciary 
duties in Pakistan. As opposed to the situation in Pakistan, the corporate cause of action 
has been broadened in the UK by the enactment of the Companies Act 2006. In fact, 
this enactment has not done away with the common law rules on the cause of action 
rather; it has enlarged the range of corporate cause of action.
59
It provides that the cause 
of action arises where there is an act or omission involving negligence, breach of trust 
and breach of duties on the part of the directors. 
The Act retains the common law concept of fiduciary duties of directors (duty to care 
and duty to loyalty) and in doing so, it extends the range of the cause of action to 
directors’ breach of fiduciary duties. The Act also includes the claims of negligence 
within the scope of corporate cause of action without showing that the defendant 
directors gained personally. The claims of negligence were not earlier treated as 
corporate cause of action under the exceptions to the Foss v Harbottle Rule.  
It is, therefore, recommended that this aspect of the company should be subjected to 
serious deliberations. The sphere of cause of action should be broadened enough to 
make all types of directorial transgressions such as abusive transactions, exploitation of 
corporate opportunities, excessive salaries to managers, tunnelling of corporate assets 
and other acts of mismanagements, actionable. The company law should expressly 
provide for the directors’ duties. 
Accordingly, violation of statutory and fiduciary duties of directors, articles of 
association and other legal provisions premised on protecting the interests of companies 
and their shareholders, should be considered as the corporate cause of action in the 
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derivative litigation. Statutory framework of derivative actions of many jurisdictions 
such as Canada, Australia and New Zealand provide no limit in relation to the corporate 
cause of action.
60
 Therefore, it would be pertinent if the framework for derivative 
actions in Pakistan permits derivative litigation against anyone and under any cause of 
action where the board chose not to bring actions against the wrongdoers. 
5.3.2.5 International Corruption and Derivative proceedings  
Derivative litigation is also important in the fight against bribery, corrupt payments and 
waste of corporate assets. The cause of action in derivative proceeding should also be 
extended to matters of questionable payments made by the companies. Such corrupt 
payments might be used in furtherance of the interests of the companies; however, 
shareholders are entitled to challenge such payments on grounds of the waste of 
corporate assets and breach of fiduciary duty which the directors owe to the 
shareholders. This element of cause of action in derivative proceedings is recognised in 
the US. For example, in the case of Auerbach v Bennet, corrupt payments and 
kickbacks paid by the corporation were challenged by a shareholder through a 
derivative action. The court permitted the action to be continued on the cause of action 
involving acts of bribery and illegal payments.
61
 
Likewise, international corruption was also recognised in the UK in the judgment of 
Konamaneni and others v. Rolls Royce Industrial Power (India) Ltd and others in the 
context of derivative proceedings and it became a cause of action in derivative litigation 
as an exception to the Foss v Harbottle.
62
 In this case, minority shareholders of an 
Indian company namely; Spectrum Power Generation Ltd levelled allegations of 
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bribery against British enterprises for bribing managing director of the Indian company 
in return of getting business contracts relating to the installation of power station in 
India. The claimant shareholders sought court permission to commence litigation 
against Spectrum Power Generation Ltd Company in the UK.  The claimants were 
allowed to commence derivative action. The claimants contended that the issue as being 
fraud against minority fell within one of the exceptions to the Foss rule. The court held 
in favour of the claimants and accepted the case holding that the English courts possess 
jurisdiction over derivative proceedings pertaining to foreign corporations. 
The suit gave new insight into how to interpret fraud on minority as being one of the 
exceptions to the Foss Rule. Acts of bribery and illegal payments are now also 
actionable under the statutory derivative action system provided in the Companies Act 
2006.
63
 
International corruption is a subject which also needs to be given attention in Pakistan. 
Scams such as Karkey
64
 and Reko Diq
65
 offer ample testimony to such kind of 
corruption which the situation calls for an attention of legislators to extend cause of 
action to international corruption and illegal payment in derivative proceedings so as to 
strengthen the enforcement powers of shareholders to punish the wrongdoers involved 
in acts of bribery and receiving kickbacks in return of transacting business deals on less 
than market rates. In Karky scam, the managing director of Private Power and 
Infrastructure Board (PPIB) and three chief executives directors of Lakhra Power 
Generation Company along with other government officials were found involved in 
                                                 
63
 See section 260 of the UK Companies Act 2006.  
64
 See Daily Dawn Newspaper, 22 June, 2016, Arrest made in Karkey Scam Case <www.dawn.com › 
Newspaper › Islamabad> accessed 30 December 2016. 
65
 See Daily Dawn Newspaper, 26 March, 2017, The Reko Diq Disaster < https://www.dawn.com › 
Newspaper › Editorial> accessed 03 April, 2017. 
  239 
 
award of contracts for Karkey in return of receiving kickbacks and other illegal 
payments. 
 It is, thus, recommended in this thesis that the extension of cause of action in 
derivative proceeding to international corruption ought to be considered by the policy 
makers and legislators in the new company law in Pakistan. 
 5.3.3 Assessment of derivative Action 
Like most of the common law jurisdictions where derivative litigation is recognised by 
the law, courts also assume a paternalistic role relating to assessment of derivative 
actions in the UK.
66
 The aim of assessment of derivative actions is to determine 
whether the suit is in line with the interest of the company and whether it should be 
permitted to continue or dismissed. However, ‘court approach’ pertaining to the 
assessment of derivative actions is not operative in all the jurisdictions. For example, in 
the US, it is the board of directors which is required to make assessment as to derivative 
proceedings. This part of the discussion evaluates both the approaches in regard to 
determining whether if the court approach is adopted; it would ensure more corporate 
accountability in Pakistan. 
5.3.3.1 The Board approach pertaining to the assessment of derivative action 
The ‘Board Approach’ is the salient feature of the US statutory framework for 
derivative actions. In this respect, a special litigation committee (comprised of 
independent directors and disinterested directors) is established by the board of 
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directors for making assessment as to derivative proceedings.
67
A shareholder in his/her 
first step towards derivative litigation is required to refer the case to the board of 
directors to take action against wrongdoers.
68
 In situations where the board dismisses 
the demand unjustifiably or the board members are themselves the wrongdoers, then it 
is very unlikely that the board would approve litigation against themselves.
69
 
In this context, a concept of special litigation committee (selected by the board) was 
provided to avoid problems which were likely to arise in getting approval of litigation 
from the board of directors. The special litigation committee is supposed to assess 
derivative actions and further, the assessment/investigation of the committee is subject 
to judicial scrutiny. In relation to the acceptance of assessments of the committees, the 
US courts have laid down some conditions to evaluate reasonability of the assessments. 
For example, In the Aronson v. Lewis,
70
 the court set out two conditions namely; 
business judgment rule
71
 and independence of the committees while making 
assessments as to derivative actions. In another landmark case, Zapata corp v. 
Maldonado, the court required that assessments of derivative actions should be made by 
independent committees and that in good faith.
72
 
However, so far as the courts’ attitude towards compliance with the rules set out by the 
Zapata case, is concerned, they just follow the ‘rubber stamp’ approach in accepting the 
committees’ decisions. They do not normally apply their independent judgments on the 
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merits of the investigation of the committees in relation to admitting derivative 
actions.
73
 
When the ‘Board Approach’ is referred, it means a ‘special litigation committee’ 
chosen by the board to assess derivative proceedings.
74
 In that context, it is argued that 
since a company is an independent entity,
75
 the insiders should decide upon the matters 
of derivative litigation like other business decisions. This is because the company is 
affected by the business decisions and by the decisions in respect of litigation. 
Therefore, the board of directors acting in accordance with the company’s interest 
should decide upon the issues regarding the grant of permission to continue derivative 
actions. 
Rebuttable Presumption 
The board supremacy in regards to legal claims and litigation decisions is based on the 
concept of rebuttable presumption. As such, the courts are required to deny 
shareholders’ derivative right of action if it does not show its grounds and proceedings 
in the best interest of the company. It might be possible that the grant of leave to a 
derivative action may not be in line with the best interest of the company and the 
presumption as to the usurpation of the best of company is referred to as a ‘rebuttable 
presumption’. The rebuttable presumption is justified on grounds of corporations’ 
internal affairs to be managed by the commercial judgments of management and 
therefore, the external intrusion into the internal affairs of companies should be 
discouraged. Moreover, it gains its justification that litigation decisions could better be 
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judged by the management to determine the viability of legal claims considering 
matters effecting operations of companies’ businesses. 
Problems with rebuttable Presumption 
There are a number of defects of the rebuttable presumption which make crucially 
important an intrusion of outsiders to decide upon the issue of admissibility of 
derivative proceedings in an impartial and independent manner. This is because 
allowing board of directors to make assessment of a derivative action in a situation 
where the board members themselves are the wrongdoers would lead to frustration of 
the derivative proceedings. 
Although there are cogent reasons to assign the board of directors with the task of 
assessing the derivative suits, yet it would give rise to serious problems in situations 
where the board members are themselves the wrongdoers. In this context, it is also 
widely recognised that for the assessment of derivative actions, the board Approach is 
not an appropriate approach.
76
 This is because where the majority board members are 
alleged to have been involved in malfeasances, the board principally loses its right to 
investigate upon the derivative suits and accordingly, should not determine the 
admissibility of suits of such a nature. Even where some of the board members are 
alleged for wrongful acts, the other board members might tend to protect and exonerate 
such directors by reason of structural and subconscious bias.
77
 This fellow directorial 
empathy was considered and acclaimed in the case of Zapata Corp v Maldonado.
78
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Therefore, under this viewpoint, it would be appropriate not to let the board of directors 
assess derivative actions. 
Furthermore, since the derivative suits are aimed at enforcing directors’ duties,79 it 
seems implausible to assign the task of assessing derivative suits in relation to which 
they are alleged to have breached their duties. The errant directors, under the rebuttable 
presumption, are unjustifiably protected. Indeed, it may further deepen agency problem 
in Pakistan and would adversely affect the corporations’ performance. Most 
importantly, a judicial response to such a situation would be to ensure independence of 
the special litigation committees instead of looking at the main problem in reference to 
resolving the matter in issue in accordance with the interest of the company. Thus, the 
courts’ focus would shift from dispute resolution to ensuring independence of the 
special litigation committees. As a result, courts’ role to ensure the efficacy of the 
derivative suits as to undo corporate wrongs may be misapplied. 
Moreover, assessment of the special litigation committees in relation to admissibility of 
the derivative suit is subject to judicial scrutiny.
80
 The judicial scrutiny as to the 
committees’ recommendations is premised on ensuring the independence of the 
committees in exercising their function of assessing derivative actions. However, this 
would be a hectic process to pursue in reference to the assessments of derivative suits. 
It would also lead to causing duplication of the company’s resources as the company 
would first incur cost on the investigation of the derivative suits and second, on the 
judicial scrutiny proceedings. And if the court happens to reject the assessment made 
by the committee on account of lack of independence and failing good faith 
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investigation, all the resources incurred by the company on the assessment of the 
derivative action would go in vain. 
Thus, according to this dimension of argument, the board approach pertaining to the 
assessment of derivative actions would not necessarily solve the issue of fair 
assessment of the applications for derivative proceedings in Pakistan. 
5.3.3.2 The Court Approach pertaining to the assessment of Derivative 
Action 
As stated above, courts take a paternalistic position in assessing derivative actions in 
the UK.
81
 There is a two-stage procedure for bringing derivative proceedings under the 
UK Company Act. Courts are required to establish first a prima facie case before it is 
taken up for the regular hearing.
82
 Courts are tasked with preliminary investigation and 
to make sure that there is a sufficient ground to pursue the suit before it is taken up for 
the regular trial. The litigating shareholders are required to file an application to courts 
for seeking approval of derivative actions. 
The courts have to decide upon the application in accordance with the filtration 
mechanism provided in the section 263(2) of the Act. Section 263(2) of the Act 
provides that in a situation where a person bound to act in line with the promotion of 
the interest of the company would not seek to continue the claim, the courts, in such a 
situation, are required to refuse derivative actions. Moreover, the section also requires 
courts to refuse suits where a matter complained of, has already been made good or 
authorised by the corporation. 
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 However, courts in the UK possess wide discretionary powers to decide upon the 
application of admissibility of the derivative suits. For example, courts are not bound to 
refuse actions even if the action had not passed the ‘good faith’ test.83 In addition, 
courts have the power of judicial review. It means that courts are not bound by the 
decision of the companies in respect of withdrawal of a suit. They are, nonetheless, 
empowered to permit derivative action. This gives courts a decisive role in the 
assessment of derivative actions in the UK. 
Bearing in mind the dominance of controlling shareholders in the corporate entities in 
Pakistan, it would be more appropriate for Pakistan to adopt similar ‘court approach’ 
for assessing the applications for derivative actions. This is because courts are 
independent from the influences of insiders to establish first the prima facie case and 
then to take up the case for full hearing.
84
 If an applicant fails to establish a good case at 
first stage, the court must refuse the suit in line with the British company law 
requirement.
85
 The ‘Court Approach’ pertaining to the assessments of derivative actions 
is envisaged to avoid problems with the board approach which is criticised for lacking 
independence and for failing good faith investigation.
86
 
However, one may argue that the board of directors, being insiders, possess sufficient 
relevant information for establishing a case, which the courts come short of. Moreover, 
it might be argued that judges lack business related expertise for deciding upon 
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corporate conflicts.
87
 Furthermore, it is also argued that the judicial control of 
derivative action would mean to intervene in the independence of directors which they 
require for exercising their business judgment to decide on how to promote the interest 
of the company.
88
 
In this respect, it is submitted that criticism on the ‘court approach’ is clearly 
misplaced. For example, assessment of the derivative actions is not a business decision 
which necessitates business related knowledge; rather it is a legal matter which requires 
application of a legal mind. Assessment of derivative actions does not require business 
related special expertise.
89
 Judges of commercial courts possess sufficient knowledge as 
regards matters of violation of corporate rights and thus, stand at an appropriate 
position to decide upon questions in relation to assessment of the derivative suits. 
Since a derivative action is litigation in nature; the courts are well-experienced in 
dealing with variety of corporate litigation in this respect. Moreover, judicial forums 
are characterised as neutral and independent from the influence of insiders. Such an 
objectivity of judicial forums would help avoid issues concerning lack of independence 
of the special litigation committees in assessing the derivative suits. Last but not the 
least, judges have vast and diverse experiences of dealing with the breaches of 
directors’ fiduciary duties as they get to acquire in due course of time, adequate 
knowledge relevant to corporate abuses necessary to determine the merits of corporate 
disputes.
90
 In this regard, courts can also be assisted by business experts and corporate 
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lawyers of very high calibre where they require their advice and insight on particular 
matters of law.
91
 
In the light of the above discussion, the better approach would be to consider judicial 
control of derivative actions in Pakistan. This is necessary for the following reasons;  
First, the ‘Board Approach’ is not suitable in Pakistan as in situations when the board 
members are alleged to have been involved in corporate wrongs; it is not justifiable to 
let them decide upon their own wrongdoings. This would invariably mean to let them 
off the hook. Although, they are required to appoint a special litigation committee in 
this respect, yet the independence of the committee selected by the board of directors is 
subject to many questions marks.
92
 
Second, the framework of independent directors is envisaged to protect minority 
interests and to avoid misaligned interests between major and minor shareholders.
93
 
The framework was adopted in Pakistan with an object to have an adequate corporate 
accountability mechanism.
94
 However, independent directors lack independence, in real 
sense, in Pakistan in view of the conventional so-called practice of hand-picking.
95
 The 
role of special litigation committee to assess the derivative suits would be, in fact, a 
reminiscence of the failure of the independent directors to counter-act directorial 
wrongdoings. It, therefore, seems to be unlikely that the committee selected by the 
                                                 
91
 Amicus Curiae (friend of court but not a party to suits) is a concept, meaning thereby, courts can seek 
help and guidance from experts in areas where the courts require their advice. 
92
 Ibid (n 52) 227 
93
 Pranav Mittal, ‘Role of Independent Directors in Corporate Governance’(2011)4 The NUJS Law 
Review 285-298, 285  
94
See The Code of Corporate Governance 2002, Pakistan 
<http://www.ecgi.org/codes/documents/code_corporate(revised).pdf>accessed 11 February 2016; Valeria 
Kozhich and Haroon H Hamid, ‘Corporate Governance in an Emerging Market; A perspective on 
Pakistan (2007) 1 (1)Journal of Legal Technology Risk Management 22-33, 25.  
95Independent director’s integrity, Daily DAWN newspaper, 13 January 2013 < 
www.dawn.com/news/776832/independent-directors-integrity > accessed 03 February 2016  
  248 
 
board would function fairly and independently to assess the derivative suits in right 
perspectives. 
Additionally, the appointment of the committee for the assessment of derivative 
litigation would result in extra financial burden on corporations. Cost incurred on the 
investigation of the allegations would be borne by the companies regardless of the 
consequences and outcome of the committees’ investigation. If investigation of the 
committees as to admissibility of the derivative suits happens to be dismissed by the 
court, the expenses incurred and the time spent on the committees’ investigation would 
be wasted. The ‘court approach’ would be helpful in avoiding duplication of the 
companies’ resources which are otherwise likely to be incurred by the companies if the 
board of directors are tasked with making assessments to derivative actions. 
5.3.4 Guidelines for courts in order for making assessments of derivative 
proceedings. 
In order to make better use of derivative litigation, courts in Pakistan ought to consider 
factors such as the promotion of derivative litigation, prevention of meritless suits and 
to proffer the supreme interests of the companies while making assessments of 
derivative proceedings. In this respect, some guiding principles are suggested in order 
to achieve the optimal use of derivative actions in Pakistan. 
5.3.4.1 To determine the Best Interest of the Company  
The cause of action in derivative proceedings is construed as “to allow derivative action 
that serve the best interest of the company”. The best interest of the company is 
understood in the terms of the benefits of the collective body of investors as a whole.
96
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This very concept of the best interest of the company applies to the derivative action as 
well. For instance, when derivative actions are commenced, they need to be allowed in 
accordance with the best interest of the company. For the guidance of courts in 
Pakistan, the open textured term of, ‘the best interest of the company’ should be 
interpreted considering the factors such as the likelihood of success of the suit, legal 
costs involved, subject matter or amount at stake, financial position of defendants 
because the judgment debtor might be unable to meet the judgment, possible damage to 
the company’ s reputation and downfall of share price due to the litigation factor and 
potential gains accruing to the company, and availability of other possible solution to 
the dispute. 
The derivative cause of action should be premised on establishing the case in the best 
interest of the company and not merely on proving a prima facie case. This 
interpretation of ‘the best interest of the company’ matches with the provisions relating 
to the best interest of the company in the Australian and South African Company laws 
and is recognised by the courts in these countries.
97
 
It is submitted that the best approach for consideration in Pakistan is to learn from the 
jurisprudence developed by the New Zealand courts in which the element of 
reputational damage was given little weightage while assessing derivative actions.
98
 
This is necessary because it might have negative effects on the advantages of derivative 
proceedings if reputational element is given significance while making assessment of 
derivative actions in Pakistan. However, where litigation is prone to cause fall of share 
price of the company, then the reputational factors should be taken into account as loss 
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of share price would, indeed, mean loss to the interest of the company and the 
litigation, in such case, cannot be regarded as the one initiated in the best interest of the 
company. 
5.3.4.2 To promote derivative litigation 
Another pertinent issue in relation to courts in Pakistan might be confronted as to 
whether to assess derivative proceedings on the basis of cost-benefit analysis or 
otherwise? It is submitted in this regard that the best interest of the company should not 
be determined through cost-benefit analysis. The financial aspect of derivative 
proceedings need not to be overemphasized as the real benefits of derivative actions go 
beyond the corporate compensation. Adoption of the cost-benefit criteria by the courts 
in Pakistan to determine the best interest of the company might lead to frustration of 
potential gains of derivative proceedings, which are, in essence, the deterrent 
objectives. Thus, in this regard, it is recommended that even if the legal costs of the suit 
overshadow the potential recovery, the leave application should not be turned down by 
courts on compensatory terms. If the suit is brought on merit and has the potential of 
public deterrence against future corporate misconduct, it should be permitted to be 
continued for the full trial. 
However, it does not mean that the cost-benefit criterion for assessing derivative 
proceedings has no relevance in the context of Pakistan. In fact, a balance needs to be 
struck between compensatory objectives and deterrence value of derivative litigation. 
For instance, in situations where there is clear and blatant violation of law, the 
deterrence aspects of derivative proceedings should be taken into account by the courts 
in Pakistan in order to promote derivative proceedings. This approach has also been 
recognised by Australian and New Zealand courts holding that the cost-benefit analysis 
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is not the sole factor to assess derivative proceedings in line with the best interest of the 
companies.
99
 
5.3.4.3 To prevent Meritless Suits  
Applicants bringing derivative suits only with ‘Good Faith’ should be granted leave to 
continue with the derivative proceedings in order to prevent meritless suits. The term 
‘Good Faith’, however, is an elusive one and is not so easy to be comprehended. The 
simple course is that it should be presumed that derivative proceedings have been 
commenced in ‘Good Faith’, unless proven otherwise. The ‘Bad Faith’ of shareholders 
for initiating derivative actions can be ascertained where the applicants were 
unnecessarily delaying the actions. Another useful guideline for courts in Pakistan to 
ascertain the good faith test lies in a British court judgment holding in the case of, 
Harley Street Capital v Tchigirinsky (No 2) that if the claimant shareholder get to be 
the shareholder after the alleged wrong, he/she will be presumed as failing good faith 
test in reference to continuing with the suit.
100
 However, apart from above stated good 
faith tests, an overall liberal approach is recommended to be considered in Pakistan in 
order to promote derivative proceedings to protect corporate assets. This is necessary 
because a narrow approach, in this respect, would adversely affect the potential benefits 
of the use of derivative litigation in Pakistan. 
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5.4 To improve accessibility to derivative action  
Litigation is not desirable for most litigating parties and sometimes it is very expensive 
and labour intensive.
101
 A claimant makes decision as to litigation after having carried 
out a cost/benefit analysis.
102
 This is more relevant in derivative litigation because 
shareholders might not be willing to bring suits against wrongdoers on behalf of 
companies due to various reasons. 
For example, they might not find any significant financial benefit in taking the time and 
bearing legal costs for derivative litigation because proceeds of successful derivative 
actions would accrue to the company. The litigating shareholders are entitled to benefit 
from successful derivative actions only in proportion to their shares in the companies. 
Moreover, shareholders might not choose to commence derivative litigation expecting 
it from other shareholders to do this job. They might also think that shareholders other 
than the derivative claimant would be free-riders, then why should they take all the 
risks whereas benefits arising from successful suits are to be shared indirectly by all.
103
 
In this context, shareholders might prefer to quit the company by selling their shares 
instead of bearing the litigation costs. If shareholders choose to bring suits against the 
wrongdoers, they have to bear litigation costs which may include lawyers’ and courts’ 
fees and sometimes, it may also include the costs of defendant if the claimant loses the 
suit. In view of the litigation costs and the indirect benefits flowing from derivative 
actions, there is a lack of incentive for the claimants to bring suits against wrongdoers. 
In order to encourage and incentivise shareholders, in most of the common law 
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jurisdictions like the UK, the funding issue has been tried to address through 
indemnification of derivative claimants for the cost incurred by them on derivative 
litigation.
104
 
The rule for the indemnification of derivative claimants was established in the 
Wallersteiner v.Moir case (No.2).
105
  In this case, Wallersteiner, the director of the 
company successfully protracted the case for over 10 years and Moir, the claimant 
failed in recovering losses done to the company. Considering the litigation costs 
incurred and time spent by Moir, Lord Denning set out the rule for indemnification of 
the claimants against costs incurred by them in the course of the agency, stating that a 
minority shareholder who acts as an agent of the wronged company in good faith 
should be indemnified against costs incurred by him/her because the benefits of the suit 
will be ordered in favour of the company.
106
 Moreover, the court held that derivative 
claimants are entitled to indemnity costs orders at the stage of obtaining permission to 
continue derivative action.
107
 
However, Watlon J regarded the rule for indemnification of costs unfair to the 
companies in the Smith v. Croft case.
108
 He set out the financial need criteria for 
shareholders to claim indemnification of costs incurred by them on the derivative 
proceedings. He stated that shareholders would be entitled to indemnity order for costs 
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only if the derivative claimant was genuinely in financial need.  The same narrow 
approach was followed by courts in many other cases.
109
   
5.4.1 Contingency Fee Arrangements 
With the exception of Pakistan,
110
 contingency fee arrangements are recognised in a 
number of countries so as to task lawyers with supporting genuine litigants who do not 
have resources to bring violators of their rights to book. Under the contingency fee 
arrangement, a claimant is not required to pay lawyers’ fees if he/she loses the case. 
However, a lawyer is entitled to fee if the claimant wins the case. As such, contingency 
fee arrangement is based on the, ‘no win, no fees’ rule. Lawyers may be encouraged to 
support claimants by offering them either percentage of the benefits of suits or their 
fees may be determined on the basis of time they spent, normal fees charged on hourly 
basis and their quality of work.
111
 This might operate to the benefits of derivative 
claimants who do not have resources and have no incentives to bring suits against the 
wrongdoers in corporations. 
On the basis of unjust enrichment theory, the rules of common fund and substantial 
benefit have been established.
112
 Under these rules, companies are required to 
indemnify derivative claimants from out of the company fund created as a result of 
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successful derivative actions.
113
 This is for the reason that if a derivative suit succeeds 
and the costs of the suit are not paid by the company to the claimant, the company is 
unjustly enriched. The shareholders by their efforts get benefits not only for the 
company but also for other shareholders as well. Therefore, the claimant is entitled to 
be indemnified against legal costs incurred on the derivative litigation.
114
 
This part of the discussion examines both the approaches i.e; indemnification of 
derivative claimants and contingency fee arrangements to determine as to whether, if 
contingency fee approach is adopted in Pakistan, it would incentivise shareholders and 
improve accessibility to derivative actions. 
5.4.2 Problem with the Indemnity Costs Approach 
As mentioned above, levying of costs is always a disincentive for derivative claimants. 
Cheffins and Black, in this regard, consider that legal costs is central to the 
disincentives problems shareholders face in bringing derivative proceedings.
115
 The UK 
Companies Act does not provide for indemnification of shareholder applicants. 
However, the rule for indemnification of claimants is provided under the Civil 
Procedure Rules in the UK.
116
. Under the Civil Procedure Rules, rule 19.9E, courts may 
indemnify shareholders against the costs incurred by them on the application for leave 
for the suit or derivative suit or against the legal costs incurred on both. The rule of 
indemnification of claimants was thought to be a solution of disincentives for 
shareholders in derivative proceedings. However, this is not the case all around. There 
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are various major flaws with the indemnity orders approach that do not provide 
incentives to shareholder claimants in the real sense. 
First, the rule 19.9E of the Civil Procedure Rules does not clarify the conditions under 
which the claimants are entitled to be indemnified against legal costs incurred and 
hence, it is left to the courts’ discretion to award costs or otherwise. The vast discretion 
given to courts denies derivative claimant assurance of the reasonable costs.
117
 As a 
result, legal cost is just a prospect and it depends on the courts’ discretion which creates 
uncertainty as to the indemnity costs orders.
118
 For example, in many cases, courts in 
the UK have been more cautious in relation to ordering indemnity costs in full.
119
 
In this regard, the financial need test established in the case Smith v Croft is 
unjustifiable.
120
 Under this test, a shareholder who applies for indemnity costs order has 
to show that he/she is in real need for the funding support, failing which, they are not 
entitled to indemnity costs order. The financial need test has been regarded unfair and 
inappropriate.
121
 This is because a shareholder brings suit against wrongdoers in a 
representative character and the proceeds of the suit accrue to the company. Hence, it is 
not worthwhile to consider the financial status of shareholders in this regard. 
In recognition of the problem with this financial need test, a Canadian court held that 
the financial need test is of no relevance to making indemnity costs orders.
122
Anybody 
who fails the financial need test may convince any other shareholders who meet the 
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criteria to bring suit and thus can be indirectly beneficiary of indemnity cost order. 
Thus, the financial need test is unjustified rule in determining whether to indemnify the 
claimant or not. It would also be difficult for Pakistani courts to apply the financial 
need test fairly and in a systematic way in awarding legal costs to the successful 
claimants. 
Second, the fundamental problem with the indemnity costs approach is that it does not 
provide an incentive to shareholders in the real sense.
123
 This is because although the 
potential derivative claimant expects to be indemnified against the legal costs incurred 
on the derivative litigation, yet this does not mean that it serves as an incentive to 
shareholders for putting in derivative claims for the enforcement of corporate rights. 
Basically, provision of an incentive means to offer something additional to the legal 
costs incurred by the shareholders on derivative actions. The indemnity costs approach 
does not promise anything additional to the indemnified claimants and maintains the 
original position in respect of any gains for derivative claimants. In this respect, the 
claimant might also lose costs incurred against consultancy with solicitors, which 
remains out of consideration for indemnification purposes. This is manifested from the 
fact that courts in the UK awarded only limited costs to claimants and that too was only 
in a few cases.
124
 
Third, there are other disincentives for claimants which might not be met by the 
indemnity costs order as it offers nothing more than the actual legal costs incurred. For 
example, a shareholder claimant is entitled to benefit the proceeds of the successful 
derivative suit proportionate to his/her shareholdings in the company. Sometimes, 
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proceeds of the successful derivative suit might not be granted by the companies to the 
shareholders as the company may choose to reinvest the recovery instead of sharing it 
with the shareholders. Moreover, it might not always be the case that a successful 
derivative suit would invariably result in monetary benefits for the company. It may 
happen that a successful suit leads to a mere declaration of corporate rights without 
bringing any monetary benefits to the company.
125
  Thus, these disincentives to 
potential shareholders claimants cannot be always expected to be lowered by the 
indemnity costs orders. 
Another problem with the indemnity costs approach is that shareholder claimants have 
to take the risk of losing their money spent during the course of the derivative action if 
the company in whose name the action was taken happens to be insolvent. This would 
operate to the detriment of the claimants even if they were granted indemnity costs. 
Obviously, this would operate as strong disincentive to the potential shareholder 
claimants as they might not be willing to put their good money at risk. 
To sum up, the indemnity costs approach suffers from various flaws which render it an 
inadequate incentive for shareholder to step forward and take actions against 
wrongdoers. The approach to indemnify claimants against legal costs was envisaged by 
the UK Law Commission to incentivise shareholders to take derivative actions.
126
 
However, in reality, this approach provides little incentives for claimants. Thus, in view 
of problems with the indemnity costs approach, it is submitted that Pakistan should 
learn from the experience of the UK to avoid problems faced by the UK in providing 
incentives for shareholders claimants through indemnity costs approach.
127
 This is 
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because although the derivative claimants by and large expect to be indemnified, yet 
there are real concerns for them in this approach which does not address the issue of 
disincentives for derivative claimants with an amount of certainty. 
5.4.3 Why the contingency fee approach is suitable for Pakistan? 
On the other side, as stated above, principles of contingency fee are based on an 
arrangement between a claimant and a lawyer to pursue litigation. In this arrangement, 
the claimant is not liable for the legal costs including the lawyer’s fees regardless of the 
outcome of the action. In return of the services rendered by a lawyer for pursuing the 
suit, the lawyer is rewarded by way of sharing some percentage of the total proceeds of 
the suit or he/she is paid on the basis of ‘loadstar method’.128 As such, the lawyer takes 
the responsibility of the legal costs purported to be incurred on the litigation. The 
derivative claimants get away with the risk of legal costs and on the other hand, they 
are entitled to share the benefits of successful suits indirectly. At least, they have 
nothing to lose in the course of taking derivative actions under the contingency fee 
arrangements. This approach is expected to work effectively in Pakistan so as to 
provide a real incentive to shareholders to step forward and bring suits against 
wrongdoers. 
It may also be added in this respect that in view of shareholders’ apathy caused by the 
dominance of business families and the State in the business sector, the indemnity costs 
orders are not expected to incentivise shareholders to have a dynamic rule in the 
corporate sector of Pakistan. In family-controlled companies which form a major 
portion of the business sector in Pakistan, the families hold control and powers. It 
comes with no surprise to challenge the authority of such dominant controllers with the 
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risk of gaining less and losing more.  In the SOEs, the management is represented by 
influential bureaucrats and they are placed on the managerial positions on the basis of 
their political connections with the government.
129
 
 For these reasons, although the society in Pakistan is litigious, the corporate actions 
cannot be expected without providing certain incentives by considering contingency fee 
arrangements in Pakistan. The US experience in this regard can provide a good lesson 
for Pakistan that derivative actions cannot be employed without contingency fee 
arrangements.
130
 Moreover, lowering legal costs is manifested as a strong incentive for 
shareholders to take derivative actions in Japan where lowering the costs leads to a 
significant increase in derivative proceedings.
131
 
In Wallersteiner v. Moir, Lord Denning remarked that the US and Canadian 
contingency fee approach should be considered for derivative litigation. He was of the 
view that there are strong arguments in favour of contingency fee arrangements to be 
recognised by public policy in derivative proceedings. He thought that without 
contingency fee arrangements in derivative proceedings, there are chances that 
wrongdoers in corporations would get away scot free.
132
 Thus, contingency fee 
approach would be more advantageous than the indemnity costs orders in Pakistan to 
improve accessibility to derivative actions for shareholders to enable them to take 
actions against wrongdoers for enforcing corporate rights. 
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However, one may argue that if the proposal as to contingency fee arrangements is 
adopted, it may lead to strike suits and unfounded litigations. The rationale behind such 
argument might be that under the contingency fee arrangements, shareholders happen 
to lose nothing although benefit from the proceeds of successful suits. Moreover, it 
might also be argued that if the problem of costs is addressed adequately, it would lead 
to open the floodgates of litigations. 
However, this seems to be not a positive view because wrongs in number and resultant 
litigation cannot be ignored because of deluge of litigation. As regards the concern that 
the contingency fee would create unmeritorious derivative proceedings, practically 
there is no authentic empirical evidence that indicates the risk of unmeritorious 
litigation facilitated by contingency fee arrangements.
133
 
It is obviously expected that contingency fee arrangements would improve accessibility 
to derivative actions but it does not mean that suits facilitated by contingency fee 
arrangements would be without merit. Furthermore, under the contingency fee 
arrangements, business minded lawyers enter into arrangements in which they take the 
liability of legal costs and in return, expect percentage of the proceeds of the suits. 
Therefore, it is very unlikely that the lawyers would accept such risky and 
unmeritorious suits as probability of success happens to be very low in such suits and 
losing these suits would mean waste of lawyers’ services rendered and the costs 
incurred in the course of litigation. 
On the whole, the benefits of the contingency fee approach overshadow its 
disadvantages. In order to ameliorate the plight of small investors and prevent the 
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violations of corporate rights, shareholders’ enforcement power needs to be 
strengthened otherwise wrongdoers would continue getting away with the liabilities for 
their wrongful acts. Thus, with an acknowledgement that there might be some 
vexatious litigation in this respect, however, overall contingency fee approach would, 
to a great extent,  improve accessibility to derivative actions which is expected to 
encourage shareholders to challenge controllers’ authority, currently considered as 
‘corporate blasphemy’.134 
In relation to other concern that contingency fee approach, if adopted, may lead to open 
the floodgates of litigation. In this respect, it may be added to what earlier submitted 
that courts should make sure that the claimant has either direct financial stakes in the 
company or should has legitimate concern over the way the company is being run. In 
fact, the concern that floodgates of litigation would be opened by lowering 
disincentives for shareholders is over-emphasised. For example, the experience of the 
countries such as Canada, the US, the UK, New Zealand and Australia where flexible 
and shareholder friendly approach has been adopted regarding derivative actions, 
indicates that there was no deluge of litigation in such countries after lowering 
disincentives for shareholders to take actions.
135
  
The reform proposals made in this thesis have been discussed with the interviewees 
from both the public and private sectors. The aim is to share with them the reform 
proposals and to incorporate their insightful and illustrative suggestions. Deficiency of 
operating rules on derivative proceedings and dearth of case law and case 
commentaries together with weak relevant knowledge base is elaborated by giving an 
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insight of multiple interpretations and, by reflecting the reactions of the interviewees. 
The next section of this chapter provides analysis of interview data. 
5.5 Analysis of Interviews 
The interview component of this thesis consisted of eight semi-structured interviews 
(probing questions) from both private and public officials. The aim of conducting 
interviews was to inform and assess the viability of reform proposals made in this 
study. With acknowledgment that although the number of interviewees may not be that 
big in size, yet this number has provided sufficient assessment as to the reform 
proposals. Thus, qualitative brevity instead of unnecessary length has been preferred. 
The interviewees  from various backgrounds such as local corporate lawyers, senior 
official from SECP and renowned corporate law academics and their coding references 
are given in the table below; 
                                                     Table 2 Interviewees and their Coding References 
Categories  Number of Respondents  Coding References  
Local Corporate Lawyers               4   A,B,C,D  
Senior SECP officials               2        E,F  
Academics               2        G,H  
Total = 8  
Source: developed by the author.   
5.5.1 To develop statutory framework for derivative actions  
As far as question of strengthening shareholder enforcement power is concerned, there 
is an overwhelming consensus amongst the interviewees to the effect that there is a 
need for statutory framework as regards derivative actions in Pakistan. This is to 
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remove confusion and offer clarity in relations to the rights of shareholders to take 
derivative actions.
136
 Interviewee B, in this respect, expressed that 
 “Due consideration should be given to the common law rules on derivative litigation 
alongside codified derivative action system”.137 
 The interviewee was of the view that this will be helpful as the codified law might not 
cover all demanding future eventualities. As such, the common law rules on derivative 
actions, in such situations, can be invoked to fill in the unforeseen voids left in the 
codified law.
138
  
The view expressed by the interviewee in this respect appears to be apparently well 
grounded; however, after having given a close thought to the common law rules on 
derivative actions, it may be added adversely that it may not be proper to have two 
parallel frameworks for derivative actions. This is because such state of affairs might 
tend to create confusion and uncertainties in relation to the procedural and substantive 
rules on derivative actions. As a result, shareholders may be confronted with confusion 
in selection of more suitable option for fighting corporate wrongs. 
Many commentators have disapproved two parallel frameworks applying to derivative 
actions. For example, Paul Von Nessen et al, have pointed out problems shareholders 
are facing in Hong Kong as a result of two parallel systems of derivative actions as the 
common law rules were retained there after the codification of derivative actions 
                                                 
136
 Respondents; A, B, C, D, E, F, G , H  (28, 23, 29,26, 27, 28 , 25, 30  September 2016) See Appendix 
5. 
137
 Respondent B,  a local corporate lawyer (23 September, 2016, London, UK) See Appendix 5. 
138
 Respondent B, a local corporate lawyer (23 September, 2016) See Appendix 5.   
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system.
139
 Moreover, Andrew Keay is sceptical as to whether two parallel frameworks 
for derivative actions with different rules would be helpful.
140
 He is of the view that 
statutory derivative action system is aimed at simplifying rules on derivative actions 
and thus, invoking common law rules in league with the codified derivative action 
system might frustrate its potential benefits as it is primarily meant to avoid 
uncertainties and overlapping which may tend to weaken enforcement operations.
141
 
Further, in recognition of the problems of the common law, the UK Law Commission 
has recommended for the replacement of the common law rules with codified 
derivative action system in order to make derivative litigation more opportune to 
modern conditions and accessible.
142
 
 As this thesis argues that the public enforcement singly cannot ensure effective 
shareholder protections, therefore private sector enforcement needs to be capitalized via 
derivative actions. Thus, in the light of the argument advanced and the proposal made 
as to statutory derivative actions in this thesis articulated and supported by all the 
interviewees, policy makers and legislators should consider codified derivative actions 
system in Pakistan. 
5.5.2 To simplify and clarify the procedural route for derivative actions 
In respect of reform proposals made in this thesis so as to simplify the procedural route 
for derivative actions, there are varied opinions of the interviewees. The proposals as to 
                                                 
139
 Paul Von Nessen , S.H Goo and Chee Keon Low, ‘ A parallel path to shareholder remedies: Hong 
Kong’ derivative actions in Dan W. Puchniak (eds), The Derivative Action in Asia : A Comparative and 
Functional Approach ( Cambridge University Press 30 July 2012) 303 
140
 Ibid (n 10) 47. 
141
 Ibid (n 10) 47. 
142
 Law Commission; Shareholder Remedies para.6.51 -6.55; Poole, Jill and Roberts, Pauline isobel, 
‘Shareholder Remedies: Corporate Wrongs and the Derivative Action’(1999)Journal of Business Law 
99-125, 100. 
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the range of claimants, actionable wrongs and the ‘Court Approach’ pertaining to the 
assessment of derivative actions were discussed with them at length whose comments 
on each of the proposal are discussed below;  
5.5.2.1 The range of derivative claimants 
In respect of derivative claimants, almost, all interviewees agreed that every individual 
shareholder regardless of number of shares in a company defrauded by a wrongdoer 
should have the right to take actions. However, as submitted that a shareholder who 
gets to be the shareholder after the occurrence of alleged fiduciary wrong should be 
disentitled to commence derivative suits. Likewise, a shareholder who initiates 
derivative suit and later on, walks away from the company, should also be disqualified 
to continue to pursue the suit. In reply to the question as to whether the 
contemporaneous and continuous ownership requirements, if considered in the context 
of Pakistan, can help prevent cheap settlements and unmeritorious litigation; all the 
interviewees were of the unanimous view (though with some clarifications) that these 
requirements are necessary in order to avoid misuse of derivative litigation. 
 Contemporary stock Ownership  
All interviewees agreed unanimously that attention needs to be paid to the proposal 
made in this thesis for the requirement of contemporaneous ownership so as to 
discourage purchasing of shares with ulterior motives.
143
 Interviewee B in this respect 
opined that; 
                                                 
143
 All respondents ( local corporate Lawyers A, B, C, D), (High-ranking official of the SECP E, F), 
(Academics G, H 23 -30 September 2016) See Appendix 5. 
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 “Due consideration should be given to the situations where after-acquiring 
shareholders purchase shares without having the knowledge of an alleged fiduciary 
wrong in a company”.144 
A similar view was also expressed by interviewee F.
145
 They suggested that 
‘Contemporaneous Ownership Requirement’ should be relaxed to such situations where 
after-acquiring shareholders were not aware of the alleged fiduciary wrong for the 
reason that it was not disclosed to them.
146
 
The explanation made by the interviewees regarding the above said exception to the 
contemporaneous requirement has enough to be viewed favourably. This flows from 
the fundamental principle of law that bona fides and mala fides are separate in 
consequences and cannot be treated alike. Thus,  a shareholder, who acquires shares 
with bona fide intention and in good faith considering the future prospects of a 
company and without having the knowledge of an alleged fraud, should not be 
disqualified from bringing derivative actions. In fact, applying the contemporaneous 
requirement to bona fide buyer of shares after the alleged wrong is not appropriate. 
Applying the exception of bona fide purchases of stocks to contemporaneous ownership 
requirement is not a something new in law. In a number of jurisdictions, shareholders 
who purchase stocks without having the knowledge of alleged wrongful acts in a 
company are treated competent to take derivative actions.
147
  Thus, in the light of 
comments made by the interviewees, it is added that while considering standing rules of 
                                                 
144
 Respondent B, a local corporate Lawyer (23 September, 2016) See Appendix 5. 
145
 Respondent F, a senior SECP official (28 September, 2016) See Appendix 5. 
146
 Respondent  B, a local corporate lawyer,  and Respondent  F,  a senior SECP official, (23, 28, 
September 2016) See Appendix 5.  
147
 Ibid (n25); Rosenthal v. Burry Biscuit Corp[1948] 60 A.2d 106, 111;Schoon v Smith [2008]953 A.2D 
196,203; AlaBy Prods. Corp v Cede & Co[1995] 657 A.2D 254,264; Danielewicz v Arnold [2011] 769  
A 2d, 274, 291.  The Contemporaneous Ownership Requirement is provided in, Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure Rule 23.1. 
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derivative claimants, contemporaneous ownership requirement needs to be taken into 
account. Similarly, as also opined by interviewees B and F, the contemporaneous 
ownership rule should not apply to situations where alleged wrongs were not divulged 
to after-acquiring shareholders who purchased shares unaware of the wrong intended to 
be rectified through derivative action. 
Continuous Ownership Requirement  
Six out of eight interviewees supported the proposal as to the adoption of ‘Continuous 
Ownership Requirement’ and considered it an essential standing requirement for 
derivative claimants. They expressed their opinions that the adoption of the requirement 
would help avoid abusive and dishonest litigation by the outgoing shareholders.
148
 This 
is likely that the outgoing shareholders who hold no more financial stakes in the 
company would probably pursue their private benefits instead of pursuing litigation in 
accordance with the best interest of the company. 
However interviewees G and H were sceptical as to the adoption of ‘Continuous 
Ownership Requirement’. Both were of the view that by adoption of continuous 
ownership requirement, some genuine claimants who are dispossessed of their shares 
by corporate actions or by reason of mergers would be precluded from continuing 
derivative actions.
149
 The concern shown by the interviewees appears to be based on a 
strong rationale that shareholders who are dispossessed of their stocks as a consequence 
of merger or otherwise dislodged should not be affected by the operation of 
‘Continuous Ownership Requirement’. 
                                                 
148
  Respondents A, B,C, D, (23,26,28,29, September , 2016 ) all local corporate lawyers supported the 
adoption of the ‘continuous ownership requirement’; Moreover, SECP official; E, F  also agreed to the 
core issue that when somebody who has no stakes in a company should be disallowed to take actions 
because these actions might be dishonest and with bad motives. 
149
 Respondents; G, H, Corporate Law academics (25, 30 September 2016) See Appendix 5. 
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It may be added that the requirement of continuous ownership in its turn is widely 
recognised in a number of jurisdictions.
150
 Likewise, the requirement is also recognised 
by the US regulations; as such the courts in the US allowed shareholders who were 
dispossessed of their stocks by reason of mergers to continue to follow the suits.
151
 
Keeping in view the importance of ‘Continuous Ownership Requirement’ and in the 
light of concerns shown by interviewees G and H, it is submitted that instead of 
discarding continuous ownership requirement altogether, an exception to the 
requirement may be appended so as to allow shareholders disowned as a consequence 
of mergers to continue to pursue the derivative proceedings. As such with necessary 
improvements, continuous ownership requirement in its place is virtually paramount as 
this would help in preventing outgoing shareholders from exploiting any situation. 
Likewise, as articulated by interviewees G and H, the requirement of continuing 
ownership should not apply to cases where shareholders are disowned by reason of 
manipulated mergers. This is necessary, keeping in view the phenomenon of 
concentration of shareholder ownership in Pakistan where controlling shareholders 
might prevent shareholder claimants from pursuing even genuine and merit based suits 
by the use of stock for stock mergers. 
 
 
 
                                                 
150
 Ibid (n25);Malajka M Eaton, Leonard J. Feldman, and Jerry C. Chiang, ‘Continuous Ownership 
Requirement in Shareholder Derivative Litigation: Endorsing a Common Sense Application of Standing 
and Choice-of-Law Principles’(2010) 47 The Willamette L. Rev 1-23,7; Parfi Holding AB v. Mirror 
Image Internet Inc. [2008]954 A.2d 911.  
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Alford v. Shaw [1990]68.398 S.E.2d 445;Shelton v Thompson[1989] 544 So.2d 845; Fitzpatrick  v 
Shay [1983]79.461 A.2d 243; Lewis v Ward [2004]852 A.2d 896,904; Grosset v Wenaas [2008]42 Cal. 
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Adequate representation of companies and other stockholders’ interests 
Almost all interviewees expressed that it should be ensured that a derivative claimant is 
representing the company’s as well as other stockholders’ interests adequately.152 The 
interviewees suggested that the principle of adequate representation of companies’ 
interests needs to be considered so that companies’ interests may be protected 
effectively. They were of the view that while assessing derivative application, it should 
be ensured that the claimants are representing the companies’ interests adequately and 
permit only those suits to continue which advance the companies’ interests 
vigorously.
153
 
Interviewee D in this respect emphasised upon the adoption of the principle and shared 
his views in the light of his experience as legal advisor to an organisation.
154
 The 
interviewee mentioned that companies normally have their own panel of lawyers to 
deal with their legal and judicial issues. It is very likely that at times, these lawyers 
strike under carpet deals and compromise derivative proceedings as they are obliged to 
mostly act in the interest of the company managers being their nominees and selectees 
and thus vulnerable to sacking if they proceed and perform to their displeasure. It might 
happen in situations where there is a serious issue of managerial wrongdoings; the 
companies’ lawyers may act in favour of the managers on personal relation basis 
                                                 
152
 Respondents , local corporate lawyers A B,D and a senior SECP official F ;  while other respondents; 
C, E , G and H just agreed that shareholder applicants should adequately represent the interests of the 
company as well as its stockholders without making further explanation to the adoption of the rule 
(28,23,26,28,29,26,25,30 September 2016). See Appendix 5. 
153
 Respondents, local corporate lawyers A B,D and a senior SECP official, F (28,23,26,28 September 
2016) See Appendix 5. 
154
 Respondent, D- a domestic corporate lawyer (26, September 2016) See Appendix 5.  
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instead of being fair to their duty to the companies. In that case, the interviewee 
recommended that outside lawyers should be hired for pursuing derivative litigation.
155
 
Interviewee D also recommended that apart from shareholders, the range of derivative 
claimants should be extended to non-shareholder constituencies of companies. In this 
regard, the interviewee, particularly, suggested that employees of the companies should 
be allowed to take derivative actions. According to the interviewee D, shareholders 
sometimes lack sufficient knowledge of a wrong due to informational asymmetries. In 
this regard, the interviewee was of the view that employees, as being insiders, are 
expected to be more conversant with the managerial wrongdoings than the 
shareholders. Therefore, if employees were allowed to initiate derivative proceedings 
against wrongdoers in corporations, the suits may be based on more rich information of 
the wrongs. This would help increase in the incidence of corporate rights being 
enforced effectively.
156
 The proposal made by the interviewee appears to be appropriate 
and may not be contentious in the sense that this is not a new rule in the law as we see 
that employees often function as ‘whistle-blowers’ tipping off managerial and 
directorial wrongdoings in corporations. 
5.5.2.2 Actionable wrong  
All interviewees unanimously supported the proposal made in this thesis, that besides 
directors and corporate officers, shareholders with majority voting power should also 
be brought within the scope of fiduciary duties.
157
 The interviewees voiced that the 
major conflict of interest lies between major and minor shareholders in corporate 
                                                 
155
 Ibid respondent D- a domestic corporate lawyer( 26 September, 2016) See Appendix 5. 
156
 Ibid,Respondent D. See Appendix 5. 
157
 Respondents- local corporate lawyers  A, B, C, D; Senior SECP official E, F ; Academics G, H ( 28, 
23,29,26,26/27,28,25,30 September 2016). See Appendix 5. 
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entities in Pakistan. They were of the view that controllers are the real power in both 
the family owned and the State-Owned Enterprises which the power needs to be 
regulated so as to prevent misuse of their positions instrumental to expropriating 
corporate assets.
158
 
Interviewee B was of the view that  
“Other parties wrongfully benefiting from directorial manoeuvrings should also be held 
accountable”. 
 The interviewee explained that ‘‘board of directors might avoid proceedings against 
‘other parties’ associated with controlling shareholders or with any of the board 
members’’.159 The interviewee further elaborated that transactions entered into by 
‘other parties with directors, in good faith, should not be subjected to derivative 
litigation.
160
 The interviewee in this respect explained that ‘other parties’ transacting 
with directors in ‘good faith’ should not be subject to derivative actions for the reason 
that this may affect business operations adversely. Accordingly, the proposal made by 
interviewee B seems to be plausible and ought to be considered in future amendments 
in the company law. 
The legal frameworks of Australia, New Zealand and Canada provide that anyone can 
be subjected to derivative proceedings under any corporate cause of action where the 
board of directors fail to bring suit against wrongdoers.
161
 More so, in the UK, the 
Companies Act provides that any other person who knowingly benefits from directorial 
                                                 
158
 Ibid all respondents. See Appendix 5. 
159
 Respondent B, a local corporate lawyer (23 September, 2016) See Appendix 5.   
160
 Respondent B, a local corporate lawyer (23 September, 2016) See Appendix 5.  
161
 Ibid (n 10) 48. 
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breaches can be subjected to derivative litigation.
162
 Thus, in order to prevent 
controlling shareholders from expropriating corporate assets, the ambit of law should 
be stretched to controlling shareholders. Similarly, in the light of the proposal made by 
interviewee B, company law in Pakistan needs to be deliberated in direction to hold 
‘other persons’ benefiting wrongfully from directorial misconducts, accountable. 
In response to the proposal made in this thesis that the range of actionable wrongs need 
to be enlarged. Almost all the interviewees supported the view that the range of 
corporate cause of action in derivative suits should be broadened enough to include all 
serious illegal activities on the part of directors, corporate officers and controlling 
shareholders. In this respect, all the interviewees stressed the need for streamlining and 
codifying directors’ duties and added that besides common law fiduciary duties, breach 
of statutory duties by the directors should also be made actionable.
163
 However, 
interviewee H was sceptical to the proposal in favour of British style codified 
framework of directors’ duties in Pakistan.164 The interviewee argued that 
 “Although such framework would enlarge directors’ responsibilities and thus, would 
help broaden corporate accountability, yet it might lead to ‘managerial apathy’ resulting 
in paralysis of business operations”.165 
In view of the concern expressed by the interviewee H, it is submitted that an 
appropriate balance needs to be struck amongst corporate cause of action, protection of 
corporate rights and safeguarding directors against threats of vexatious proceedings. To 
that end, courts should play their role to control meritless litigation brought against 
                                                 
162
 See section 260(3), the UK Companies Act 2006.  
163
  Respondents local corporate lawyers  A, B, C, D; Senior SECP official and Academics  E, F, G, 
H(28, 23,29,26,26/27,28,25,30 September 2016) See Appendix 5. 
164
 See section 172 to 177 of the UK Companies Act 2006.Directors’ statutory duties. 
165
 Respondent  H , an academic, ( 30 , September 2016), See Appendix 5. 
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directors. (The ‘judicial approach’ has been suggested in this thesis to assess derivative 
actions so as to avoid meritless litigation).  
5.5.2.3 Assessment of Derivative Actions  
It is pertinent to mention here that assessments of derivative actions are required to be 
made so as to filter out baseless suits and to determine whether to allow derivative 
proceedings or not. Six out of eight respondents supported the proposal made in this 
respect that conferring on courts powers of assessing derivative actions would be more 
in the interests of the companies.
166
 
In opposition to the judicial approach, interviewee G argued that instead of leaving this 
area to judicial scrutiny, shareholders, in members’ general meetings, may be tasked 
with deciding as to whether to turn down or grant leave for derivative actions.
167
 The 
interviewee was of the view that 
 ‘‘shareholders, as being residual claimants, should have authority to decide upon 
litigation affecting their rights’’.168 
The interviewee went on to explain that adoption of the ‘court approach’ would mean 
nothing less than undermining the boardroom authority of decision-making processes in 
corporations.
169
 The interviewee’s view was that since members’ meetings are source 
of powers of board of directors; therefore, making decision of derivative proceedings at 
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 Respondents  A, B,C,D, local corporate lawyers and senior SECP officials E and F  (28,23,29,26 
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 Respondent  G ( 25 September 2016) See Appendix 5. 
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 Respondent G (25 September 2016) See Appendix 5.   
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such meetings would not amount to a trespass upon the decision making powers of 
board of directors. 
The interviewee argued that decision making as to the assessments of derivative actions 
at the members’ meetings would help empower shareholders to decide in accordance 
with the interests of the companies. Moreover, they would not be subject to arbitrary 
decisions of board of directors who are criticised for being biased in deciding upon 
initiation of litigation against other board members.
170
 Argument made by the 
interviewee as to conferring on shareholders the authority of assessing derivative 
actions may be, by the principle of shareholders’ ownership rights, true. However, this 
approach, if adopted in Pakistan, would lead to various problems. For example, in 
situations where controlling shareholders are themselves the wrongdoers or for that 
matter the directors are under their control, assessments of derivative actions made at 
the members’ meetings would be likely to be intended to letting them off the hook. 
 Moreover, it is not easy to unite shareholders for summoning meetings for assessing 
derivative actions. There is a legal impediment in this respect as the right to include 
proposed resolution for consideration in the agenda of members’ meeting is not 
available to every individual shareholder singly under the Companies ordinance of 
Pakistan. Only shareholders representing not less than 10 per cent of the total number 
are allowed to include their proposed resolution for consideration in the agenda of 
members’ general meeting.171 Shareholders’ unwillingness to vote and participate in 
members’ general meetings is another major problem in this regard. It is particularly 
relevant with reference to minority shareholders who, being under impressions that 
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 Respondent G (25 September 2016) See Appendix 5. 
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their vote would not necessarily influence decisions to be made at members’ meeting, 
remain mostly inactive.
172
 
In addition to shareholders’ rational apathy and legal impediments, shareholders by and 
large lack relevant information and expertise necessary for understanding the nature of 
corporate wrongs and accordingly assess derivative actions.
173
 Information to corporate 
wrongs and relevant expertise are necessary in considering as to whether grant leave for 
the suit or otherwise. In order for assessing derivative actions, shareholders might have 
general information regarding allegations of corporate wrongs through media reports; 
however, they lack sufficient information and related knowledge about wrongs. Thus, 
in view of problems noted above, decisions making in respect of assessment of 
derivative actions at shareholders’ meetings may not be fair and impartial.  
In this respect, with regard to the assessment of derivative actions, interviewee H was 
of the view that 
 ‘‘impartial arbitrators should be appointed for assessing derivative proceedings’’.174 
 The interviewee underscored the need of a neutral person possessed with relevant 
expertise and professional repute to be hired for the purpose of assessment of derivative 
actions. The interviewee maintained that this sort of approach would help solve issues 
of legal costs and help prevent board of directors from exonerating their errant 
colleagues. Further, the interviewee went on to explain that it would help avoid 
unnecessary procedural requirements and rule-bounded management of cases as in 
traditional courts’ litigation proceedings. 
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 Stephen M Bainbridge, ‘Director Primacy and shareholder disempowerment’(2006) 119(6)Harvard 
Law Review 05-25, 19. 
173
 Ibid 20.  
174
 Respondent H, (30 September 2016) See Appendix 5.  
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 The interviewee was of the view that since parties to the disputes, agree and bind 
themselves to the decisions of arbitrators, naturally, it helps resolution of disputes 
amicably and potentially leads to win-win settlement of disputes instead of win-lose 
litigious settlements.
175
 The interviewee’s proposal as to appoint arbitrators seems, on 
the face of it, to be appropriate and would not be contentious as it is not something new 
because it is inseparable part of all civil jurisdictions in receipt of wide acclaim across 
the world.  
On the other hand, although arbitration is a popular dispute resolution mechanism, yet 
this too is not entirely free from problems when it is viewed to be utilized for assessing 
derivative actions. It is claimed in its favour that arbitration is a cheaper and speedy 
dispute resolution mechanism. At first glance, although it may look so, yet it is not. It is 
not as cheaper as one may presume. In essence, it may also involve heavy expenditures 
like procedural costs of arbitration and arbitrators’ fees. Undoubtedly, arbitration as a 
tool to resolve disputes has gained wide popularity; yet, one cannot overlook the fact 
that the target of justice cannot be hit without state intervention and the use of its 
coercive authority to push the parties to come to terms. In this context, even in the 
enforcement of arbitral awards, judicial intervention is essential,
176
 without which, 
arbitral awards are nothing but declarations of rights. 
The arbitration mechanism may be questioned for the assessments of derivative actions 
from another angle. At times shareholder claimants might accept less than a fair and 
just settlement which the company would have been entitled to as a result of courts’ 
assessment of derivative actions. In fact, positive view as to the popularity of dispute 
resolution mechanism through arbitration appears in terms of resolution of international 
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 See section 3 of the Arbitration Agreements and Foreign Arbitral Awards Act, 2011. 
  278 
 
commercial disputes and family matters instead of redressing wrongs committed by 
directors of the companies.
177
 
Further, a distinction between a normal suit and a derivative suit also needs to be borne 
in mind. In a derivative suit, a shareholder commences litigation in the name of a 
wronged company and accordingly, the shareholder represents the company and other 
stockholders. On the other hand, arbitration is focussed at assisting parties to reach an 
amicable possible agreement. Alongside, a party unwilling to put dispute to arbitration 
cannot be forced to go for that. Even if both the parties agree to arbitration, the 
shareholder party might accept something less than an adequate settlement of the 
dispute. This incidence would not mean that the wrong has been remedied in line with 
the best interest of the company. In this context, the company can be a rightful party to 
arbitration. However, it becomes problematic in situations where the company happens 
to be in control of the wrongdoers who, obviously, would not be willing to put the issue 
of assessments of derivative suits to arbitration. 
Thus, analysis of views of both the interviewees G and H shows that assessments of 
derivative actions at shareholders’ meetings and through arbitration mechanism are not 
wholly free from problems.  In this purview, the judicial approach, if adopted in 
Pakistan, as suggested in this thesis and supported by majority of the respondents 
would necessarily solve the issues of making assessment of derivative actions on merit. 
5.5.3 To improve accessibility to derivative action 
In order to address the problem of costs, contingency fee approach has been suggested 
in this thesis so as to incentivise shareholders to take derivative actions against 
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wrongdoers in corporations. Six out of eight respondents supported that contingency 
fee approach, if adopted in Pakistan, can solve issues of costs in derivative actions.
178
  
Interviewee E excused making comments on the use of contingency fee concept.
179
 
Interviewee D was of the view that contingency fee may cause derivative proceeds 
unnecessarily delayed because lawyers might prolong proceedings in order to increase 
their fees and rewards. The interviewee suggested that 
 “Shareholders can be incentivised to take derivative actions if a reasonable percentage 
of benefits of derivative actions are shared with them”.180 
The concern shown by the interviewee that contingency fee arrangement may engender 
unnecessarily delayed proceedings is a valid argument that needs to be answered. It is 
so because delaying proceedings unnecessarily by lawyers with intent to increase 
rewards would be unfair to the companies because they would get less than actual 
recoveries from suits as the more the lawyers’ fees; the less the proceeds of suits would 
accrue to the companies. 
In fact, the interviewee was sceptical about contingency fee approach considering that 
lawyers would charge fees on the basis of hours they spend and the quality of work 
they render. To the extent that lawyers would charge on hourly basis, argument made 
by the interviewee seems to be convincing as unscrupulous lawyers might protract 
proceedings with intent to increase their working hours. However, it would not be a 
favourite choice for the lawyers to protract proceedings, if their fees are determined on 
the percentage method. 
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Under the percentage method, lawyers are not paid on the basis of their hourly services 
and quality of work but they are paid proportionate to the proceeds of suits. The 
percentage method may serve as an answer to the concern shown by the interviewee 
that lawyers may protract derivative proceedings with bad motives.  However, one may 
also argue that the percentage method would result in windfall benefits for lawyers 
which would also be unfair to the companies. In this respect, it is submitted that this 
problem can be solved by setting a maximum limit for lawyers’ fees. This would mean 
that lawyers would be paid proportionate to the proceeds of suits but they would not be 
entitled to charge more than the ceiling fixed for maximum fees. 
The proposal as to reward successful claimants with part of the proceeds of suits made 
by the interviewee D provides a reasonably convincing way forward to consider the 
merits of this approach in the context of Pakistan. 
The proposal made by the interviewee D gets support from the approach adopted in 
New Zealand where courts may order to pay a reasonable percentage of proceeds of 
suits to derivative claimants instead of paying full recovery to the companies.
181
 This 
proposal can be a second solution to the issue of disincentives for shareholders in 
derivative proceedings in Pakistan. This is because most of companies in Pakistan are 
family-controlled and if a company happens to be in control of a wrongdoer, all 
benefits flowing from successful suits might be used improperly by the controllers. 
Therefore, ordering a reasonable percentage of proceeds of suits in favour of 
shareholders may help compensating them against expenses incurred by them on 
derivative proceedings. 
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This proposal also remained under consideration with the UK Law Commission which 
did not favour it remarking that it might jumble up the distinction between direct and 
derivative actions. In this respect, it is submitted that without providing an incentive 
either through paying shareholders with part of the proceeds or through contingency fee 
arrangements, accessibility to derivative actions would not be enhanced. Without the 
enhancement of the accessibility, there would be not an effective use of derivative 
litigation. As discussed earlier, indemnity costs orders as intended by the UK Law 
Commission to incentivise shareholders, do not really provide an incentive to 
shareholders encouraging them to step forward and take derivative actions. This is 
because indemnifications of legal costs means to claimants simply return of their 
expenses incurred on derivative proceedings and not something additional in return of 
their time spent and other expenses not included in the costs orders. If, in this regard, 
shareholders are rewarded by ordering a reasonable percentage of the benefits of 
successful suits, as recommended by interviewee D, they would necessarily be 
incentivised to take derivative actions. 
The proposal made by the interviewee also gets support from the stance that if directors 
can be paid for their work they do in rectifying wrongs done to companies, then why 
shareholders should not be paid for their efforts in making good losses caused.
182
  Even 
otherwise paying proceeds of suits to the shareholders would not be beneficial for them 
in the sense that shareholders are not paid in full against the costs they spent on 
derivative actions as costs incurred on instructing solicitors, meetings with counsels and 
attending to sign witness statements is not included in indemnity costs orders. 
                                                 
182
 Ibid (104) 375. 
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Reisberg, in this perspective, argued before the enactment of statutory derivative 
actions system in the UK that shareholders should be rewarded through paying a 
reasonable percentage of the recovery of successful suits. He suggests that courts 
should consider factors such as complexity of a case, quality of effort rendered by the 
claimants and the extent of risk likely to be borne by them, while determining 
percentage of the recovery of suits to be paid to derivative claimants.
183
  
Nyombi and Kibandama are of the same view that rewarding shareholders with part of 
the recovery of derivative suits can be a solution to the problem of disincentives with 
them in derivative litigation.
184
 They consider that shareholder can be adequately 
incentivised through rewarding them with part of the recovery from the successful 
derivative proceedings. According to them, this is because in indemnity costs orders, 
there is always a gap between the actual finances spent by claimants and the costs 
ordered by courts which the deficiency can be made up by rewarding derivative 
claimants with part of the proceeds of successful suits.
185
 
Thus, the above analysis shows that rewarding successful claimants with part of the 
recovery of derivative suits can be another way to improve accessibility to derivative 
actions. It is worth noting that this approach is being utilized successfully in Canada.
186
 
However, it cannot be a substitute for contingency fee approach which has benefits of 
its own. Therefore, as a solution to the issue of disincentives for shareholders in 
derivative proceedings, both the approaches may be capitalized for future legal 
amendments in Pakistan. 
                                                 
183
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5.6 Concluding Remarks 
Based on argument, the experiences of some other jurisdictions, particularly, those of 
the UK and on the insightful suggestions of the interviewees, this chapter stood 
focussed on the long-awaited statutory framework for derivative actions in Pakistan. 
This defines with an amount of clarity, the shareholders’ rights of derivative actions 
which are known for their complexity under the common law. In order to simplify the 
procedural route for derivative actions, defining the range of derivative claimants, 
delimitation of actionable wrongs and the ‘Court Approach’ have been discussed in 
detail.  Issues which can lessen the efficacy of derivative proceedings have been 
highlighted and the guiding principles derived from the experience of other 
jurisdictions have been provided for consideration of legislators in Pakistan. 
 In regard to standing requirements of shareholder claimants, it is suggested that only 
actual shareholders of a company should be allowed to initiate actions against 
wrongdoers. To that end, contemporaneous and continuous ownership requirements 
have been suggested to legislators for their consideration for future amendments in the 
company law in Pakistan. These standing requirements have been suggested to be 
helpful to prevent unmeritorious suits by outgoing and after-acquiring shareholders. 
In view of the fact that controllers of parent companies may choose one or more their 
subsidiaries to commit wrongs and thus, push shareholders of the parent companies to 
suffer indirectly through suffering of subsidiaries, double derivative actions have been 
recommended to hold wrongdoers in subsidiaries, accountable. Further, the requirement 
of ‘adequate representation of companies and other stockholders’ interests, have been 
emphasized in this thesis. This is to avoid multiplicity of litigation and to reap optimal 
benefits of derivative actions. In regard to assessments of derivative actions, different 
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approaches derived from the proposals of the respondents and from other jurisdictions 
have been evaluated. The British ‘court approach’ has been recommended to be the 
most suitable for Pakistan to adopt highlighting shortcomings of other approaches in 
this context and the appropriateness of the ‘Court Approach’ to decide whether to grant 
leave for a derivative action or not. 
Given the lack of sufficient incentives for shareholders in indemnity costs orders 
approach as adopted in the UK, it has been argued in this thesis that solution to the 
issue of disincentives to shareholders in derivative proceedings lies in contingency fee 
arrangements and in rewarding claimants with part of the recovery from the successful 
derivative suits. Proposals made in this chapter have been discussed with the 
interviewees and accordingly, their views and illuminating suggestions have been 
incorporated so as to provide a cutting analysis of the attending issues. This 
comprehensive analysis has helped to provide more realist solutions of the problem of 
controllers’ misuse of their positions and self-serving decisions detrimental to 
companies’ business operations. It is, thus, hoped that the reform proposals made in this 
thesis will be taken into account for futuristic guidance as to amendments in the 
company law in Pakistan.  
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Chapter 6.  Conclusion  
6.1 Introduction  
The purpose of this chapter is to summarise all the research issues discussed in this 
study together with comments on their relevance and meanings. This recapitulates and 
identifies contribution resulting from this research as well as directions for future 
research. This also highlights limitations of this study so as to provide a ground for the 
areas of future research. 
At the start of this thesis, three questions were set to be answered;( 1) to what extent the 
insiders (controlling shareholders and directors) misuse their authority in taking 
business decisions in disregard of companies’ and their minority shareholders’ 
interests? (2) What role do derivative actions play in promoting good corporate 
governance and in preserving corporate assets? (3) How can law on derivative actions 
be reformed, simplified and modernised so as to reinforce enforcement power of 
shareholders for safeguarding their interests? These questions have been answered in 
this thesis with a conclusion reached that derivative litigation can play an valuable role, 
if given full life, in preventing insiders from taking business decisions in disregard of 
the companies and small investors. 
Key findings in this study and their relevance in the context of directions of future 
research is explained. This chapter considers six main elements of the study. First, the 
justification for conducting this research is elaborated. The purpose is to shed light on 
the background of this research with resultant research questions and the research gap 
this thesis helped filling. It refers to preceding chapters that shed light on the procedural 
and substantive barriers to minority shareholders seeking adequate remedies and the 
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role of derivative proceedings in promoting good corporate governance and ensuring 
better corporate accountability. Second, key findings have been given and it has been 
shown how they addressed the research questions. Third, reform proposals made in this 
thesis are explained in the light of findings. Fifth, the research limitations and areas of 
future research are elaborated. Last but not the least, at its conclusion, the central theme 
of the thesis, is explained. 
6.2 Justification for conducting this research 
The issue of managers’ self-serving attitudes and preserving corporate assets is widely 
debated. In view of shareholder ownership concentration and vulnerability of minorities 
in both the private and public companies in Pakistan, this thesis argues that derivative 
litigation has a crucial role to play in strengthening the enforcement power of minority 
shareholders to protect their rights. The debate over shareholder protection started with 
Berle and Means’ study that evidenced a division between control and ownership. This 
division between ownership and control was theorised by Jensen and Meckling 
acknowledging that where controllers’ interest diverges with non-controlling 
shareholders’, the controllers would invariably decide in line with their own interests. 
Therefore, legal rules and an effective monitoring mechanism need to be in place in 
order to prevent controllers from pursuing their private interests at the cost of the 
companies’ and non-controlling shareholders’ interests. 
According to modern economic theorists, market forces have ability to play a role in 
enhancing managerial efficiency and corporate accountability. The claim of the modern 
economic theorists is based on the Eugene Fama’s theory of efficient market 
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hypothesis.
1
 When we say that the capital markets function as to push management to 
align its interests with those of the shareholders, it means that we are assuming that 
publicly available information is reflected in share price. In theory, it may be correct to 
say that in an efficient market, the securities price reflect available information. 
However, the market efficiency hypothesis becomes strikingly questionable when we 
apply it to the inefficient markets like that of Pakistan where share price does not reflect 
available information. The collapse of the dot.com bubble during 1999-2001 offers 
sufficient evidence to the fact of the capital markets’ mispricing with consequential 
failure of many companies. Likewise, the prevalence of financial frauds and a number 
of empirical studies show that the equity prices do not reflect available information in 
Pakistan. Academics like Andrew Lo are strongly sceptical as to singly rely on the 
capital markets to discipline errant management particularly in countries like Pakistan 
where the publicly available information is not reflected in equity prices. 
The debate over market-based disciplinary mechanisms was popularised by Henry 
Manne, an American researcher who argued that the market for corporate control can 
act as a managerial disciplinary mechanism. The market for corporate control works on 
the principle that where managerial wrongdoings cause reduction in share price of a 
company, the company may fall prey to a takeover.  Therefore, the underperforming 
managers, due to the fear of being sacked by the acquirer, are pushed to act in the best 
interest of the company.  In this sense, the takeover market could influence managerial 
behaviour and prevent managerial malfunctioning. 
                                                 
1
 See Eugene F Fama,‘ Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work’(1970)25 
(2)Journal of Finance 383, 383 : Eugene F Fama,‘ Efficient Capital Markets 11’(1990)46 (5) Journal of 
Finance 1575-1617, 1575.  
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However, in chapter 1, it has been shown that the efficacy of market for corporate 
control is subject to various contingencies and limitations. For example, takeover 
market mechanism works in a very limited range. Normally, numerous companies are 
out of this range where they could become takeover targets. For example, if managerial 
inefficiency does not significantly cause fall of share price, then the company is out of 
the range of falling prey to takeover. Similarly, if managerial inefficiency is so extreme 
as to cause takeovers, then it can become a risky undertaking for the acquirer. The 
corporate takeover market thus have serious limitations in its operations as its 
effectiveness depends on variables such as ownership structure, informational 
requirements and defensive tactics used by managers of the companies which are 
subject to potential takeovers. 
Second, the takeover market mechanism is an expensive route to dislodge incompetent 
management as it involves substantial transaction costs.  Therefore, the bidder has to 
think of the issues like agency costs, undervalued company and transactions costs 
before making decision of takeover. Third, the takeover market mechanism has its little 
application to closely held companies.  Although, closely held companies have 
relatively less significance in economic terms, yet they constitute the vast bulk of 
companies in Pakistan. As a result, this limits the scope of takeover market mechanism 
in Pakistan. Last but not the least, liquidity problem in the capital markets of Pakistan 
informs that relying on the takeover market would not necessarily solve the issue of 
disciplining errant managers. 
The contractarian theory of corporate law explains the concept of company law that the 
modern business corporations exist on basis of contracts that determine the legal 
relationships among management and shareholders. The contractarians are critical of 
legal intervention. They believe that shareholders are protected through private 
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contractual system. They opine that managerial actions are bound by contractual 
commitments and shareholders may safeguard their interests by exercising their 
contractual rights. However, the legal contractarian theory is subject to well-grounded 
criticism. Many researchers like Clark,
2
 Easterbrook and Fischel,
3
 and Keay and 
Zhang
4
 have criticised contractarians’ view on the grounds of incomplete nature of 
contracts. This is a well-known problem with the formation of contracts that they 
cannot exist in an ideal form as it has been described by Williamson as, ‘the foresight 
is, at best, imperfect’. This incomplete nature of contracts may provide controlling 
shareholders with opportunities to engage in illegal activities because minority 
shareholders, due to information asymmetries, might not be able to predict the potential 
misuse of incomplete terms of contracts and consequential ex-post opportunism at the 
time of signing contracts. 
The concept of incomplete contracts necessitates that there should be additional 
mechanisms which could complete these contracts. These mechanisms may include 
independent board directors, incentive compatible compensation and takeover markets. 
However, Michael Jensen, a famous financial economist, notes that financial markets 
and internal governance systems have their own limitations and thus they are unable to 
push managers to act in the best interests of the company and the shareholders. He 
recommends that the imposition of legal liability on malfeasance managerial actions is 
vital in order to protect shareholders who suffer due to incomplete contractual 
provisions. Furthermore, legal origin, communitarian and agency theories recommend 
that imposition of legal duties on managers is important for promoting fair play for all 
                                                 
2
 Robert C Clark, Corporate Law (Aspen Publishers ,Inc 1986)2-4. 
3
 Frank H. Easterbrook and Daniel R. Fischel, ‘Voting in Corporate Law Corporations and Private 
Property,' (1983) 26(2) Journal of Law and Economics 395-427,402. 
4
 Andrew. Keay, Hao Zhang, ‘Incomplete Contracts, Contingent Fiduciaries and a Director's Duty to 
Creditors’(2008)32(1) Melbourne University Law Review 141-169,154. 
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the non- shareholder and shareholder constituencies of corporations. These theories 
favour legal intervention for regulating corporate affairs and managerial actions. 
A pertinent question arises as to if a company is wronged, then who should be the 
‘proper plaintiff’ to take action against the wrongdoers. According to fiction theory, a 
company is a legal person distinct from its members; therefore, it is the company itself 
responsible for its attendant legal liabilities and rights. Based on this independent legal 
entity concept of corporate law, the company is the ‘proper plaintiff’ to take against 
those who have defrauded it. Chapter 1 (fiction theory of law) has shown that it would 
leads to problems where the company is in control of wrongdoers. It would mean to 
infer that wrongdoers would not approve litigation against themselves. This state of 
affairs makes the case for derivative litigation enabling shareholders to come forward to 
take actions against wrongdoers and thus, preserve corporate rights. 
It is expected that public enforcement would share a significant burden of enforcing 
corporate rights role. However, the public enforcement i.e government initiated 
proceedings is not free from problems and suffers from inherent limitations. Chapter 1 
has shown problems with the public enforcement mechanism. For instance, in public 
initiated proceedings, a wrong committed by directors is treated as a criminal act and 
not a civil wrong. It is difficult to prove a criminal guilt as the standard of proof 
required for proving a criminal case is, ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ which is difficult for 
prosecution to establish. Moreover, it is potentially impracticable option to deal with 
every single wrong committed by directors and managers through public enforcement 
mechanism. The public agencies do have enforcement priorities due to their limited 
official capacity and financial resources. Hence, it becomes difficult for them to deal 
with all managerial misconducts apt to arise. The public enforcement also suffers from 
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flaws such as the possibility that public agents may succumb to the pressure of private 
interest groups contrary to the interest the law intends to protect. 
Thus, the legal control and enforcement of corporate rights depends principally on 
shareholders’ derivative proceedings. The company law in Pakistan does not recognise 
derivative proceedings. On the other hand, law governing derivative actions has 
received world-wide approval. This makes the situation worth exploring in the context 
of Pakistan. Various countries specific studies have been carried out to explore the role 
of the derivative suits to deter reckless behaviour of controlling managers. However, no 
study, in this regard, has been carried out that focusses solely on the subject of 
derivative proceedings in the context of Pakistan. This thesis aims at abridging this gap 
in the literature by examining the role of derivative litigation in promoting good 
corporate governance and vindicating the corporate rights. 
6.3 General Findings  
In this thesis, three main findings were made;  
(a) Self-serving behaviour of corporate management in Pakistan,  
In order to test the theoretical claims made by a number of researchers about 
widespread violations of corporate rights by the insiders, the case studies in chapter 4 
have shown that directors failed to discharge their duties in accordance with the law on 
four key aspects. First one relates to unauthorised inter-corporate financing and 
advancing of soft loans to associated companies. Second, shareholders were deprived of 
their right to participate in the affairs of the companies due to the reason that annual 
general meetings were not held. Third, directors misstated facts to shareholder and 
failed to provide material information to shareholders. Fourth, directors abused their 
powers in keeping parallel books of accounts and straightaway misappropriating 
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corporate assets for their personal gains. These case studies are, amongst many others 
which exemplify managerial misconducts in Pakistan that need to be disciplined 
through an adequate disciplinary tool. 
(b) Derivative litigation can, indeed and should play a role in reinforcing enforcement 
power of shareholders, 
Findings in Chapter 1 have shown that other legal and extra-legal managerial 
disciplinary mechanisms have their own limitations that underpin the use of derivative 
litigation to discipline management. After having examined the market-based 
disciplinary mechanisms such as the capital market and the market for corporate 
control, conclusion was reached that these mechanisms fall short of adequately 
disciplining management due to their inherent limitations. For example, the capital 
market works to discipline management on the basis of reflecting publically available 
information in share price. However, a number of financial frauds and empirical studies 
have shown that capital market in Pakistan does not reflect available information in 
share price and hence does not operate to discipline management efficiently. Similarly, 
the market for corporate control works in a limited range and suffers from various other 
flaws which render it an inadequate managerial disciplinary mechanism. 
Likewise, shareholders’ voting rights and the framework of non-executive directors are 
not free from problems. Shareholder voting is an insufficient type of self-enforcing 
mechanism due to the problems of shareholders’ rational apathy, collective action 
problems and information asymmetries. The effectiveness of NEDs as unbiased 
monitors and to control agency costs is also subject to criticism. Empirical evidence 
shows that the effectiveness of the NEDs suffers from the problem of their real 
independence, additional costs and insufficient business related knowledge, in the 
context of Pakistan.  
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Findings in chapter 3 have shown that the existing law enforcement mechanism under 
the Companies Ordinance is deficient and does not guarantee adequate protection to 
minorities. Four major problems were highlighted by the analysis of minority 
protection mechanism under the Companies Ordinance; 
 (1) lack of sufficient legal rights such as right to include resolutions in agenda of 
members’ meetings, voting rights, pre-emptive rights and right to dividends (2) 
inadequate enforcement right in the form of remedy against unfair prejudice,(3) non-
availability of derivative litigation and problems reflected with the Foss v Harbottle 
rule (4) litigation costs as the major disincentives to shareholders in taking actions 
against wrongdoers. In a business environment in which the threat to corporate interests 
is negligible, imperfect managerial disciplinary frameworks seem to be inconsequential. 
(c) It comes with no surprise that the derivative actions, if given full life, have a 
potential to prevent insiders(directors, controlling shareholders and other corporate 
officers) who are making the best of weaknesses of inadequate enforcement 
mechanisms in Pakistan, from taking self-serving decisions in corporations. The need 
for the statutory framework for derivative actions as identified in chapter 3 emerges 
from the problems reflected in the Foss v Harbottle rule, inadequacy of alternative 
remedies and the issue of legal costs combined together, hamper shareholders’ actions 
against wrongdoers in corporations. 
6.4 Theoretical implications  
The findings in this thesis should further our understanding of derivative proceedings 
and show how a functional derivative action framework contributes to strengthen 
enforcement power of shareholders. 
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This thesis contributes to the literature by putting forward reform proposals concerning 
statutory framework for derivative actions in Pakistan. As such, the original 
contribution that differentiates this thesis from other studies can be found mainly in 
three aspects. 
First, it provides an in-depth theoretical examination to enrich legal scholarship on 
derivative proceedings in Pakistan. Prior to this, there is no study in the context of 
Pakistan that solely determines the extent to which derivative litigation can serve as a 
tool to promote good corporate governance and prevent corporate rights from being 
infringed. This thesis examines legal and extra-legal managerial disciplinary 
mechanisms and concludes that they have limitations of their own and hence cannot be 
a substitute for derivative proceedings, at least, in the context of Pakistan. 
Second, based on arguments put forward in this thesis, on the original experiences of 
some other jurisdictions, particularly, those of the UK and on the insightful suggestions 
of the interviewees, guidelines and reforms in relation to the statutory framework for 
derivative action have been suggested for policy makers, legislators and practitioners in 
three main prospects. First, it clarifies the procedural route for derivative proceedings 
catering for standing rules of derivative claimants, actionable wrongs and assessment of 
derivative actions. Second, it suggests guidelines for an effective use of derivative 
litigation and prevention of abusive litigation. Third, it provides an alternative approach 
to funding problems that operate as disincentives to shareholders in derivative 
proceedings. It has been shown that the British indemnity costs orders approach would 
not provide adequate incentives to shareholders to step forward and take actions against 
wrongdoers. Basically, in Pakistan, the major problem relating to derivative litigation is 
in reference to incentivising shareholders. This thesis considers contingency fee 
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approach as the most suitable solution to the issue of disincentives to shareholders in 
taking derivative actions.  
Third, prior to this thesis, there is no qualitative empirical study so as to see how 
statutory derivative action system works effectively in the marketplace. Lack of legal 
material and references on derivative claims necessitate the inclusion of the opinion of 
domestic corporate lawyers and policy makers over the structure of statutory derivative 
action system. This is important in the context of Pakistan where legal material, 
derivative cases and accordingly case comments are not available, which are essential 
for the consolidation of substantive and procedural problems with derivative 
proceedings in Pakistan. This thesis also contributes to the legal scholarship on 
derivative actions in Pakistan by reflecting the viewpoint of interviewees regarding the 
law reform proposals made in this thesis. The insightful and illustrative suggestions of 
the interviewees significantly helped to provide more realistic solutions of enforcement 
problems and suggest a meaningful and functional derivative actions framework for 
Pakistan. 
6.5 Recommendation for future Research  
Following are the challenges and identified areas that need to be researched in future;  
(A): Although this thesis has provided theoretical underpinnings of derivative litigation 
and suggested the law reform proposals in respect of the derivation actions framework, 
yet, the efficacy of derivative litigation depends on the efficiency of a judicial system. 
In 2006 onwards, the turbulent- out burst of so-called judicial activism started from the 
hallmark agitation of Mr Iftikhar Chaudry- former chief justice of Pakistan who was 
illegally ousted from his office by the military dictator General Pervaiz Musharraf.  It 
was followed by glorious lawyers’ movement that significantly changed the things. The 
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judicial system earlier working without adequate facilities has now been equipped with 
latest technological facilities and further, a number of faculty enrichment measures, 
through judicial policy 2012, have been taken such as installation of judges’ training 
centres, recruitment of additional judges and liability-bound improvised overview 
mechanism. Moreover, under Pakistan Vision 2025 One nation, one Vision’ separate 
commercial courts, specialised commercial chambers in the existing courts and 
modernisation of corporate laws has been emphasised in order to achieve the optimal 
results of ensuring investor protection. However, still it needs to be researched in future 
to see the role of judiciary in the effective use of derivative litigation. 
(B): Institutional investors have a key role to play in promoting good governance in the 
investee companies. Due to their large shareholdings, the institutional investors may 
exert pressure on management to perform its duties in line with the best interest of the 
company. In contrast, the individual shareholders, due to their small shareholdings in 
the investee company, may not play such an emphatic role in order to influence the 
affairs of the company. In fact, institutional investors are the culprits of this apathy in 
Pakistan. The institutional investors in Pakistan have so far been rather passive to play 
their role in this regard. Institutional investors have a valuable role in improving good 
corporate governance and ensuring corporate accountability. Researchers must study 
the participatory role of institutional investors in improving the accessibility to 
derivative suits for safeguarding corporate rights. 
(C): The role of derivative litigation cannot be restricted to only preserving corporate 
assets and preventing management from expropriating minorities’ interests, it can also 
be utilized against acts of bribery, and violation of health and safety laws. The scope of 
derivative litigation in relation to corporate social responsibility issues such as 
violations of labour rights, anti-bribery, environmental and health and safety laws also 
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need to be studied in future. In this regard, Law and Economic research method could 
be employed by future researchers in order to study the impact of derivative 
proceedings upon economic growth and safeguarding all stakeholders’ interests in 
Pakistan. 
(D); Although this thesis argues that derivative litigation has a crucial role to play in 
fostering corporate accountability, however, litigation of any kind is never meant to be 
the most favourite choice to safeguard corporate interests. For instance, litigation 
involves costs issues and it may also damage the reputation of a business entity 
involved in legal proceedings. In this perspective, litigation is never meant to be a 
primary solution to disputes. Softer options to resolutions of disputes such as 
arbitration, mediation and negotiation (ADRs) should be encouraged before initiating 
legal proceedings. Therefore, researchers must study to find ways for encouraging the 
role of ADRs in resolving issues of shareholder protection in Pakistan, which would 
help reduce burden of litigations on courts and would encourage amicable settlement of 
disputes. 
6.6 Closing Remarks  
This study provides a comprehensive legal scholarship on the subject of derivative 
litigation which has received a world-wide acclaim. In particular, it provides a detailed 
overview; theoretical underpinnings and informed explanations of the law governing 
derivative litigation by explaining the principles operating behind derivative 
proceedings, and making it a valuable source of understanding  for legislators, policy 
makers and practitioners in Pakistan. It brings into use the principles operating behind 
derivative actions and suggests reform proposals as to developing a statutory 
framework for derivative actions in Pakistan. This study also included a comparative 
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perspective for looking at other jurisdictions to explain how derivative actions system 
might develop in Pakistan. It has provided a comprehensive assessment of reforms 
suggested to make better use of derivative proceedings by having insightful opinions of 
the interviewees. 
This study also endeavours to have a fundamental rethink of the objectives of derivative 
proceedings. Putting these objectives into a comprehensive framework for derivative 
actions, it argues that the actions needed to be taken at three different levels so as to 
inspire life into this managerial disciplinary tool;(1) conceptual i.e a meaningful and 
functional derivative actions framework;(2) strategic, i.e provision of adequate 
incentives to shareholders so as to advance objectives underlying derivative 
proceedings ;(3) doctrinal, i.e clarifying the procedural route for taking derivative 
actions thus, maintaining the exclusiveness of this remedy for the realisation of its 
valuable objectives in preserving corporate assets. 
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Appendix 4: Interview transcript 
Interviewee, B  
Time of Interview: 48 minutes  
Date: 23 September, 2016 
Position: a senior corporate lawyer cum company law teacher.             
Asslam-o-Alaikum, 
Yeah, Wa-Alaikum Asslam, who you speaking? 
Question. Sir, I am Aamir Abbas. I have learnt you are senior corporate lawyer, having 
long served as senior public prosecutor and District Attorney, in Public Sector and 
currently teaching Company Law at Various Universities in Pakistan. 
Answer. Yeah, it is. 
Question. Will you kindly like to share your illustrious views on some questions, i have 
in my mind. These questions emerge from the reform proposals I have made for 
reforming company law in respect of a functional statutory derivative action system in 
Pakistan? 
Answer. Yeah, why not? It is my pleasure. But what is it needed for? It has many 
angles to explore. Have you any selective questions or you want general discussion? 
Question. Sir, I have some selective questions. In fact, as i have explained in the 
consent form that I have to submit my PHD thesis shortly and I intend the reform 
proposals made in my PhD regarding the statutory framework for derivative actions 
should be well-informed and comprehensive. 
Answer. Okay! Go ahead. 
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Question. Sir, Is there an effective legal mechanism for the enforcement of minority 
rights in the company law in Pakistan? What’s your personal opinion? 
Answer. Although express remedial measures are there in the statute, yet, by no means, 
adequate. We can safely say there is no effective legal mechanism in Pakistan for 
guarding against minority rights subversion. 
Question. Sir, I fail to understand. When you say express provisions are available in 
statute, then why and how these can fail to address this problem? 
Answer. My answer cannot be speaking without making reference to certain provisions 
of law on the subject, section 290 of the companies ordinance 1984, according to the 
Ordinance, confers rights on shareholder to start legal proceedings against unfair acts of 
the directors but that is just conditional. They can exercise this right provided they have 
20 per cent votes in the company. It means that if their votes are less than 20 per cent, 
they have no right to bring actions against offenders. It can be safely inferred from this 
that up till minorities remain minorities in real sense, that is to say, below 20 per cent 
threshold, they are deprived of voting right However, when they cross the stipulated 
line, only then they reach the stage of enjoying this enforcement right. The question is 
when 20 per cent limit is crossed how they can be termed as minorities. Evidently they 
step into majority category and rank in to majority shareholders. In this way, the real 
minors remain the sufferers at the end of day. Am I clear on the point? 
Answer. Yeah, very clear no ambiguity left but is it the only remedy, though 
inadequate, provided in the statute? 
Answer. The statute provides another remedy under section 305 of the Companies 
Ordinance and that is winding up of a company. Perhaps it is cosmetically provided in 
the law as literally it is no remedy at all. In fact winding up of a company is highly 
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drastic step in ordinary conditions. Such an extreme and extraordinary step is neither a 
favourite choice nor feasible ordinarily. It is obliged to many panicky factors and is 
possible only when structure of a company becomes entirely shabby and unable to stay 
on its feet. Simple question is who would go for winding up a company, otherwise 
healthy, simply on the complaint of a minor or minor segment of the company? Is it 
sufficient? 
Question. Of course, but is it all about it? 
Answer. Okay! There are other usual remedies like Securities and Exchange 
Commission to take action against offenders; but these also have their own limitations, 
bottlenecks and repercussions. Probably you might know that all. Major problem to me, 
is the political control of this Securities and Exchange Commission of Pakistan which 
halts the functioning of this body independently.  
Do you need any elaboration? 
Question. Sir, I need not any explanation on the point I am fully cognizant but I have 
other questions. 
Answer. Welcome! 
Question. Sir, in your valued opinion, can derivative litigation ensure effective 
managerial accountability mechanism in Pakistan? Is there any need for statutory 
framework for derivative actions in Pakistan? 
Answer. Yeah, there is no second opinion that derivative actions are inevitable in 
Pakistan. It is mostly for two reasons. First, public enforcement has quite inadequate 
operational capacity. Government launched institutions have limited resources and 
resultant limited employees strength and related facilities. So, these are unable to cater 
to the wide-spread requirements. So, definitely, there should be a fool proof alternative 
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system capable of taking notice of each and every wrong coming to light and no rogue 
element should be allowed to escape simply due to insufficient accountability 
mechanism. 
Second, if a company is in control of managerial lobby and is itself at fault or involved 
in malpractices,  then obviously no action by the management against themselves can 
be imagined. So, a shareholder should be adequately equipped with necessary 
armament to move for action on behalf of the company against the management 
breaching their fiduciary duties. 
Are you satisfied? 
Sir, I am fully satisfied, but my linked question remains as to whether statutory law in 
line with common rules on derivative actions should be relied? and if so why and how? 
Can you explain? 
Answer. I believe both the statutory enactments and common law rules should work in 
tandem. 
Question. Will you please justify this duality?  
Would it not create confusion or overlapping? 
Answer. No not at all. A statute is an independent express provision of law, mandatory 
to be followed. Company law is a special enactment and any special enactment or law 
not only over rules unwritten rules of law like those of common law but also even 
codified general laws, whatsoever. It has overriding effect, hence creates no confusion 
or overlapping. Common law lays down guiding principles and comes into play only 
when a codification is exhausted or silent on a point .common law is based on common 
sense which appeals to folk mentality but cannot be substitute of codified law. This is 
why in the UK unwritten common law was utilized over centuries till necessity of 
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codification was left and the bill of Magna Charta came into light, perhaps as the first 
instances. For example, statute does not expressly provide for the order or sequence in 
which witness are to be examined to court. In such situations, common law formula, 
“first come first served” may be applied. A witness first in attendance is preferred to be 
examined leaving the others for later occasions. Stretching it further, importance of a 
witness or uncertainty about his availability on the next date is also given weigh. 
Is it clear now? 
Question; to some extent but it is not clear how common law rules can complement 
codified law? 
Answer. It is so simple. Do you know principle of “Caveat Emptor”? 
Question; to some extent I think it means “Buyer should be alert”. 
Answer. Yeah, of course now let’s see if it is provided in any statute? To my 
knowledge, nowhere. It is under common law principle that a buyer while buying a 
property should first make sure that it is free from all encumbrances, to avoid future 
controversies. 
Similarly, a statute simply provides for maximum punishment which is seldom awarded 
in ordinary crimes. Under common sense, it is the degree of the gravity of offensive act 
which decides the issue of quantum of punishment. I may further add, for example, that 
statute does not provide for the number of questions to be put during cross-
examination. 
Do you know that? 
Yeah, I do. 
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Okay! Under common law principle “Brevity is the soul of wits” the questions and 
answers during cross-examination are weighed and not numbered. Under law there is 
no limit to questions but common sense demands there should be an end. A ‘reasonable 
time’ is to be allowed as of law but beyond that, a judge may stop the questions. This 
“reasonable time” is issue of common law and not of codified law. That is left to the 
direction of a judge as judges’ discretionary powers also owe their moral strength to 
common law rules. I may add in this context that sometimes common law rules are so 
demanding that they are formulized into codification. For example, the common law 
rule ”Nemo Debit Bis Vexari” that is “a person should not be harassed twice” has been 
codified under section 403 Criminal Procedure Code of Pakistan and Article 13 of the 
constitution of Islamic Republic of Pakistan,1973, where it is provided that a person 
once tried cannot be tried again on the same facts in issue. Similarly, “Res judicata” in 
civil jurisdiction has also been codified under section 11 Civil Procedure Code of 
Pakistan, meaning that a case finally and conclusively decided cannot be tried again. 
Thus, I suggest derivative actions are necessary to be included in the law in order to 
enhance shareholder activism. However, I do not recommend to discard common law 
rules on derivative actions altogether, those are necessary because at times a codified 
law does not cover all conditions , in that case, the common laws rules can be examined 
and invoked to cover those problems. 
Q. Sir, so far discussed, I am fully satisfied but I have further a few questions, if you do 
not mind? 
Answer. Oh! Welcome, no problem. 
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Q. Sir what is your personal opinion?  If contemporary stock ownership and continuous 
ownership are necessary elements in relation to standing rules in derivative 
proceedings?  
Answer. Yeah, it is. As regards contemporaneous ownership, it is necessary and should 
be duly considered for its application in Pakistan. Logic is very simple to this turn, a 
gentleman having no stakes at time when the wrong was committed, has not rights to 
initiate legal proceedings. This is a basic civil law principle as you might know, that 
personal entailing no interest in the litigation has no right to initiate litigation except for 
the interpleader suit. Interpleader suit concept, you would be knowing it, litigation is 
started to determine the rightful owner of the subject matter.  However; one thing I 
want to make it clear to you that due consideration should be given to the situation 
where after acquiring shareholders purchase shares without having the acquaintance of 
an alleged wrong in the company. As regards continuous ownership, it is also necessary 
because a person who has quitted the company cannot be relied to be serious in 
rigorously pursuing a case. A leaving-shareholder should be disentitled to pursue the 
litigation because he may withdraw from the litigation for receiving kick-backs or any 
other gratification from the errant directors.  
Question; Based on your opinion are adequate representation of companies’ interest and 
so-called double derivative actions necessary elements in relation to standing rules in 
derivative actions? 
Answer. Yeah, of course. Court should make sure that a claimant is adequately 
representing the company’ interest. My opinion regarding this requirement is obviously 
clear, you should not allow an abortive attempt to enforce corporate rights, it must be 
meticulously met that shareholders adequately representing not only the company but 
also the interests of all other shareholders in the company.  Indeed, this rule needs to be 
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enforced in Pakistan. Likewise, the rule of double derivative action is also very 
important needed to be introduced in Pakistan. The shareholders of a parent company 
should be allowed to move for action against the wrongdoers in subsidiaries because 
Companies in Pakistan are mostly affiliated with each other; therefore for litigation 
purposes, the rights of all the affiliated companies should be taken care of. 
Do you follow? 
Yeah, I do. My next question, please. 
Question; In regard to assessment of leave application for a derivative action, which 
forum, whether court or board of directors would be more appropriate to see prima 
facie feasibility of derivate proceedings? 
Ans. An independent forum like court is decidedly better forum to decide the issue of 
granting or otherwise the leave application for these proceedings. Evidently, a directive 
action is mostly required to be initiated against wrong doing directors of the board of 
directors being in dominating position to do whatever they like. If they are tasked with 
crucial issue of deciding upon the feasibility of derivative proceedings, they can hardly 
be expected to go against their business kinship. In fact, impartial and unbiased forum 
is required and not the persons who are themselves the subject matter of the proposed 
proceedings. There is no ambiguity in my mind, courts are the appropriate forum, 
derivative actions are initiated for enforcing the duties of directors. It is by no means 
justified to allow directors to decide upon their illegal activities. Further, I would add to 
your question of court approach that on the scope of cause of action in derivative 
litigation other parties wrongfully benefiting from directorial manoeuvrings should also 
be held accountable via this litigation because board of directors might avoid 
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proceedings other parties associated with controlling managers or with any of the board 
members. 
Next question if any? 
Yeah, I still have another question. 
 Okay, carry on. 
Q. In your valuable opinion, how potential shareholders can be incentivized to bring 
suits against wrong doers? In this context, if contingency fee arrangement has any role 
to play in Pakistan? If so, why and how? 
Ans. Yeah, contingency fee arrangement can be a valuable choice to encourage 
shareholders to take action against wrong-doers because this is based on the concept of 
no win, no fees. This would mean that shareholders will not bear risk of losing their 
money spent in the course of litigation. With no fear having in mind, shareholders, 
creditors and even employees would be encouraged to come forward and take on the 
fraudsters”. Similarly, indemnity costs is also one of the options to address this issue. 
However, I am of the view, that although these may be conducive to some extent yet 
would not promise something conspicuously additional to incentivize shareholder 
claimants.  
Now it is to be seen if it stands out while juxtaposed with some other solutions, say 
indemnity costs order. In indemnity costs the litigant claimant is hardly repaid whatever 
he actually incurred. Indemnity in a successful suit does not include miscellaneous 
expenditure involved in counsels’ meetings facilitating witnesses, transport expenses, 
documentation etc and at the end of the day the litigant finds himself standing where he 
was after off-setting his miscellaneous litigation expenses against whatever he receives 
as indemnity costs. So in my opinion it is not an ideal and efficacious solution as it does 
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not promise any net benefits substantially accruing to the litigant. As against it, in 
contingency fee arrangement the litigant shareholder has neither to pay anything prior 
to or subsequent to the conclusion of a suit. 
 In this arrangement, a lawyer takes upon himself to advance the suit without receiving 
his professional fee under an agreement that he would be entitled to a specified share of 
a successful suit proceeds. So as result of a successful suit, the litigant shareholder 
receives his proportionate share of suit proceeds whereas in case of losing the case at 
least he suffers nothing as he had neither paid any fee to the counsel nor suffered any 
charges incidental to case proceedings. So, the concept of contingency fee arrangement 
is based on the rationale that there is a chance to get but no chance to lose. 
 
Do you get the point? 
Yeah, perfectly 
Okay, now its suitability in the scenario of Pakistan may be evaluated in view of 
attending conditions. You know, litigation, in Pakistan is drawn over years together. 
This cumbersome process involves not only lot of roughs and rigors of the trial but also 
considerably high budget of expenditure say counsel’s fee, transportation, witnesses 
catering preparation of records so on and so forth. On the other hand, there happens to 
be an overwhelming uncertainty about concrete positive results. Rather there is all 
probability of losing because of exercise of influence by the influential management. In 
such a situation a shareholder even if substantially wronged would think hundred times 
to go for proceedings which not only fail to compensate the untold agony suffered by 
him over a considerable span of time but also do not ensure, even in a successful suit, at 
least the recovery of whatever expenses actually borne during proceedings. This is 
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primarily responsible for generating general apathy in wronged shareholders who 
keeping in view uncertainties, strife and struggle and incidental charges would mostly 
prefer to ignore the wrongs and excesses done to them. In this scenario, a mechanism 
like contingency fee arrangement may be high degree suitable for Pakistan as it nothing 
claims from you prematurely and leaves you tension free as the lawyer takes the 
responsibility of fighting the case through and through against settled share of suit 
proceeds agreed upon. So in this backdrop of the matter contingency fee arrangement 
may be a blessing in guise and I would not be lagging behind in recommending it for 
Pakistan. 
Is it clear? 
Perfectly, I am really grateful. 
Is that all now or anything left? 
Sir I am fully satisfied. I thank you from the core of my heart for sparing your valuable 
time. 
Thank you. I wish you best of luck. 
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Appendix 5: Interview Responses 
The purpose of interviews is to gather information from participants by eliciting their 
views on reform proposals made in this thesis; how derivative action system be 
improved to get better results.  
 
 Question. 1 Based on your opinion, is there an effective enforcement 
power in the hands of shareholders to enforce corporate rights in 
Pakistan?  
A ’There is minority protection remedy under section 290 of the 
Companies ordinance , but the problem with this remedy is that it is 
available only to shareholders holding more than 20 per cent shares . 
This means that real minority shareholders have no legal remedy except 
to apply for winding up remedy which is readily available. However, 
courts hesitate to offer this remedy because they refer first avail other 
available remedies ’’  
B ‘’There is Wind Up Remedy for shareholders, if shareholders are 
unfairly prejudiced by the management, they can apply for winding up 
remedy provided under section 305 of the companies Ordinance’ 
Second, remedy provided under section of 290 of the statute is 
inadequate because it requires conditions to seek this remedy only if you 
have 20 per cent shares in the company.’’ 
C Remedy is there under 290 section of the ordinance but in my 22 years 
of corporate law practice, I could not redress a single client of mine 
through this section, major hurdle of this remedy is high percentage of 
shareholding to avail this remedy , it requires 20 per cent shareholding’’.  
D ‘‘Enforcement rights for minority shareholders should be strengthened 
because the existing enforcement mechanism is weak that in fact 
protects weak majority shareholders but not to the small investors in the 
real sense because the small investors shareholders are individual 
aggrieved shareholders who need protection against wrongful acts of 
majority shareholders’’. 
E No! there are many shortcomings in enforcement mechanisms of 
corporate rights. As  the Companies Ordinance provides cumulative 
voting system but due to the reason minority are disorganised they fail to 
select director on the board who could protect their rights‘’  Government 
is planning to improve minority protection by making amendments in 
the law’’ 
F ‘’There is remedy available to minority shareholders under section 290 
of the companies ordinance but minority rarely avail this remedy ’’ 
reason might be procedural complexities ‘’SECP has established a task 
force to suggest reforms to improve minority protection’’. 
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G ‘’Small investors are the neglected part of companies in Pakistan and 
they are most often mistreated at the hands of controlling shareholders 
and directors’’  
H ‘‘Companies do not have any written policy for minority shareholders, 
and there is no sufficient protection for shareholders in the Code of 
Corporate governance’’ for the protection of  minority shareholders, the 
representation of independent directors should be increased, Independent 
directors should trained and their presence on the board of directors 
should be doubled’’. 
 
 
 Question. 2 In your opinion, can derivative litigation be an effective 
managerial accountability mechanism in Pakistan?  Is there a need 
for statutory framework for derivative actions in Pakistan’’. 
A ‘‘Derivative actions can be a good enforcement right in the hands of 
shareholders. Shareholders do not take derivative actions in Pakistan and 
the reason is very simple that they are not available in the company law. 
in my opinion,  this right of action should be provided in the law as this 
right is available to shareholders in many jurisdictions’’.  
B ‘‘Derivative actions are necessary to be included in the law in order to 
enhance shareholder activism , However, I do not recommend to discard 
common law rules on derivative actions altogether, those are necessary 
because sometimes a codified law does not cover all conditions , in that 
case, the common laws rules can be examined and employed to cover 
those condition’’.  
C ‘‘It is an important enforcement tool, I expect from legislators to 
consider to make amendment in the company law to accommodate 
derivative actions’’   I am not well-versed in common law rules on 
derivative actions’’ But I can say that common law is cases based law 
and courts in Pakistan generally are reluctant to apply old case based 
laws due to the reason that it might be against the public policy or 
against the constitutional provisions ’’. 
D Derivative litigation is a cost effective remedy as oppose to remedy 
provided under section 290 of the companies ordinance. This remedy is 
attractive because the legal costs incurred on the litigation is paid by the 
company in derivative actions, this would end of the day encourage 
investors to call culprits to account’’.  
E Yes!  in my opinion this is an important remedy, I think Pakistan is one 
of the few countries where derivative actions are not available. The 
government of Pakistan in this regard has assigned the task of The 
Corporate Law commission review to suggest reforms in the company 
law. The commission has recommended for statutory derivative action 
system which has not yet been finalised’’.  
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F ‘‘My opinion is that derivative actions are important in Pakistan 
because, private sector enforcement should be encouraged. I do not 
know common law position on this litigation but in a sense it provides 
evidence that common law position is not helpful for shareholders’’. 
Second, I recommend public enforcement agencies such as SECP and 
FIA and NAB should be strengthened to play their role in punishing and 
preventing misdoings in companies by the management.’’ 
G ‘’Shareholders enforcement power is weak in Pakistan, small investors  
prefer selling their shares instead of taking actions, if derivative actions 
like in the UK are provided in the company , it would help them to take 
on fraudsters.’’  Reason is that the company is to pay the costs this will 
encourage shareholders to take steps against wrongdoers.’’ 
H ‘‘My view on derivative actions is clear, it needs to be there in the 
company law but with proper safeguards, shareholders can exploit this 
power against the management of company.  It would be because they 
do not pay litigation costs, therefore, they might be they use derivative 
actions improperly.’’ 
 
 
 Question.3 based on your opinion, Contemporaneous Stock 
ownership and Continuous ownership are necessary elements 
relating to standing rules in derivative proceedings? 
A Yes’’ 
“Shareholders should be the stockholder at the time when wrong was 
committed if they want to bring actions against the offenders who has 
wronged the company‘’  
---------- 
Second, “Shareholder who has quitted the company, principally he has 
no right to continue the suit, obvious reason is that he has no financial 
stake in the company, this shows he does not intend to pursue the case 
rigorously.” 
B Yes, I think , it is important requirement but in my opinion 
’due consideration should be given to the situations where after-
acquiring shareholders purchase shares without having the knowledge of 
an alleged fiduciary wrong in a company’’ 
------------ 
Second, “A leaving shareholders should be disentitled to pursue the 
litigation because he may withdraw from the litigation for receiving 
kick-backs or any other gratification from the errant directors’’  
 
C “This is American Standing rule, shareholders who was not shareholder 
at the time of the commission of the offence is not entitled to take 
derivative action, I think, it should be in Pakistan to stop baseless and 
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vexatious litigation against the managements of the companies”.  
----------- 
Second, “This is also US standing rule in derivative actions, shareholder 
who has sold his shares in the company, then how can he be diligently 
pursuing the case while he himself is not part of the company, so I 
recommend this requirement should be adopted in Pakistan”. 
D “Contemporary ownership should be necessary for taking derivative 
action , otherwise  anyone can buy a share of the company and start 
litigation against the company which is not good for the company itself 
and for its management to perform their duties properly’’ 
--------- 
“Somebody who start litigation and meanwhile leaves the company 
cannot be trusted to rigorously pursuing the litigation; therefore he 
should not be allowed to pursue the suit”. 
E “Yes I agree with the stock requirement to start derivative litigation for 
stopping unnecessary litigation”. 
--------- 
“I favour this requirement also, basically current stake or financial 
benefit must be there in the company, so that the shareholder will 
consciously pursue the case”. 
F “I think it should be cleared that if somebody buys shares, and he is not 
disclosed the wrong ,  he comes to know the wrong after buying the 
wrong , then he should be allowed to take derivative action against 
management”.  
--------- 
Second, “Somebody who left the company, it means he has no interest in 
the company, there is no logic to allow him to continue the suit.”  
G “Contemporaneous ownership is necessary in my opinion because 
somebody buys shares knowing the current status of the company and 
secondly his interest in the company has not been violated therefore, he 
has no legal right to take action”. 
----------- 
“I do not agree with this proposal because. For example shareholder 
starts litigation, later he is ousted from due to mergers then this will be 
unfair with the shareholder to stop him from litigation”.  
H “It is good standing rule, it clears the situation about the rightful 
claimants in derivative actions as otherwise it will be confusion that 
somebody coming in the company later than the commission of the 
offence is entitled to take action or not I recommend he should not be 
entitled to take derivative action because his rights direct or indirect has 
not been violated”. 
---------- 
“Continuous ownership requirement is not justified in my view because 
  367 
 
anybody who brings action against the management and later before the 
case is finalised, he loses his shareholding in the company due to 
mergers then it would unjustified for that litigant”. 
 
 
 Question. 4 Based on your opinion, adequate representation of 
companies’ interests and the so-called double derivative actions are 
necessary elements relating to standing rules in derivative actions?  
A “It should be part of locus standi rules on derivative actions , one should 
understand that derivative actions is representative litigation and if the 
company is not adequately represented then the purpose of this litigation 
will not be met’’ 
------------= 
“Upon your explanation about the concept of double derivative action, I 
totally agree to allow shareholders of a parent company to bring suit 
against other affiliated companies because there is groups of company, 
almost all listed companies have their subsidiaries, so the management 
of the holding company may commit wrong in the subsidiary company 
therefore, shareholder of the holding company should be allowed to 
bring actions against the offenders”. 
B My opinion regarding this requirement is obviously clear, you should 
not allow an abortive attempt to enforce corporate rights, it must be 
meticulously met that shareholders adequately representing not only the 
company but also the interests of all other shareholders in the 
company’’. 
------------ 
Yes! to me this is equally important to incorporate double derivative 
actions, because Companies in Pakistan are mostly affiliated with each 
other; therefore in litigation, they should be taken as single corporate 
entity’’.  
C ‘’Yes I favour this requirement because ultimately if company interests 
are not adequately represented, then derivative actions are of no use’’. 
------------ 
“I do not know very well about this concept but as it appears , it should 
be considered bearing in mind the affiliated companies structures which 
are connected with each , it means harm to one company would be to all 
affiliated companies, therefore shareholders of flagship company should 
be allowed to take actions against culprits who have done wrong in the 
subsidiary companies”. 
D “Very much support your view about this requirement’’. 
Because normally companies have their own legal counsels,   
these counsels may strike under carpet deals and compromise derivative 
proceedings as they are obliged to mostly act in the interest of the 
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company managers being their nominees and selectees and thus 
vulnerable to sacking if they proceed and perform to their displeasure.” 
 
“I also suggested that not only shareholders but employees of the 
companies should also be allowed to take derivative actions. because 
shareholders sometimes lack sufficient knowledge of a wrong due to 
informational asymmetries. Thus the employees of the company, as 
being insiders, are expected to be more conversant with the managerial 
wrongdoings than the shareholders”. 
E “I support your proposal on this point because without adequate 
representation, all the shareholders would be sufferer, if you taking the 
lead to correct the wrong, you should do it in an effective way.’’ 
---------- 
“This is new to me, however, the way you explained its purpose, it agree 
and support this suggestion.” 
F “My view is that while assessing derivative application, it should be 
ensured that the claimants are representing the companies’ interests 
adequately and permit only those suits to continue which advance the 
companies’ interests vigorously”. 
--------- 
“Managers or directors of parent companies may choose one or more 
their subsidiaries to commit wrongs and can push shareholders of the 
parent companies to suffer indirectly through suffering of subsidiaries, I 
support double derivative actions to hold wrongdoers in subsidiaries, 
accountable.”   
G “It should be imperative, because resources should not be wasted on 
weak and inadequately initiated litigation which would not bring benefit 
to the company whose assets were expropriated”.  
--------- 
 “Derivative action is to put check on managers and stop them from 
doing frauds, therefore, in affiliated companies situation , double 
derivative actions rule will of particular importance.” 
H “Proper representation of the company and for the interests of other 
shareholders must be ensured, without which the wrong against the 
company will not be rectified properly”. 
--------- 
“I confirm your suggestion about double derivative suits, because both 
the holding and other affiliated companies are inseparable’’, wrong in 
one company would leave impact on other associated companies”.   
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 Question.5   In regard to assessment of leave application for a 
derivative action, which forum, whether court or board of directors 
would be more appropriate to see prima facie feasibility of derivate 
proceedings? 
A “Court is the proper forum to assess the merit of the application for 
derivation litigation’’ it will be useful for courts to further enquire into 
the issues of case as already established by it at first stage of assessing 
the application for derivative actions”. 
B Yes! “I am very clear, no ambiguity in my mind, courts are the 
appropriate forum, derivative actions are initiated for enforcing the 
duties of directors. it is by no means justified to allow directors to decide 
upon their illegal activities” 
C “When final hearing is to be tried at courts, then application for 
assessing the merit of the application for derivative should also be made 
to courts, it would help court to understand the background of the 
litigation and so it would be merit-based assessment”. 
D “I would support court approach, board might be an effective forum to 
assess application for derivative litigation in the US, but I do not support 
in Pakistan where board of directors of business entities are under 
control of governments or in private companies, under the majority 
shareholders”. 
E “Judicial Approach is my suggestion, because board of directors 
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 Question .6 In your valuable opinion, how potential shareholders 
can be incentivized to bring suits against wrongdoers? In this 
context, if contingency fee arrangement has any role to play in 
Pakistan? If so, why and how? 
involves issues of independence , if independence of board body is 
ensured then it might be fine but in Pakistan , this is very difficult that 
board of directors would take decision independent  from the influence 
of majority shareholders”. 
F ‘‘Although courts have problems but from available options, courts 
would be appropriate to decide the application for litigation against the 
illegal act of the insiders.’’  
G In my view, “Instead of leaving this area to judicial scrutiny, 
shareholders, in members’ general meetings, may be tasked with 
deciding as to whether to turn down or grant leave for derivative actions.  
‘‘shareholders, as being residual claimants, should have authority to 
decide upon litigation affecting their rights’’  
H “With regard to the assessment of derivative actions impartial arbitrators 
should be appointed for assessment of derivative actions.”  
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A “Contingency fees is recognised by the laws of various countries  and it 
can provide a good incentive for shareholders to sue the culprits in 
corporations’ 
The reason in my view is that it is to support aggrieved party who has no 
resources to litigate and due to lack of resources, the offender would not 
be punished”.   
B Yes, “contingency fee is effective solution to incentivise shareholders, 
because this is based on the concept of no win, no fees. this would mean 
that shareholders will not bear risk of losing their money spent in the 
course of litigation. With no fear having in mind, shareholders, creditors 
and even employees would be encouraged to come forward and take on 
the fraudsters”.  
C Shareholders can be attracted to sue people alleged for wrongful acts 
through allowing contingency fees.  Moreover, if law ensures full 
indemnification of shareholders for the legal costs they spend on 
litigation, it be  promote corporate accountability’’  
D ‘’Under contingency fees approach, lawyers may protract legal 
proceedings to enhance their fees which would negatively affect the 
suits and it would be unfair to company pay these unnecessary fees of 
lawyers.’’ ’shareholders can be incentivised to take derivative actions if 
a reasonable percentage of proceeds of derivative actions are shared with 
them instead of paying full recovery flowing from successful suits to the 
companies’’  
  372 
 
E Excused to answer ; “Not well aware of the benefits and disadvantages 
of contingency fees concept “ 
F “Contingency fee is a strong incentive save it is not misused because 
when shareholders know that nothing will go out of their pocket, they 
will tend to bring frivolous cases. This concern must be considered, if 
proper safeguards are there , then this can provide a strong incentive” 
G “The US is a good example of contingent fees and third party funding, 
where these concept are helpful to ameliorate aggrieved parties to 
litigation who have no adequate resources to fight his case”.   
H “If an aggrieved party has no resources to enforce his/her rights, then 
public enforcement agency should be accessed but otherwise 
contingency can be an alternative to the public enforcement agencies”.  
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